Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in the Netherlands

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FACIT - Faith-based Organisations and social exclusion in European Cities
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Mistakes of any kind in this report are the responsibility of the authors. The field of FBOs and social exclusion in the Netherlands is a dynamic one. Activities, organisations and names change quickly. Therefore, it is possible that some information (collected since 2008) has become outdated in the mean time. Since this is not the final publication on this subject, the authors welcome remarks and comments on the report. MDavelaar@verwey-jonker.nl.
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Introduction

Claims are increasingly made these days within academic, political and media circles about the possibilities of religions and faiths in general and faith-based organisations (FBOs) in particular for tackling social issues. Around the same time as the appearance of Charles Taylor’s (2007) magnum opus, *A Secular Age*, the online journal *Eurozine* published a series of articles, including contributions by Jürgen Habermas, José Casanova and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, on European post secularism¹ and *The Economist* published a special report devoted to religion and public life across the globe.² Combined with recent governments in the US and the UK revalorizing FBOs in matters of social policy, urban regeneration and social cohesion in state-regulated urban policies, the European public sphere is dense with unresolved questions about the ways religion and faiths are imbricated in the social and political concerns of the day. What is, for example, the position of FBOs in combating poverty and other forms of social distress in cities? How has this role changed over time and how do these activities contribute to combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion? And: what are the implications for policies and the governance of European cities? From both scientific and policy perspectives, there is a great need for better empirical and comparative data on what is going on in European cities in matters of poverty and exclusion policies and, in particular, the contribution of FBOs in the reduction (or deepening) of the problems. FBOs have direct entrance to the ‘poor side’ of cities because of (1) their activities in deprived urban neighbourhoods and among excluded groups and (2) as in the case of many FBOs with a non-western background, because their members often belong to these deprived and excluded groups themselves.

The European research project FACIT on Faith-based organisations (FBOs) and social exclusion in Cities addressed these question about the changing and present role of FBOs in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion (such as social isolation, homelessness or undocumented persons) in 21 cities across 7 countries. Participating countries are: Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, UK, Turkey, Spain and Sweden.

This report provides an integrated overview of the Dutch case-studies conducted within this project exploring faith-based activities in Tilburg, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. It also contains elements of the national context report on Faith-based organisations and social exclusion (Davelaar et al. 2009) published in a volume of seven national context reports (Dierckx et al, eds. 2009).

Whereas that report concentrated on presenting a state of the art of national FBO activity in combating social exclusion in the Netherlands, this report offers deeper insight on FBOs operating at the local level in the framework of the national context. The data from the case studies provides valuable information on more than 60 FBOs in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg. This report is based primarily on this data in conjunction with the earlier national mapping of FBOs, including interviews of 20 FBOs present at the national level.

**Background of the FACIT project**

This research has involved national and urban level fieldwork in the seven countries based on interviews and desk-research and includes an innovative cross-evaluation methodology.

The cause for this European project is situated in the following developments:

- The consolidation of situations of poverty and social exclusion in society and the importance social organisations and authorities attach to combating this.
- The relative ignorance of a lot of social activities of FBOs.
- The enduring role of religion in the public domain.
- An increasing appeal on civil society; volunteering and private initiatives in combating social exclusion, enhancing social cohesion and strengthening social capital of individuals and groups (and between groups).
- The need for clarification about the changing role of the government in the welfare state; the central assumption is that FBOs tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state in several domains of public life, particularly in social welfare and in social protection.

The four specific objectives of the FACIT project are: (1) to assess the significance of FBOs from a variety of faiths in the policy and practice of urban social policies in general, combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion in particular; (2) to assess the institutional and political conditions under which FBOs have become increasingly present in urban social policies; (3) the extent to which FBOs have been informed and are operating in a context of a shadow state formed by the retrenchment of welfare states; and (4) to assess the relations that FBOs have developed, formally and informally, with other NGOs and with national and local public authorities.

These objectives lead to the following research questions:

1. What social services do FBOs provide and how can they be positioned within (or outside) the changing Dutch welfare state?
2. What is the social and religious geography of the cities we investigated and what are the geographies of FBOs in these cities?
3. What is the (changing) role of faith in (the social activities of) FBOs?
4. What relations do FBOs develop with other FBOs and NGOs, and why?
5. What relationship do FBOs develop with local government, and why?
6. What are the main future challenges and threats for FBO action in cities?

**Definitions**

**Faith-based organisations**

In this report we argue that there are essential nuances of conceptualization and definition in the analysis of FBOs that require sensitivity at the outset, namely inherent diversities between denomi-
nations, types and remits of FBOs, subtleties in understanding how scale issues influence the way the urban context in wider city-regional frameworks impacts on FBOs and social issues and the heuristic value of ideal-type abstractions while recognizing complexities within any typology and timeframe. Herewith, it is important to note that FBOs are not just churches or other official religious institutions per se, but frequently also para-religious associations that exist as independent legal entities. These can be larger or smaller organisations, closely aligned to mosques or churches or operating in a ‘stand alone’ modus. These roles typically refer to a combination of direct action approaches based on community development, social facilities and service provision, on the one hand, and lobbying/ political participation activities on the other.

We expect that FBOs are likely to engage in a combination or hybrid of these roles. It is important to distinguish between faith generally and FBOs in particular. By faith we typically refer to beliefs and ideas that are unsupported by rational and/ or empirical evidence and are reserved for concepts of religion, spirituality and belief in a transcendent reality (see Harris 2004). Defining an FBO is a contentious issue and as Clarke (2006) notes in the frame of international development, FBOs are a complex set of actors that remain inadequately understood. There are, for examples differences between more traditional and evangelistic FBOs and between FBOs strictly working for their own community and FBOs as umbrella organisations for faith-motivated and secular people within a post secular context.

It is vital to differentiate in this way and stress the inherent political and ideological variety of FBOs so that our research can avoid misrepresentation as a legitimizing and constitutive element of what Jamie Peck (2006) calls the ‘New Urban Right’. Rather, the aim is to couch the rich diversity of FBOs in cities as simultaneously part and parcel of neoliberal cities and inherent sites of resistance and contestation (cf. Ramsay 1998; May et al 2005). We pay also attention to FBOs as providers of basic, emergency social services but also as the basis for political action and the enhancement of democracy.

The definition of an FBO we favour is:

any organisation that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values, and that functions as a welfare provider and/or as a political actor.

While there are other possible definitions our approach is sufficiently broad to contribute to contemporary research on FBOs and to help sharpen new definitions and understandings in the European context. Writing from an explicitly US perspective, Cnaan et al (1999) point to six categories of religious service organizations: (1) local congregations (or houses of worship); (2) interfaith agencies and ecumenical coalitions; (3) citywide or region-wide sectarian agencies; (4) national projects and organizations under religious auspices (5) para-denominational advocacy and relief organizations; and (6) religiously affiliated international organizations. Similarly in the US, for Wuthnow (2000): “[A] t a minimum, FBOs must be connected with an organized faith community. These connections occur when an FBO is based on a particular religious ideology and draws staff, volunteers, or leadership from a particular religious group. Other characteristics that qualify an organization as ‘faith-based’

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3 One might be compelled to ask about reasons for researching the faith basis of individual and organisational action on poverty and exclusion in cities. First, in a sense all organisations are faith based (political; ideological, humanist, spiritual etc.). And second, our knowledge of FBOs across European countries is limited compared to the US and new research is very much required at this moment in time with foresight of future trends.
are religiously oriented mission statements, the receipt of substantial support from a religious organization, or the initiation by a religious institution”. Our approach pays respect to these and other US concepts while following a new European orientation.

Social exclusion
We use ‘social exclusion’ as a generic concept that refers to various situations and processes such as polarisation, discrimination, poverty and inaccessibility. Social exclusion implies two conditions: a hierarchical relationship between individuals, positions or groups and a separation by clearly discernible fault lines. Certain fault lines are the result of collective intervention (e.g. subsistence income or institutional isolation), while others occur without any explicit and deliberate intervention on the part of social actors (segmented labour markets) (Vranken 2009). These instances of exclusion concern various areas of social and individual life - like income, housing, education or social relations - and they can manifest themselves in specific ways in each of these areas.

Methods / Research design of the Dutch study
As all countries in the project, we have confined ourselves to organisations that directly or indirectly refer to one of the monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) or religious values and function as welfare provider and/or political actor. Furthermore we have focused on those organisations that are active in combating social exclusion and therefore excluded FBOs that primarily operate in the international arena (on issues such as development cooperation, emergency relief, conflict resolution etc.). We therefore have also avoided FBOs in other domestic policy areas such as faith-based school board associations, broadcasting services, trade unions and elderly and youth organisations.

To identify the most important FBOs involved in combating social exclusion on the national level we have made use of various data collection methods, including literature, policy documents, newspaper articles, website research, consultation with experts, participation in conferences. We have interviewed representatives of most of the FBOs we identified at the national level.4

After studying the national context and mapping FBO activity at the national level, we examined faith-based practices and social exclusion at the local level. Since the European project is concentrating on big cities, we included the largest cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, in our survey. Both cities show a huge diversity in terms of religious composition of the population and both face serious challenges in the social domain. Especially Rotterdam scored negative on diverse aspects of social exclusion over the last decades. Tilburg, finally, was chosen because of its Catholic background and its position outside the main urban agglomeration of the Netherlands, the ‘Randstad’, covering the four largest cities.5

Structure of the report
The next chapters will present a mapping of FBOs at the national level (Chapter 1), the Dutch welfare state regime in relation to FBOs (Chapter 2), the urban context (Chapter 3), the role of FBOs in the local welfare systems (Chapter 4), the religious dimension of faith based actions against social exclusion (chapter 5), the organisational network of FBOs (Chapter 6), FBOs and questions of policy and governance (7) and future challenges (8). Each chapter will end with a short conclusion/discussion. The last chapter contains the overall conclusion (9).

4 A list of the interviews conducted can be found in annex 1.
5 A list of the interviews conducted in these cities can be found in annex 2, including information on the organisations in a nutshell.
1 Mapping Faith-based Organisations at the national level

1.1 Religious context

Anyone exploring the range of FBOs and their relations to the Dutch welfare state and questions of governance has to be aware of the basic developments in Dutch religious history and changes in state-religion relations.

Milestones in Dutch religion history

Van Eijnatten and Van Lieburg (2005) distinguish several milestones in Dutch religious history, in terms of the role of religion in the public domain. The first is around the year 1000, when Christianity (Roman Catholicism) settled in the territory, formerly consisting merely of local forms of religiosity. Some 600 years later, the reformation brought Protestant traditions to the territory, and one of them, Calvinism, would be connected to the Revolt against the Catholic Spanish King, which led to the establishment of the Dutch state. The second milestone, according to the authors, therefore takes place around 1580, when Calvinism becomes linked to the political elite of the Republic of the United Provinces (1648–1795). Some 250 years later, the Batavian Revolution would make the Calvinists lose their privileged position. The year 1848 is marked as a third milestone, when a new constitution would guarantee the freedom of religion and also marked the beginning of the separation of church and state.

Knippenberg (2006), who gives a comprehensive overview of the development of Dutch church-state relations since the foundation of Republic, adds more recent milestones in Dutch religious history. The first is pillarisation, also known as verzuiling, which refers to the group formation of orthodox Protestants, Roman Catholics, socialists and to a lesser extent Liberals. The institutionalization of the freedom of religion and education in the new constitution of 1848 gave rise to a struggle for equal treatment (in terms of public funding) of neutral and faith-based schools. This turned out to be a forerunner of a struggle for full political rights of Protestants and Catholics respectively. In 1917, also known as the year of Pacification, two main conflicts were settled: the school dispute and the struggle for universal suffrage. This encouraged institutionalisation along religious and ideological lines in other sectors of society (including health care and housing) and strengthened the pillarisation of Dutch society. It was also the start of what Lijphart (1975) has called ‘consociational democracy’ that institutionalised religious and ideological diversity in the political system. Within this system the confessional ‘pillars’ developed into strong bulwarks of organisations and subcultures.

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6 The school dispute dealt with the question whether the state should support both public and confessional private primary schools, and was settled by equal financing of both types of primary education. In the same year men and women were given passive and active voting rights as well. Both elements were laid down in a new Constitution.
The next watershed takes place in the 1960s, when increasing prosperity, higher levels of education, and growing mobility gave rise to fast secularization, both in terms of declining beliefs and practices, as in terms of the weakening of the authority of the faith-based ‘pillars’. Within Western Europe, the Netherlands is among those countries with the steepest decline in church attendance and levels of belief in God in the last 50 years (Norris and Inglehart, 2004, p. 89). With de-churching also church related institutions, such as political parties, and newspapers, lost members and influence. The care and social welfare sectors professionalized and were transformed into neutral organisations, by way of large amounts of state subsidization. The new constitution of 1983 reflects the fact that the Netherlands had become a secularized country. It has limited financial relations between the state and churches, and no longer distinguishes between religious and non-religious beliefs (see also chapters 2 and 7). Secularization also becomes present in the political landscape. Since the 1990s a Christian majority vote is no longer the norm, which is reflected in the so-called ‘purple’ cabinets (a nickname of a government coalition of social-democrats and liberals) from 1994-2002. Since 2002 the Christian Democrats were back in government though, and in the previous cabinet they ruled together with the Socialist Party and the Christian Union, with a strong focus on solidarity and norms and values. In the period this report was written the formation of the newest cabinet was still unknown.

**Secularization as a non linear process**

Some scholars are, however, critical about secularization understood as a linear process of decline of religion and rather speak of the transformation of religion. Kennedy (2005, p. 32-39) for example distinguishes three periods in post war Dutch religious history: 1) the high tide of the religious subcultures, 1945-1965, 2) the transformation of religion into an ethics of engagement (1965-1985); and 3) a return to ‘the spiritual’ (1985 to the present). The last period mainly reflects the growth of Evangelicalism and new forms of spirituality.

**Impact of immigration**

Moreover, at the same time, the religious landscape also drastically diversified as a result of immigration that followed from the economic growth since the 1960s. So-called ‘guest workers’ were recruited, mainly from Morocco and Turkey, for unskilled and low skilled labour. After the oil crisis of 1973 the borders were closed for economic migration, but family and marriage migration from Turkey and Morocco would continue to increase the immigrant population of whom the large majority are Muslim. Migration from Suriname - that gained independence in 1975 - would further increase the Muslim population, but mainly brought new Christian and Hindu populations to the Netherlands. Asylum seekers from countries like Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Somalia would further diversify the religious landscape. The separation of state and church in combination with the history of ‘pillarisation’ provided ‘new’ religious minorities (especially Muslims) with favourable political opportunity structures to establish places of worship and state-financed schools and broadcasts (Rath et al, 2001). This does not mean that secularization is irrelevant for migrant communities. There are indicators that second and third-generation Muslim migrants show lower levels of religious participation (visiting the mosque, praying, wearing the veil etc.) than their parents, although there are no significant differences in religious perceptions (Phalet and

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7 While some claim that ‘de-churching’ (ontkerkelijking) already started in the 1920s (Van Harskamp, 2005, p. 44-45), most studies on secularization start at the end of the 60s and demonstrate the steady decline of church attendance and membership, especially in urban areas.
Haker, 2004). As can be seen in table 1 and 2, declining membership of traditional churches and a diversification of the religious landscape is the latest trend in Dutch religious history. 8

Table 1  The religious composition of the Dutch population 1900-2005, based on membership data (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Calvinist</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant church in the Netherlands(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonite</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestant</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Protestant</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Catholic</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Catholic</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No denomination</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Knippenberg, 2006, p. 324

\(a\) The Protestant church in the Netherlands was founded in 2004 as a merger between the Dutch Reformed church, the Reformed churches in the Netherlands, and the Evangelical Lutheran church in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The original component parts are also included in the first three rows.

Table 2  Membership of religious communities in 2006 (absolute numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman-Catholic church</td>
<td>4,406,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant church in the Nederland</td>
<td>1,944,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox-reformed churches</td>
<td>238,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietistic orthodox-reformed churches</td>
<td>221,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical and Pentecostal churches</td>
<td>148,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal churches</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religious communities</td>
<td>156,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,132,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 There are no official data on the number of so-called Christian migrants, but estimates point towards 800,000 (Euser et al., 2006, p. 34-36), the majority from countries like Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, Iraq, Iran, Cape Verde, Ghana, Vietnam, South-Africa, Philippines, Brazil and Ethiopia.
Continued from Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Muslims</td>
<td>428,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan Muslims</td>
<td>296,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Muslims</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>944,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>100,000-215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>313,000-428,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bernts et al, 2006, p. 91

Volunteering

For a long time the common opinion was that volunteering ‘escaped’ the negative consequences of individualization and secularization. Indeed the Netherlands has relatively high numbers of volunteers in comparison to other countries. The two largest denominations (the Catholic church and the Protestant church) build on 3,500 priests, pastors and deacons, 800 pastoral workers and 545,000 volunteers (De Hart and Dekker, 2006, p. 140). But as church attendees are more likely to be involved in voluntary work (see for example De Hart en Dekker, 2006, p. 139-169), a decline in church membership and attendance is expected to result in a decline of volunteers. This is not always the case, as demonstrated by the increase of volunteers in Catholic churches. While the number of priests declined by 54 per cent in the past 25 years, the number of volunteers and pastoral workers increased with 19 per cent and 164 per cent respectively. According to De Hart and Dekker (2006, p. 140) this has transformed it from a church into a volunteers organisation.

The authors are sceptical about the possibility of new Evangelical and Pentecostal religious movements to compensate the loss of volunteers within the traditional churches (that face both ‘de-churching’ and aging). The main reasons are that these movements recruit members mainly from (orthodox) Protestant circles and are associated mainly with ‘bonding’ and not ‘bridging’ social capital. The authors are more positive about the role of migrant churches in the participation and integration of migrants.

Research by Civiq (2005) indicates that mosque organisations have on average 41 volunteers. Volunteers from traditional churches and mosques have different characteristics. While volunteers from traditional Dutch churches and denominations mainly consist of elderly women, volunteers working for mosques (estimated around 16,000) are dominated by younger men (Dautzenberg and Van Westerlaak, 2007). That is not to say that Muslim women are not active in volunteering. Muslim women often have their own organisations with links to the mosque, especially in the case of Turkish mosques (Canatan et al., 2003). Representatives of Muslim umbrella organisations do indicate the increasing difficulties to recruit volunteers from the younger generations.
1.2 **General overview of national Faith-based Organisations**

In this chapter we present an overview of Dutch FBOs that are active in combating social exclusion in the Netherlands and that are represented at the national level. Existing research on FBOs has generated different categorizations or typologies, depending on the aim of study (for an overview see Sider and Unruh, 2008). The categorization presented here has emerged from our data collection. We have thus used a grounded theory approach to identify these categories. In the course of the research, we changed this categorisation slightly compared to the first presentation in the national context report (Davelaar et al., 2009).

Figure 1 provides an overview the different types of Faith-based organisations we noticed in the Netherlands. (Note that this overview is not meant to be exhaustive).

1.2.1 **Diaconal bodies of established Dutch churches/denominations**

This category includes the diaconal organisations closely connected to the established churches and denominations in the Netherlands.\(^9\)

Traditionally diaconia consisted of material assistance to the poor, orphans, widows and elderly within the respective Catholic or Protestant pillars. With the emergence of the welfare state a major share of the activities of the traditional churches were taken over by the state. The church-controlled organisations themselves disappeared or continued to function on a less visible and much smaller scale (De Boer and Duyvendak, 2004; Davelaar, 1997). Others succeeded to survive and to maintain their size, but were integrated into the welfare state project. The former ties with the churches were cut though. An example is Relief, the Christian Association of (Health) Care Providers, with 300 members (hospitals, geriatric hospitals, hospitals and homes for mentally or physically disabled persons, etc). We excluded these FBOs from our mapping exercise, because they are mainly focused on service delivery for the general public, not focussing on excluded groups, and almost entirely occupied by fulfilling legal tasks for which they obtain regular public finances. An exception is perhaps Jewish Social Work (with some 43,000 members), which provides care and social services exclusively for the (post-war) Jewish community. Its current activities include social service delivery within the context of the welfare state (home care and social work), in addition to activities aimed specifically at problems faced by the Jewish community.\(^11\) The (small) Jewish community in the Netherlands is represented by the Central Jewish Council (Central Joods Overleg).

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9 Charitable funds, providing funding and advise to many FBOs, are not included in this overview because they are not directly involved in service provision or in political advocacy. Their role should not be underestimated. Examples of charities are SKaN fonds, Sint Laurensfonds, Haëlla Stichting, PIN.

10 The diaconal bodies of the smaller protestant churches, such as the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (liberated) and the Christian reformed Churches are left aside in this report. We do pay attention to diaconal initiatives promoted by active members of these churches.

11 It is somewhat debatable to what extend we can classify Jews in the Netherlands as a socially excluded group; socio-economically speaking they score above average, but their dependence on social work is much higher than the Dutch average due to post-war psychological problems and what the representative of JMW calls a 'confidence split' ('vertrouwensbreuk'). This FBO therefore represents an exception to the general picture, in which faith-based welfare organisations opened their doors for the general public when the state took over financial control.
Figure 1 Overview types of Faith-based Organisations in the Netherlands
With the state taking care of the most important social rights at home, the diaconal work at the national level of the Protestant and Catholic churches became largely aimed at global injustices, such as global poverty reduction, emergency relief and sustainable development. At the same time, new attention was paid to ‘new’ marginals at home (such as people with debts, people without access to the welfare state, undocumented people or asylum seekers) and/or people with social problems beyond the scope of the mainstream welfare state (such as homeless people, drug addicts, and prostitutes). The national diaconal body of the Protestant church, for example, supports local diaconal projects (such as walk-in centres and projects for the homeless or refugees) and translates signals from local churches into national projects and lobbying activities. The Catholic churches do not have a similar national counterpart. Support from the dioceses for diaconal work by the local parishes is weak. The mid-level deaneries, responsible for the support of volunteers in the parishes, have been largely dissolved in recent years (Groningen 2003, Rotterdam 2007, and Utrecht 2008). Our respondents in the national survey speak of a ‘fragmented state of affairs’. However, several interlinked networks of professionals and volunteers with a clear Catholic profile are still active. With support of Catholic funds, religious orders and funding by local authorities and in some cases provinces, they maintain a certain level of activity and launch new initiatives, too.

We provide here some examples of FBOs that fall within the scope of this category¹²:

- Protestant church in the Netherlands (PKN)
  - Church in Action, national missionary and diaconal body at home and abroad
- Roman Catholic church in the Netherlands
  - Diocesan Alliance
  - Episcopal Committee Justitia et Pax Netherlands
  - National diaconal body
  - Conference of Dutch religious orders
    - Network of Religions for Refugees
    - Religious against Women Trafficking Foundation
- Jewish Social work

1.2.2 Ecumenical platforms and networks

In this category we can distinguish between two subtypes: ecumenical platforms with a strong national coordination (‘top-down’) and rather loose networks with a limited national presence and with small-scale local initiatives as the constitutive elements (‘bottom-up’).

**National platforms and networks**

The group includes ecumenical organisations that emerged from cooperation among established churches after the Second World War. The engagement of church-goers in social and political issues stimulated ecumenical cooperation, and reflects what Kennedy (2005) calls the transformation of religion into an ‘ethics of engagement’. During the Cold War years many church affiliated people joined the peace movement and demonstrated against nuclear weapons. But also issues like unemployment, poverty and gender inequality mobilized them into action. One example of an FBO that stems from ecumenical cooperation between Protestant and Catholic churches is the Church Service in Industrial Society (DISK), which started in 1972, and was originally aimed at pastoral care for (industrial) workers. During the 1980s the organisation became more involved in working with welfare recipients, female dependents on welfare and disabled people. In the 1990s the bureau increased its political lobby activities and became involved in national discussion on social economic

¹² The listing under this and the following headings is by no means complete.
issues. Other examples are the ecumenical platforms of the Council of Churches: the Poor Side of the Netherlands/EVA and the working group on Refugees, and the INLIA foundation, which supports and represents a network of churches providing assistance and care for asylum seekers in distress.

All these ecumenical platforms are engaged in capacity building on the one hand (finding resources, networking, informing their rank and file on recent developments in poverty and asylum policies), while at the same time taking a political stand on these issues. A very different example of an ecumenical network is the Evangelical Alliance (EA). Its roots are partly in the traditional Dutch churches and partly in new evangelical churches and communities that developed slowly but steadily since the 1960s and 1970s, like Pentecostal churches and Baptist churches ‘American Style’. The EA was founded in 1979 and unites some 100 organisations (including the influential and large Evangelical broadcast society), 6 denominations and 250 local churches. Although the alliance is mainly aimed at creating Christian unity and mission work, it also supports diaconal projects and has several member organisations actively involved in providing social services, such as Youth for Christ, Help in Practice (HiP), Present and many local organisations.

Evangelical churches and organisations in general put more emphasis on their faith-based identity than the traditional Dutch churches and ‘the force of prayer’ is an integrated part of their social activities. Most of these have clear missionary goals. In the day to day diaconal work, however, ‘making converts’ is only an exception to the rule, according to both the representatives of the EA, its members and their non-evangelical partners in the local work. Although the Council of Churches (representing the traditional Dutch churches) and the Evangelical Alliance are traditional ‘rivals’, there is recently more cooperation, for instance by co-organizing a national expert meeting on how churches can help people with debt problems.

We provide here an overview of the most important FBOs that fall within the scope of this category:

- Council of Churches (Raad van Kerken)
  - The poor side of the Netherlands/ Working group Economy, Women and Poverty (Arme kant/ EVA)
  - Working Group on Refugees
- Church Service in Industrial Society (DISK)
- INLIA, International Network of Local Initiatives for Asylum Seekers
- Evangelical Alliance

Ecumenical networks of small-scale local initiatives
The main example here is the network DAK (Door Aandacht Kracht, ‘Powered by Attention’) that unites three former faith-based associations of local work that provide shelters for the homeless and other easily accessible services for urban marginals, walk-in ‘neighbourhood houses’ for isolated, elderly residents and are engaged in other ‘pastoral care’ initiatives in neighbourhoods.

The driving forces behind these organisations are often members of progressive (and sometimes dissenting) strands within Christianity, both in theological and social dimensions. The rank and file of staff and volunteers nevertheless tend to mirror Dutch religious pluralism on theological and socio-political matters. According to the website, there are almost hundred theological and social welfare professionals and thousands of volunteers for the 180 independent projects of this network. Another example in this category is the small but active Emmaus movement that consists of groups of idealist people who work and share with people in need, in eight working and living groups in the Netherlands.
Important examples of FBOs in this category are:

- **Network DAK** (175 walk-in centres and offices)
  - Walk-in centres association, ICB
  - Network Urban Mission (NUM), professionals and volunteers working in deprived urban neighbourhoods
  - National ecumenical network parochial care for drug users (LOND)
- **Emmaus movement**

### 1.2.3 Umbrella organisations of ‘new’ religious communities

In this group we include the various umbrella organisations of ‘new’ religious communities that settled in the Netherlands from the 1960s onwards. In this report we confine ourselves towards Muslim and Christian newcomers, since we are concentrating on FBOs with a monotheistic background. It is estimated that there are currently some 400-500 Muslim prayer halls in the Netherlands and at least 930 migrant churches (the majority in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) (Euser et al., 2006). Mosques and migrant churches are often organised along national, ethnic and/or linguistic lines. The diversity of Muslim umbrella organisations (for instance those with a Turkish background) also reflects the religious diversity and political situation in the countries of origin. Most mosques are a member of a national or regional federation or umbrella organisation, while Christian migrant communities often operate in a relatively independent fashion. An exception is the Association of Migrant Churches\(^{13}\) (SKIN), a platform of some 60 Protestant migrant churches. Catholic migrant communities are often informally related to the dioceses. From 1975-2004 a national organisation (called Cura Migratorum) was responsible for pastoral care of Catholic migrants, often employing former missionaries, but since 2004 this has become a responsibility of the different dioceses.

We include the national umbrella organisations of ‘new’ religious communities for a number of reasons: because their rank and file often include a large number of social excluded people and they are often involved in political advocacy and the empowerment of their group members in the society with retention of their religious identity. As mosques are often accompanied by women and youth organisations, these sometimes too have a national umbrella organisation, such as the Women Federation of Milli Görüş North Netherlands. There are also independent women organisations, such as Al Nisa, a small voluntary organisation aimed at providing information about Islam and the emancipation of Muslim women in the Netherlands.

In addition to these self-organisations\(^{14}\) of ‘new’ religious communities, the government encouraged the establishment of a body that could act as interlocutor for Muslims in the Netherlands, just like the ‘Inter-church Contact in Government Affairs’ (Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken) representing 21 church communities including Catholic, Protestant, Baptist, Jewish, Moluccas umbrella organisations. In 2004 the Contact Body Muslims and Government (CMO) was established, consisting of seven Sunni (Turkish, Moroccan and Surinam) umbrella organisations and one Shi’a group (Iraqi). Only shortly after the official recognition, another platform, the ‘Contact group Islam’ (Contactgroep Islam) was formed, including different branches of Islam (Sunni, Shitite Alevis and the Amhadiyya) that

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13 Not all churches involved, are willing to accept this label. Some because they reject the focus on the migrant-identity, others because their membership is a mixture of ‘migrants’ and natives.

14 In the Dutch context a frequently used concept to refer to cultural, political or religious organisations set up by migrant communities or other ethnic groups themselves. Used to highlight the contrast to support organisations or platforms initiated by ‘white’ organisations or public authorities from the 1970s on.
did not feel represented in the newly established national body. Both umbrella organisations have regular contact with the government on issues related to faith, integration and social issues. For (Protestant) Christian migrants this role is performed by the Association of Migrant Churches (SKIN).

We provide here an overview of FBOs in this category:

**Inter-religious Christian umbrella organisations**
- Association of Migrant Churches (*Samen Kerk in Nederland*, SKIN)

**Islamic umbrella organisations**
- Contact Body of Muslims and the Government (*Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid*, CMO)
- Contact Group Islam (*Contactgroep Islam*, CGI)

**Organisations of Turkish Muslims**
- Islamic Foundation Netherlands (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland* - ISN) - Diyanet
- Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (*Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie* - TICF) - Diyanet
- Milli Görüş North Netherlands, Women Federation North Netherlands and the Dutch Islamic Federation (*Nederlands Islamitische Federatie* - NIF) - Milli Görüş
- Islamic Foundation Centre (*Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland* - SICN) - Süleymani's
- Federation HAK-Der (*Federatie van Alevitische en Bektashitische sociaal-culturele verenigingen in Nederland* - HAK-Der) - Alevis

**Organisation of Moroccan Muslims**
- Federation of Moroccan Mosques (*Unie van Marokkaanse Moslim-Organisaties in Nederland* - UMMON)

**Organisations of Surinamese Muslims**
- Union of Dutch Lahore Ahmadiyya Muslim Organisations (*Unie van Lahore Ahmadiyya Moslim Organisaties Nederland* - ULAMON)
- World Islamic Mission Foundation Nederland (SWIM)

**Other**
- Al Nisa, independent Muslim women’s organisation

**1.2.4 Independent nationwide Faith-based Organisations**

In the fourth group we refer to certain sub-groups. The first group consists of established faith-based welfare organisations that operate independent from traditional Dutch churches, often with a mother organisation abroad. The second group is formed by independent nationwide faith-based organisations focusing on activation and volunteering.

**Independent welfare providers**

The organisations in the first subgroup resemble secular organisations in the Third Sector. Providing services to specific groups is their main task. Although volunteers are part of the modus operandi, these providers are highly professionalized and do receive the lion’s share of their budgets from the state. The Salvation Army that settled in the Netherlands in 1887, employs over 4,000 professionals and provides (material and immaterial) assistance to the most vulnerable groups in society, such as households on debts, long-term unemployed and disabled, young people and families in need, homeless people, (ex-) drug or alcoholic addicts, isolated elderly and ex-prisoners. The Vincentius
association, which started in Paris and appeared in the Netherlands in 1846, is also involved in the provision of material and spiritual assistance to the poor, homeless people and elderly people. Other organisations are aimed at different target groups, such as Exodus, which provides assistance to ex-convicts, or The Hope which provides care to addicts. Still a different example is Youth for Christ, an organisation that employs some 165 professional workers and many volunteers, and is actively involved in different kinds of youth work in 20 Dutch cities.

We provide here an overview of some important FBOs that fall within the scope of this category:

- Salvation Army Welfare and Health Care Foundation
- Youth for Christ, youth work, ‘The Mall’ (inter-denominational)
- Exodus housing and work for ex-convicts (mainstream Protestant)
- The Meeting Foundation, housing and support for homeless, drug addicts and ex-convicts (supported by orthodox Reformed churches)
- Timon, youth care, supported housing
- The Hope, addiction care (supported by evangelical and orthodox Reformed churches)

Independent organisations focussing at activation and volunteering

The second subgroup includes organisations aimed at activating volunteering, especially but not exclusively, by faith adherents. These are independent social entrepreneurs, but often with close links to certain denominations and local FBOs or churches and sometimes mosques. The organisations Actioma (Catholic) and IHSAN (which aims to activate voluntary work among Muslims) formed together with a humanistic organisation and Protestant national offices, the cooperative body for societal activation of and on behalf of denominations (Samenwerkende Organisatie voor Maatschappelijk Activeringswerk - SOM). Until 2006 they received state funding (Department of Health care, Welfare and Sports).

The Dutch branch of the Vincentius association is an older example. Its groups are firmly rooted in local networks and it is often operating on the background and only working with volunteers. The main difference with other organisations in this subgroup lies in the fact that it is also operating as a charitable fund.

Some of the more recently established FBOs in this category, such as Present, HiP, and Time for Action, often act as a broker between religious volunteers and needy individuals, and more often than not take the activation of religious volunteers as a starting point, rather than problems of social exclusion. The goal is to activate people (young people especially) in new ways to be socially engaged in an increasingly individualized society. While some organisations, like HiP and Time for action, aim to match individual supply of volunteers to demands of people in need, Present has a group approach towards the activation of voluntary work. These initiatives are often founded and financed by individuals and churches with an orthodox or evangelical (Protestant) signature, in addition to support from other Christian funds. Although more conservative denominations tend to dominate here, through campaigns they reach out to others within churches. Web-based campaigns aimed at volunteering and/or raising awareness on issues such as social justice are also increasingly used by these organisations (see for example the Micha Campaign).
We provide here an overview of FBOs that fall within the scope of this category:

- Vincentius volunteering Society and Fund (originally Catholic, now Christian)
- Present Foundation
- Help in Practice Foundation (HiP)
- Time for Action
- Islamic Institute for Social Activation Foundation (IHSAN)
- Actioma, Catholic Institute for societal activation, innovation and research

1.3 Other private actors (NGOs) active for the most vulnerable groups

It is necessary to note some characteristics of Dutch Non-Governmental Organisations. Traditionally, the private non-profit sector\(^\text{15}\) fulfils an important role in service provision at all levels in the welfare state. In health care services, education, social work and community development, by far the biggest part of the work is organised through organisations with independent boards, although almost entirely financed by public means. Only over the last few years the share of private funding in organisations’ budgets has gradually risen as government retrenches its approach of subsidising these organisations. Furthermore, with a growing privatisation in care and social welfare, Dutch authorities tend to organise the provision of social services of general interest more and more through calls for tender. For these tenders, non-profit and profit organisations are, at least in principle, considered on equal terms.

The following NGOs are partly depending on faith-based action or have FBOs as influential members, with clear institutional or personal links with FBOs mentioned above:

- Social Alliance (Alliance for Social Justice): Trade Unions, churches, Humanist association
- Cooperation for Urgent Needs/ Emergency Relief (Stichting Samenwerking voor Urgente Noden)
- Food Banks
- Children's Support Funds (Stichting Leergeld, Stichting Sportfonds)
- National Platform on Undocumented Persons (PMZV)/ National Support Office for Undocumented Persons (LOS)

Other important NGOs promoting social inclusion (selection):

- Labour Unions: The Federated Dutch Labour Union Movement - FNV, National Federation of Christian Labour Unions - CNV and others
- Social Housing Association Aedes: umbrella organisation of the numerous local and regional social housing companies. Affordable housing in general, special housing projects for vulnerable groups, social development of neighbourhoods
- Federation of homelessness services and Women’s shelters (Federatie Opvang)
- Local or regional centres for social work (individual assistance)
- Local or regional organisations for community development (often merged with social work)
- Humanitas (social work, youth work, social relief)
- Society for Refugee Support (Vereniging Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland)
- Cedris, association of sheltered labour organisations (social employment and job re-integration)
- Platform of legal aid centres (Platform Rechtswinkels)

\(^{15}\) In Dutch this organised civil society sector or Third Sector is also called ‘the midfield’ (het middenveld), because it plays a crucial role as intermediary between citizen and state.
2 Welfare State Regime and its relation to Faith-based Organisations

2.1 Introduction: Faith-based Organisations filling the gap?

Following Beaumont (2008) the central idea is that FBOs are actors that tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state in several domains of public life, particularly in social welfare and in social protection. At first sight, this process looks like a return to the charity of former times, when such associations occupied the fore of social help in many countries. The process might equally signal the beginning of a new type of (local, urban) welfare regime with a stronger focus on urban policies and strategies and new interplays between local authorities and civil society organisations. Either way, the longevity and sustainability of inner city FBOs, certainly in the US, is beyond dispute. David Ley’s observations of West Philadelphia in the early 1970s compared with now, for example, remind us how churches are often the last remaining community resources in otherwise blighted urban neighbourhoods (Ley 1974). The once thriving Englewood neighbourhood on Chicago’s south side (Roberts and Stamz 2002) is another case in point, where the Antioch Missionary Baptist Church has revitalized a number of townhouses (Kramnick and Moore 1997).

While relatively little is known about faith-based social activities in academic circles in Europe, research on FBOs in the US is voluminous, particularly (urban) congregations and affiliated groups more generally in the frame of the Olavsky-inspired compassionate conservatism and Charitable Choice contracting of social services (cf. Beaumont 2004; 2008a; 2008b). Ammerman and Chaves, for example, have worked on the everyday realities of congregational life, also in cities, exploring responses to growing religious pluralism (Ammerman 1997; 2006; Ammerman et al 1998; Chaves 1998; 2004). Cnaan (2006) has written specifically on congregations in Philadelphia, with Boddie (2007) on the effectiveness of FBOs and relations with public policies and with Di Iulio (2002) on the welfare function of congregational life. Cnaan, Wineburg and Boddie (1999) argue for alliances between social workers, religious leaders and policy-makers for new form of welfare in the US, while Monsma and Soper (2006) are concerned with FBOs as agents of welfare-to-work in Los Angeles.16

There are numerous other studies on religion, social justice, FBOs and welfare/ workfare issues in the US that could be mentioned. Dutch literature on these topics is much more limited. Several sources will be mentioned throughout the chapters. To mention some (other) important publicati-

16 We would like to thank Margit Mayer for indicating the Monsma and Soper study. Mayer and a team of researchers at the JFK Institute, Free University Berlin undertook a DFG Project (2000-2003): From Welfare to Work (see Eick et al 2003), which drew attention to FBOs as agents of workfare in Los Angeles such as “spiritual renewal” of ex-convicts.
ons: on the social role of mosques (Canatan et al., 2003, Canatan et al., 2005, Driessen et al., 2004, Gruijter et al., 2006, Pels et al., 2006); on the role of churches in fighting poverty (Noordegraaf, 2004); on migrant organisations, including religious ones (Van Heelsum, 2004); on catholic migrant communities (Castillo Guerra et al., 2006); on the contribution of migrant churches to Amsterdam (Euser et al., 2006) and The Hague (Van der Sar en Visser, 2006); on Islam and (local) government (Maussen, 2006); on churches in deprived neighbourhoods (Grevel, 2009) and to end with, on Social Return On Investment of Christian churches in Rotterdam (Castillo Guerra et al., 2008).

The introduction to a recent dossier at the TESG identified three areas for further research (Beau-mont 2008a). First, deeper theorization of faiths and FBOs from an urban geographical perspective; a ‘geo-political-economy’ perspective on FBOs would be an important advance, particularly how various organisations are implicated in government valorized social policies and also within progressive multi-agency alliances. Second, more philosophically inspired and theoretical work can deal with religion, politics and implications for cities in what Habermas calls the post secular society. Finally, there is a need to deepen international comparative analyses on FBOs in cities. Much is known about FBOs in the US and also countries of the Global South\(^1\), but far less across Europe. Attending to this gap will impact directly on distinctly European controversies over immigration, integration and the best ways to pacificate or fight (perceived) religious-based radicalism.

Equally relevant is the idea that FBOs possibly hinder as well as augment reintegration of certain groups in society. Central in the analysis lies distinction between insider and outsider organisations, with insiders financed in line with government policies and outsiders often running on a shoestring, rooted in basic human concern and external to (but often an example for) government policy. This insider/ outsider distinction is illustrated by the work by May \textit{et al} (2005) on homelessness in the UK city of Bristol, in which FBOs providing night shelters, soup runs and drop-in centres fall outside of the para-state system of funding because they are deemed to provide services that keep homeless people on the streets. Other such FBOs, whose role is provision of long-term accommodation, or rehabilitation, have attained insider status as they are eligible for government funding and the associated legitimacy in connection with the task of keeping homeless people off the streets. FBOs, indeed, might deepen social exclusion of their own membership or beneficiaries (or at least are accused in the public debate or by local authorities of doing so). Pertinent examples include, again, the contested policies towards charity soup runs for street sleepers in London in the UK, as well as the general suspicion and distrust felt towards the social and political role of mosques in various European urban contexts these days. The debate on the role of Afro-Christian churches and mosques in addressing the needs of their members in The Netherlands and elsewhere is another area of contention.

\textit{National welfare systems}

In order to understand the nature of these welfare gaps it’s necessary to delve deeper into the nature of welfare systems at national and sub-national levels. When studying patterns in local social welfare development, we need to take into account national welfare systems. The typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) was based on the role of the public / private provision, the degree of

\(^1\) An article in \textit{The Economist} special report (op cit), \textit{Bridging the Divide}, shows how India, the birthplace of Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and Hinduism, continues to struggle with religious politics: (1) externally with Pakistan; (2) internally with a Hindu majority and sizeable Muslim minority; (3) fierce debates about religion in the public sphere, religious movements within Hinduism and differences between Vedanta (closer to Congress) and Hindutva (closer to Bharatiya Janata Party) strains, also their differences towards voluntarism and welfare.
de-commodification and the degree of social differentiation in service provision in the welfare system. While several critical comments have been made with respect to the empirical evidence and role of the causal relations in the explanatory mechanisms of the different welfare regimes, the importance of these kinds of typologies has been broadly acknowledged. Moreover, the different kinds of welfare regimes in Europe imply a diversity of devolving responsibilities to the local level as their constituent characteristics. We follow Kazepov (2005) on the importance of considering the context of welfare provision in practice. Institutional configurations, national (or in some federal countries sub-national) legislation and national welfare systems are structuring contexts, also within the proclaimed shift from ‘welfare state to welfare cities’.

Local welfare systems
Local welfare systems can be defined and understood in different ways. The concept can be described very briefly as anti-exclusion strategies constructed locally. Building loosely on Saraceno (2002, p.56 – 60), we can say that local welfare systems are the ‘local fabric’ of interplays between regional or local authorities, civil society (families, communities and third sector) and the market. They are an expression of the local institutional organisation, the divisions of formal and informal responsibilities of the local state and third sector organisations. They reflect the type of economic development, political system and culture in a specific city or region - including concepts of integration, citizenship, public action and local community. However, the continued importance of the national level should not be underestimated. Any local welfare system is to a certain degree shaped by national policies, regulations and welfare cultures (Saraceno 2002, Kazepov 2005).

2.2 The Dutch Welfare Regime in international perspective

Although all countries in the European Union have their own specific features with respect to their social security arrangements, it is possible to classify most countries into five welfare regimes (Soede et al., 2004). Three of them, the Nordic, Continental and Liberal regimes, are comparable with those originally discussed by Esping-Andersen in his book The three worlds of welfare capitalism (1990) and are also supported by other analyses. In line with the theoretical observations of several authors, there is also a Mediterranean welfare regime in the European Union represented by Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy. The other ‘new’ regime is that of the former Eastern Bloc countries. Two countries do not fit into any of these groups: The Netherlands and Norway. These countries are described as ‘hybrid’ (Soede et al., 2004, p. 39), because they are located between different regimes, for the case of the Netherlands between the Continental and Nordic regimes.18

The hybrid characteristics of the Dutch welfare state are discussed theoretically by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Van Kersbergen (1995) and empirically analysed in Wildeboer-Schut, Vrooman and Beer (2001).19 A typical example of the ‘hybrid’ welfare state is the Dutch pension system. The first pillar, the basic state pension, can be characterized as typically Nordic: all citizens above 65 years receive a flat-rate old age pension at a rate slightly above the minimum income. The second pillar, the occupation-related schemes, is typically Continental. For most sectors in the Netherlands, an

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18 Although the European Union does not have any formal power on the organisation and content of the different welfare regimes, one could argue that the Open Method of Coordination in Social Protection, Health Care and Pensions will lead inevitably to growing convergence between systems into a European hybrid welfare regime.
19 And see also Soede, Vrooman, Ferraresi & Segre, 2004).
20 The new government Rutte has decided to raise this age limit up to 67 years within fifteen years from now.
earnings related pension scheme is compulsory for all employees. All schemes differ in terms of their generosity, eligibility constraints, retirement age and other features. Most aim to provide a pension which is 70 per cent of most recent earnings for a single earner, which can be described as Continental. On other issues benefits are either in line with the Continental or Nordic regime. Unemployment benefits, for instance, are reasonably high and in line with the Continental regime. In line with the Nordic countries, social assistance rates are fairly high as well. No distinction is made in the Netherlands between occupational and non-occupational disability. As a consequence, the non-occupational disability benefits can be described as high, covering more than 60 per cent of earnings. The minimum disability levels are rather low and there is no minimum period of membership. In the Continental regime, these benefits are much lower and there is always a minimum period of membership. In comparison with occupational disability schemes in other countries, the Dutch scheme is not very generous.

In his study of the religious roots of modern poverty policy, Kahl (2005) compares Catholic, Lutheran and reformed Protestant traditions. He underlines that modern poverty policies are the result of a historically complex interplay of ideologies, social doctrines, practices, social movements and large shocks such as economic depressions or wars. He nevertheless attempts to hold Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed Protestant legacies accountable for the way poor people are perceived and treated in different countries and how social assistant systems are organised. Although Kahl doesn’t explicitly write about the Dutch case, it is clear that the diversity of religious roots have contributed to the ‘hybrid character’ of the Dutch welfare state. In his study on Christian democracy and the welfare state, Van Kersbergen deals with the different ideological roots of the Dutch welfare state: “In the Netherlands the conditions of an alliance between social democrat reformism (with strong Lutheran influence) and social Catholic ‘correctivism’ under the exclusion of anti-state Protestantism yielded an exceptional form of generous, yet passive interventionism” (Van Kersbergen, 1995: 232-233).

2.3 Social exclusion and activation, social exclusion and gender

The combination of relatively late industrialisation, prosperity and cultural (religious) preferences made the Dutch welfare system into a one (male) earner’s based system until the 1980s. This rapidly changed since then, but with some specific consequences, linked to the economic situation and the emancipation movement at the end of the 20th century. Female employment is mostly (small) part time employment and a relatively high percentage of men work part time (14 per cent). The female employment rate can be described as high in comparison to other Western countries. Some 68 per cent of women in the Netherlands currently work for at least one hour a week; only the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland have higher percentages. On the other hand, women in the Netherlands work much more often part-time than women in other countries; 75 per cent of working women in the Netherlands work for less than 35 hours a week, almost twice the average in the EU-15. Moreover, the average working week of those in employment in the Netherlands shows virtually no sign of increasing (Portegijs and Keuzenkamp, 2008). The government has introduced legislation enabling every employee to tailor their working hours to their requirements and ensuring that the rights of part-time workers are properly protected. Partly as a result, part-time work in The Netherlands has not, as in some other countries, remained limited to marginal jobs, but is also a

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21 The benefits for an employee with a full employment history could originally last seven years, with the first five years being earnings-related and the last two years at a flat-rate minimum level. However, the Dutch government adjusted the duration to a maximum of five years in 2003, skipping the benefit at minimum level. New reductions are under discussion.
feature of mainstream employment. Dutch women differ from women in other countries as regards their preferences. In the Netherlands, only a quarter of working women express a preference for a full-time job, compared with more than half in other countries. Around 62 per cent of Dutch women do not have (little) children who need to be looked after. At any rate, these women, too, generally work for less than 40 hours per week (Bijl, Boelhouwer and Pommer, 2007).

Poverty and social exclusion problems among women are very much linked to their social protection situation (dependent of a male breadwinner) in the past and their labour market position today. Earlier research in the United Kingdom and the United States confirms that also in these countries women are over-represented in the poor population, but that in percentage terms their number has remained relatively stable over time. In the Netherlands, the process of feminization of poverty took place mainly in the 1980s; since the early 1990s the proportion of households with a female head within the poor population has increased by only a few percentage points. The findings show that the share of low incomes among households with a female head has also increased over time, and this increase took place almost entirely in the 1980s. In addition, we find that since the end of the 1980s female breadwinners run three times the risk of being poor compared with households with a male head. The key risk groups are (non-student) young women aged up to 25, older women aged 75 and over and benefit recipients (Vrooman et al, 2007).

The new Act on Provisions in Work and Care for Lone Parents (Vazalo, Voorzieningen Arbeid en Zorg Alleenstaande Ouders)22 aims at solving some of these problems. The objective of this ‘Vazalo’ Act is to give lone parents better chances and incentives for combining paid work with care for children, by, firstly, providing a decent income for part-time work, giving a bonus for accepting work so that no complementary social assistance benefit has to be claimed; second, by insuring that increasing working time results in more income, avoiding the poverty trap; and third, by improving the income position of lone parents with an income around or just above the social minimum, by applying the Act to lone parents with an income up to 115 per cent of the net minimum wage. This should result also in improvement of chances for some 350,000 children living in households with low income (Swinnen, 2008).

**From compensating to activating welfare state**

The Dutch welfare state changed rapidly in the 1990s from a compensating welfare state to an activating welfare state (Noordegraaf, 2004). This process started at the end of the 1980s - in the midst of mass unemployment - with programmes aimed at social activation outside the labour market, alongside measures to stimulate beneficiaries re-entering the labour market. In this general ‘activation’ trend, the Netherlands may be seen as one of the forerunners (Van Oorschot, 2002). The Dutch success model of job growth and decreasing unemployment in the 1990s is often explained by the corporatist exchange of wage moderation for jobs. According to Becker (1999, p.1) this Dutch model is seen a success because, “the Dutch have not paid the price of rising poverty for employment growth.” While there have been cuts in the welfare system, poverty rates in the Netherlands are still among the lowest in the world. Becker however also points out the specificities of the Dutch case. Non-employment is high, due to high part-time employment and low labour market participation. While the Dutch case might demonstrate that rising employment does not imply a residual welfare state, eligibility rules were tightened, the level of welfare was lowered and income inequality has risen (Becker, 1999, p. 29). The Dutch miracle of job growth in the 1990s (Visser and Heme rijk, 1997) thus failed to improve the labour market situation of the most vulnerable groups, while

social security restructuring has worsened their social protection rights (Van Oorschot, 2002). In addition, some scholars argue that comprehensive welfare states have been less successful in integrating immigrants, while countries with residual welfare states are better equipped to give possibilities to ethnic minorities (Kremer, 2008). Kremer (2008, p. 589) concludes that both in education policies and labour market policies, the Dutch welfare state is acting poorly to integrate immigrants.

In the second half of the 1990s concepts taken from New Public Management (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and new policies oriented towards activation for the sake of paid labour and stronger disciplining of the unemployed (Work First) (Sol and Westerveld, 2005) came to dominate. These impulses accumulated in the large scale introduction of contracting out of the public employment services (mostly to the profit sector, but also to non-profit agencies, in some cases with a religious background). With USA and Australia, the Netherlands is a pioneer in the use of private providers for employment services (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2006). Managerial hypes are frequent and lead a short life in Dutch policymaking: Work First is adopted by almost all municipal social services and will be part of the local repertoire from now on, but attention once again turns to other forms of civic participation. In addition, local authorities have started to reassume the responsibility for the implementation of activation schemes themselves (Edzes et al., 2007).

In its voluminous report on the future of the welfare state (The Welvaartstaat herwogen), the influential Scientific Council for Government Policy (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2006) urges scientists and politicians alike not to devote inordinate time on discussions on welfare regimes and the everlasting pleas for adopting the Scandinavian way. Dutch society, it claimed, has to deal with the specificities of the path-dependent Dutch welfare state. According to the council a more fruitful discussion will be on how to replace the dominant goals of the past of caring and securing (verzorgen and verzekeren) with bonding/connecting/linking and elevating people (verbinden and verheffen). All four dimensions are functions of the welfare state, but there is a need to focus on the latter two. While bonding aims at bridging social distances between different individuals or groups (like the young and the elderly, the low and highly educated, the poor and the rich, people of different ethnic groups etc.), elevation is aimed at investing in talent and competences (mainly through education). The minor focus on poverty and the social-economic dimension of social policy has led to criticism from, for example, the Social Alliance (Janssen, 2006). The former government (2006-2010), on the other hand, embraced the report and the shift in emphasis from 1) caring and securing to elevating and connecting, and 2) from job security to security of employment. This shift expressed itself in a mixture of the reappearance of classic Christian democratic and social democratic themes and new views and strategies on the connection of the social security system with local social policies, community development, education and family policies with a strong moral undercurrent. Municipalities were pointed out as key-players to create linkages between people at the local level. That is not to say that neoliberal phenomena like job insecurity, a high rate of working poor and income inequalities have been vanishing recently; quite the contrary (Vrooman et al. 2007).
With its ‘work first’ approach, still governing Dutch social protection and social inclusion policies, the Netherlands gives a specific - or according to critics ‘one-sided’ - content to the European Active Inclusion principles, as described in the Recommendation of 3 October 2008. This Recommendation asks the member states to (1) provide a decent income for all; (2) give adequate support to access the labour market and (3) provide adequate and accessible social services and social support of high quality. The European Commission underlines the connection between and the equal importance of these three aspects of Active Inclusion.

2.4 Historical developments of Faith-based Organisations in the context of the welfare state

One of the main legacies of the period of pillarisation in Dutch history is the large and diverse non-profit sector, with its many faith-based NGOs, or to be more precise, those with a Roman Catholic and Protestant background. Catholics and Protestants - along with socialists and sometimes the less well organised liberals - had not only their own political parties, labour unions, and newspapers, but also their own schools, hospitals, housing co-ops, orphanages, and homes for the elderly. Secularization in the 1960s decreased the power of the pillars, heralding the beginning of a process of ‘depillarisation’ and the constitutional separation of church and state in 1983. While the scope of the welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s increased considerably, most public services remained in the hands of non-profit organisations, including FBOs. The government took over the lion’s share of the financial responsibilities, and in turn the denominational organisations opened their doors for the general public, regardless of their beliefs or memberships. As a result many FBOs transformed from civil society organisations to quasi-governmental organisations and are characterized by corporatist institutional forms. Others, such as the Salvation Army, who succeeded to work independently from the state, depend heavily on state financial support in order to be able to continue their activities.

The Dutch refer to this non-profit sector as societal ‘midfield’ (maatschappelijk middenveld) or ‘private initiative’. The precise definitions vary over time and to the strategic goals of individual organisations and sectors. In recent years organisations favour to ‘sell’ themselves either as flexible, responsible (social) entrepreneurs or genuine civil society organisations or networks, whereas in the 1980s and 1990s it was more reasonable and fashionable for these organisations to present themselves as vast institutions between state and market. Building on De Boer and Duyvendak (2004) we can identify four overlapping phases of NGO involvement in the welfare provision in Dutch cities and neighbourhoods: the diverse pre-history of welfare work (until 1960), the period of welfare megalomania (1960-1980), the decentralisation agenda (1980-2004), culminating in The Social Support Act (2006-). In the ‘pre history’ FBOs dominated the scene, accompanied by private initiatives from other pillars (notably socialist societies and liberal funds). A broad range of charities and funds and deacons of local churches took care of ‘dangerous and pitiful people’ (Smolenaars and Beijering, 2004). The state only played a role in special social security (bijzonder bijstand), in addition to the general social security (algemene bijstand) provided by churches. After the Second World War the tables would be turned. From the 1950s onwards all income support transferred to institutions of the

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state, and from the 1960s on ‘welzijnswerk’ (welfare work or social work) developed from care and social relief provided by private initiatives. From its inception, public and private services worked side by side, but gradually many services and activities were handed over to neutral organisations or directly to governmental organisations. In most domains part of the services remained in the hands of private boards.

Those FBOs that did not adjust their activities saw the larger part of their work abandoned due to the lack of sufficient funding. In the long run only organisations with strong ties with ideological mother organisations succeeded to work in relative independence of the state, although they too asked for public funding (De Boer and Duyvendak, 2004, p. 63). Examples are Humanitas and the Salvation Army. Some local faith-based services providers also survived, although less with general services in care and welfare, and more with activities aimed at the most hard to reach groups and heavily leaning on volunteering (Davelaar, 1997). De Boer and Duyvendak summarised the situation anno 2004 as follows: “The welfare sector can rightly be described as an orphaned (deserted or abandoned) sector. The old private initiative – directly nurtured by the ideological (levensbeschouwelijke) pillars, no longer exists. In the 1960s and 70s the central state embraced the welfare sector, to leave it entirely to the municipalities after this short period of time. The municipality did not really know how to deal with this new responsibility. The professionals were not proud of their jobs and did not prove to be the long term bearers of the high ideals. The clients rewarded their little piece of the social work much higher than the sector as a whole. The sense of ownership is fairly limited; the welfare sector belongs to no one” (De Boer and Duyvendak, 2004, 19).

Now under the Social Support Act (Wmo) (House of Representatives 2004-2005), that came into force January 2007, new attempts are undertaken to join up policies and practices at the local level. This act aims at bringing social and care services under one system, to be managed by local authorities and largely privatised/market driven in terms of service delivery. Within the parameters set by the central government (mainly participation and accountability), municipalities are currently assuming their responsibilities and finding (new) ways of organizing social and care services together with local stakeholders. There are opportunities for developing tailor made approaches, and civil society organisations, including churches and mosques are asked to act as intermediary organisations between clients and social service agencies (Dautzenberg and Westerlaak, 2007). Of course, in practice, they already played an important role in helping people to get access to their social and welfare rights; the difference is that now the responsibility for and provision of most services is transferred to the municipalities (see also chapter 7). Current FBO activities on several domains of inclusion/exclusion will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. That chapter also contains a listing of seven functions FBOs fulfil in the Dutch welfare system.

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24 Note that welfare sector is used here in a limited way: containing social work and community development, excluding education and care and the system of income provisions.
3 On the urban context

In this chapter we present some facts and figures about Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg. In addition we shortly describe local policies with respect to social exclusion, health and wellbeing and integration. This provides us with a context in which we can place the role of FBOs and their relations with local authorities and other organisations. We end this chapter with an impression of the geography of FBOs in these three cities.

3.1 Introducing Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg

Amsterdam
Amsterdam is the capital and, with a population of 755,605 (CBS Statline, 2009), the largest city of the Netherlands, located in the province of North Holland in the west of the country. The inhabitants are of around 176 different nationalities, almost 35% are so-called non-Western allochtonen, about 15% are so-called Western allochtonen and the remaining 50% are autochthons.25 While most non-Western allochtonen come from countries like Surinam, the Dutch Antilles, Turkey and Morocco, after 1992 an increasing percentage comes from African countries, like Ghana and Nigeria. While Western allochtonen are mainly concentrated in central locations of the city, like de Jordaan, Vondelbuurt and parts of Oud-Zuid, non-Western allochtonen are more concentrated at the periphery of the city (North, West, East and South of the city).

Rotterdam
Rotterdam is situated in the west of the Netherlands and is with 587,134 inhabitants (CBS Statline, 2009) the second largest in the country after Amsterdam. The port of Rotterdam is the largest in Europe. From 1962 to 2004, it was the world’s busiest port; then it was superseded by Shanghai. A popular saying in Rotterdam is: “In Rotterdam the money is earned, in The Hague (seat of government) it is distributed, in Amsterdam it is spent.” The region of Rotterdam is still home to many industries. For higher educated people, the city is the least attractive place to live of all big cities in the Netherlands, although employment in the white collar and cultural sector had expanded fast since the 1980s. In the Netherlands, Rotterdam has the highest percentage of foreigners from non-industrialised nations (36.5%).26 Nearly 47% (2009) of the population are not native to the Netherlands or have at least one parent born outside the country. The largest group of nieuwe Nederlanders (‘new Dutch’) is that of people from Surinam (51,885), followed by the Turkish (45,699) and Moroccans (37,476). The city is also home to a large Cape Verdean community (14,971), as well as the largest Dutch Antillean community (19,562).27

25 Allochtonen are those people who have at least one parent who was born abroad, and who may or may not have Dutch citizenship. Numbers from CBS Statline, 2009.
26 Ministry of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration.
27 All figures from 2008, retrieved from www.cos.rotterdam.nl
Tilburg
Tilburg is the smallest city of the three with 203,464 inhabitants (CBS Statline, 2009), but still the sixth largest municipality in the Netherlands. The proportion of the autochthon population is 78%, 13.8% of the population has a non-western background, and 9.1% are from other Western countries. The inhabitants from Turkish decent form the largest group: 7,366 (3.6%) (numbers retrieved from CBS Statline, 2009). Tilburg is also home to a large number of people with Moroccan, Antillian and Surinam roots. The city, for long not more than a collection of villages, developed rapidly in the course of the industrialisation process. It became a working class dominated city, but this image has changed. Nowadays, the city hosts a popular University, well known museums and venues and continues to grow in size.

3.1.1 Religious composition

Amsterdam
While Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations around 1900 were still responsible for some 70% of the population of the city, in 1984 its number has decreased to less than 40% (Dienst Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2001). According to a survey in 2000, 41% of people living in Amsterdam regard themselves affiliated with a denomination or weltanschauung; 17% with Christianity (5% Protestant, 10% Roman Catholic), 14% with Islam, 1% with Judaism, 3% unknown, 9% other, and 56% not affiliated. Numbers from the citizens monitor (Burgermonitor) of 2008 indicate a similar picture: about 20% of the population associates him/herself with Christianity (of whom 8% Roman Catholicism) and 13% with Islam (Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2008). Changes in the religious geography of the city are due to secularization on one hand and immigration on the other hand. Immigrants from Suriname introduced Evangelical Protestantism and Lutheranism, Hinduism, and Islam and migrants from Turkey and Morocco have introduced other branches of Islam (mostly Sunni). More recently large communities of Ghanaian and Nigerian immigrants established various Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical and Pentecostal churches.

Rotterdam
Since the reformation in the 16th century Rotterdam was a Protestant city, with a great flow of Catholic workers in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, because of the growth in workforces needed for the harbour. Rotterdam has for long been familiar with different faiths, with Norwegian, Russian and Finnish seafarer churches and christian services for maritime personnel from all over the world. The religious composition of Rotterdam strongly changed since the 1970s, because of emigrants from Spain, Italy and later Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and Cape Verde. Rotterdam is home now to a large number of Islamic (the Turkish is the biggest, but also Moroccan, Pakistani, Surinam and Bosnic) and Christian migrant communities (more than 150 different churches and religious groups). Recent figures show that Muslims comprise close to 25% of the city's population, the highest percentage of the big cities. The Catholic church has also changed colour because of migration.

Tilburg
Tilburg has a strong Catholic background. The Protestant community has always been small and still is; less than two percent of the inhabitants is a member of the Protestant Community Tilburg. Because of migration processes over the last forty years, also Evangelic Christianity and Islamic groups are explicitly represented in the city. Although the migrant population of Tilburg is much smaller than those of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, these groups have influenced the religious composition of the city significantly.
3.1.2 Poverty and social exclusion

Amsterdam

According to the poverty monitor of the municipality of Amsterdam, in 2007 some 73,765 households (18%) were classified as having a minimum income (>110% of the social minimum). Almost half of them live on social benefits. Allochtonen represent some 60% of the households living on minimum incomes (Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2007). A quarter of these households live in Amsterdam South-East and North. A relative large number of minimum income households live in the Bos en Lommer district (24.4%), South-East district (23.8%) and Geuzenveld-Sloterdam district (23.2%).

Neighbourhoods in these districts are often included in the national policy for deprived neighbourhoods (in policy terms called krachtwijken). In these areas there is a high concentration of unemployed and people depending on social benefits. Most minimum income families live in social housing. Semi-public housing corporations own about 205,000 homes, representing 55% of the total housing stock in the city. In addition to people living on minimum incomes, other vulnerable social groups in Amsterdam are undocumented people (estimated between 13,000-20,000), drug addicts (estimated at 2000), people with social-psychiatric problems (some 5000), homeless people (estimated between 2250-5000) and street children (zwerfjongeren) (350-600).

Rotterdam

In Rotterdam about 55,018 people live on 120% or less of the minimum income (StimulanSZ, 2008). Furthermore, 67,200 people are entitled to benefits, of which 33,650 receive social assistance (CBS, 2009). In 2008 23,350 children lived in a family with social assistance (Steketee et all, 2010). The poverty monitor in Rotterdam shows that the group with a minimum income mainly exists of one-person households (more than half) and single parent households (18%). Furthermore, more than half of the group exists of non-natives (Moors and Libregts, 2010).

Rotterdam has its fair share of typical urban problems, such as dilapidated inner city areas. A striking geographic feature of the Rotterdam is the fact that its low-income and deprived neighbourhoods and districts are located just outside the city centre, more than in the periphery areas (the opposite to Amsterdam). Rotterdam has highly segregated areas, especially on the South Bank of the river Maas and in the West. Almost all districts on the South Bank older than 1970 are targeted in the special policies (Krachtwijken) of the Dutch Cabinet. According to poverty monitors about 17.2% of the households were classified as low income households (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 2008). Low income households are concentrated in Delfshaven, Feijenoord, Noord, Kralingen-Crooswijk and Charlois.

28 Amsterdam has recently (May 2010) reduced the number of Districts (Stadsdelen) from 14 to 7.
29 Krachtwijken in Amsterdam include neighbourhoods in North and East (Nieuwendam-Oost, Oud Noord, De Banne, Transvaalbuurt and Indische buurt) in West and Western garden-cities (Bos en Lommer, De Baarsjes, Slotermeer, Overtoomse Veld en Osdorp) and in South-East.
30 Concentrations of social housing are found all over the city, except from the inner city. See also http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/pdf/2006_stadsregiomonitor.pdf
31 For some of these estimates see also Gemeente Amsterdam, ‘Maatschappelijke opvang, ambulante verslavingszorg en bestrijding huiselijk geweld, Beleidsplan 2007 - 2010: Participatie, partnerschap en resultaat’, retrieved from http://www.bestuur.centrum.amsterdam.nl/Bestuursarchief/2008/Commissie%20AZ/Stukken/AZ20080116WallenBeleidspMaatschappOpvang.pdf
Tilburg
Of all 50 cities in a social economic index Tilburg underwent the greatest improvement from 1997 till 2007. The low unemployment rate, number of jobs and jobs in growth sectors were accountable for that result. The number of unemployed (non working job searchers) dropped from 9.7% (2004) to 5.4% (2008), compared with the average of the Netherlands: 9.4% - 5.4%. The number of people on social assistance is 4,782. 22% of all households are low income households (up to 105% of the social minimum level). 42% of them are allochtonen. 13% of all children live in low income households. 35% of all children with a non-western background live in families on low income. Half of the households on the minimum level live so for longer than 3 years. Youth unemployment is high. The minimum income households are concentrated in North and West (18%) and oud-zuid (25%) (Gemeente Tilburg, 2008).

3.1.3 Poverty and social exclusion policies

Amsterdam
Poverty policy is mainly designed by the central city government. It is primarily aimed at people with an income up to 110% of the social minimum. Instruments of poverty policy include special assistance (bijzondere bijstand), aid to people with debts, the city card (which gives people discount to access social and cultural activities), subsidies for computers, discount on a collective insurance for people on low incomes, additional income for elderly with small pensions, cheap loans, and subsidies for poor people living on benefits for more than 3 years who are faced with incidental expenditures. The Service Work and Income (Dienst Werk en Inkomen) is responsible for the execution of these policies, as well as for providing general assistance (in the context of the national law for Work and Social Assistance). Through this Law, municipalities are stimulated financially to lead people dependant on social assistance back to the workforce. The city districts can strengthen and add to the poverty policy of the city government. Their role concentrates on prevention and referring citizens to the appropriate welfare institutions. City districts can also support private initiatives that are aimed at helping people with a social minimum income, like food banks. The central city government also cooperates with various food banks and is training people responsible for doing intakes so they can provide clients with information about the services and public welfare organisations in Amsterdam. It also facilitates so-called buddy projects run by NGOs that aim at making people independent of food banks. There is a special policy for the re-integration of homeless and drug addicts (Action Plan for Social Relief), part of which is financed by a national policy for the 4 biggest cities in the Netherlands.

Rotterdam
The design of local poverty policies resembles that of Amsterdam and rests in the hands of the city government. Rotterdam has since the 1980s always been seen as a frontrunner in this field. First with social activation policies, forms of subsidised labour and the ‘Rotterdam-pas’ for low income households, recently with programmes on ending homelessness and its attempts to make its special assistance policy known to potential beneficiaries. Nevertheless, in 2006 only an estimated 50% of those entitled to receive special assistance actually made use of the right. Of the total special assistance budget of 40 million Euros, up to 1 million Euro is available for intermediary organisations, including FBOs, that can help finding new beneficiaries. Food Banks and a private – public Special Emergency Fund are also supported to reach that goal. On basis of special national legislation (the Rotterdam-law) the local coalition government under Leefbaar Rotterdam (2002-2006), could experiment in banning low income households from a range of neighbourhoods. So-called Stadsmarieners (city-marines) were granted the right to visit people at home, ask after their problems and intervene in their situation. Other marines - independently operating, well-paid senior officials with
an broad mandate – were dealing with users of hard drugs and homeless in public spaces. These policies were continued under the coalition dominated by the social-democrats (2006–2010).

Tilburg
Increasing the range of income support and measures to promote participation among citizens with low income are the two main targets of the local anti-poverty policy. Therefore, the municipality of Tilburg wants to provide clear and specific information and communication, intensive collaboration between all organisations involved, administrative support and a personal approach and attention to specific risk groups. Although, like all other municipalities, the city cannot carry out an ‘income policy’, Tilburg is trying to reduce the negative effects of an insufficient income, as much as possible. Special Assistance (bijzondere bijstand) is brought under the attention of those entitled to it through co-operation with intermediary organisations including FBOs. Employees of the Municipal social service are aware of private funds and actively referring their clients to them.

3.2 Geographies of Faith-based Organisations

Within the urban context FBOs are strongly place-based, therefore their spatial element is important to consider.

Traditional churches
Individual, traditional, Protestant and Catholic churches that are still operative in the cities are often engaged in community outreach activities in their own neighbourhood, or set up ecumenical initiatives (e.g. Church- and neighbourhood work Amsterdam). The Elthetochurch in Amsterdam especially wants to contribute to social cohesion in the neighbourhood. Therefore together with neighbours, brainstorming has taken place about the functions of a new building, which could include a living room to come together for prayers, a social restaurant and a café.

New religious communities
In some deprived areas and neighbourhoods where traditional churches have a low profile or largely disappeared, you will typically find new religious communities of migrants (mosques and related organisations, migrant churches, for example). These organisations might be located in former churches or monasteries, offices, or garages (in the Bijlmer area, Amsterdam). In Amsterdam the Aya Sofia mosque is located in an old Roman Catholic friary for example and also the Fatih mosque transformed an old church building. The Kocatepe mosque in Rotterdam found a new home in an abandoned large monumental school building for a symbolic amount of money. Overall, the number of purpose-built mosques in the Netherlands is growing steadily (like the prominent Süleymaniye mosque in Tilburg). Christian migrants often still mostly share or rent places temporarily. An exception is Amsterdam South-East were a multi-purpose building has been erected (in cooperation with local authorities and housing association) hosting several ‘African’ Churches, in addition to office space, a creche and housing. The Round Table House in Tilburg also offers space for various religious communities.

In all three cities non-western Christian churches attract people from all over town, or even from neighbouring cities, because they are organised by ethnicity, language and/or country of origin, or because of the charisma of a pastor. A simple but important reason for them to be in deprived areas is because of the affordability of renting in these places. In a few cases they reach out explicitly to the surrounding neighbourhoods. Initiatives such as food banks and walk-in centres often make use of the existing geography of religious buildings, using churches and mosques as places to ‘reach out’.
The ecumenical Urban Mission in Rotterdam (Old Neighbourhood Pastorate) is since many years located in several deprived neighbourhoods and operates within a strong network structure.

**Redistribution of resources across urban space**

In some cases FBOs located in more well-off neighbourhoods deliberately conduct their diaconal work in deprived neighbourhoods. This is more the case in Amsterdam and Rotterdam than in Tilburg. The Protestant Diaconate in Amsterdam for instance has project bureaus and people working in different parts of the city, especially in deprived neighbourhoods. Also the deacon of Amsterdam (in cooperation with the dioceses) tries to mobilize people and resources from Catholic parishes in and outside the city to get engaged with social issues in urban areas. Although at a very small scale, such initiatives create a redistribution of resources across urban space. In Rotterdam, the Old Districts’ pastorate (Urban Mission), the Paulus church (shelter for homeless, ex-psychiatric patients, illegal immigrants and others) and projects aimed at women and children are examples supported by the relatively wealthy churches in the surrounding areas and by individuals all across the country. Several interviewees mentioned a gradual but constant shift in the number of volunteers in projects travelling in from towns around Rotterdam. For this reason, organisations like the Protestant KSA - for Social work by the churches are intensifying their relations with churches in the broader region. Rotterdam seems to benefit more from these transfers of money and volunteers than Amsterdam, simply because of the nature of its ‘hinterland’ with higher levels of church membership and church attendance. For Tilburg no substantial similar relations can be traced.

Besides this, the national churches have always been massively supporting the diaconal work in the largest cities financially. The last decade has however seen a continuous decline in these budgets. So far, (faith-based) charitable funds have been filling this gap to a certain degree.

**Heritage/tourism function of FBOs**

While in other parts of Amsterdam many churches have fused, been demolished and/or have been given new destinations, in the inner city church buildings have often remained in place due to their heritage/tourism value. An example is the St. Nicolas church, which is used not only by the members of the parish living in the inner city, but also visited by tourists, and rented to a Spanish speaking Catholic migrant community, most of whom live in deprived Amsterdam suburbs. Although membership of the parish has dropped sharply, the parish is involved in a food bank in the inner city, and brings Christmas gifts to prostitutes of the red light district. The ecumenical Open Door Foundation is also located at a very central location in the Amsterdam city centre (Begijnhof), where people can come for counselling with Catholic or Protestant pastors and receive individual aid. Other examples in the inner city are The Moseshouse, a former Roman Catholic church and a Lutheran church. Both churches do not engage (at least structurally) in religious services anymore, but are used by FBOs to organise a wide range of activities. Rotterdam and Tilburg are less visited by tourists, and also do not have monumental churches, with the exception of the Laurens church and perhaps Armenius - the Remonstrant church in Rotterdam.

**FBOs located in the inner city**

Some FBOs have deliberately located themselves in the inner city, in order to be close to their target group or to have a central location for service delivery. This is less the case in Tilburg, because this city knows little segregation and is much smaller than Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

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32 Catholic migrant communities are often organised by language (Spanish, Portuguese etc.), and therefore can come from different parts of the city to attend a sermon. Often though they are concentrated in certain neighbourhoods.
Amsterdam, for instance, several FBOs are located in the red light district providing services to prostitutes and their clients, managing walk-in centres for homeless people, or providing health services to undocumented people. An example is Oudezijds 100, a Christian ‘living community’ in the Red Light District which is involved in community outreach activities, supported housing and has a health post for undocumented people that come from all over the city to receive treatment. The organisation is worried though about the urban renewal plans in the neighbourhood (project 1012), which might cause troubles for their service delivery. In Rotterdam, the expensive land values in its high rising city centre make it possible to re-develop the church owned plot of land where the 1950s building of the Paulus church was demolished in 2007, into an at least on paper architectural masterpiece with luxurious apartments, social housing, a cafe and new church facilities for the urban outcasts (except drug addicts who after intervention by the mayor of Rotterdam in 2006 have been expelled from the church and directed to several more regular, secular projects in the city) and the surrounding residents.

Central location for high visibility
Due to their ownership of churches and church-based institutions (former housing for the elderly, orphanages etc.) some FBOs are located in upper class/ gentrified neighbourhoods in or close to the city centre. Their central location in the city gives them high visibility, and some use this visibility to make issues of social exclusion more visible. The most well known and controversial example was the already mentioned diaconal centre Paulus church in the heart of Rotterdam (1981 - 2007). Also to be mentioned is the (formerly rich and influential) Protestant Diaconate that owns several 17th century buildings and hofjes (a courtyard with almshouses around it) at central locations in Amsterdam. While some of these places are used for special social housing purposes, other spaces have been used to ‘make a place’ in the city for marginal groups - such as the homeless or undocumented people - to gather, receive help and engage in emancipator activities. Another example is the Evangelical-Lutheran Diaconate that also owns several monumental buildings in the city. Not all these buildings get a new social function though. Several monumental buildings have been sold as well (like the old Amstelhoof which is now a museum, and the Lutheran orphanage which was sold and transformed into a fund for youth care).

Low cost buildings
Other FBOs are more invisible in urban space, because they look for low cost buildings to provide their services. Examples are apartments in Amsterdam South East used by migrant communities and organisations (CARF, Jeanette Noëlhouse), and shelters in old schools (Exodus Amsterdam), offices and churches in industrial zones (New Song Tilburg) or parking garages. Because FBOs often provide services to urban outcasts, they are often not the preferred neighbours for some and face NIBMY resistance. That is also a reason for choosing low profile buildings.

Public buildings
While most FBOs own or rent private buildings in the city, some FBOs make use of public buildings, especially in neighbourhoods. For example, we came across a Ghanaian pastor with an almost entirely Antillean flock, renting a room for his religious and social activities in a municipal neighbourhood centre. He co-ordinated a food bank and rented from the authorities the place for storage and delivery of the food for free. After moving several times, the Pentecost Revival church international is now located in the community centre De Kandelaar, which houses 15 churches in 5 church halls, but also includes offices for some self-organisations, a crèche, a restaurant and apartments. The MST in Tilburg shares with some NGOs a spacious abandoned bank office that was purchased and renovated for them by the municipality. The Urban Mission in Rotterdam often co-uses buildings with other neighbourhood organisations, like in Rotterdam Middelland with the residents’ organisation Middelland and in Rotterdam-Feijenoord with a Moroccan organisation.
4 On the role of Faith-based Organisations in the local welfare system

The role of private initiatives, among them FBOs, in the social domain strongly depends on the local needs and on local history of relations with the government and general institutions. This implies that one can not speak of the role of FBOs in the Dutch welfare state or in the cities. They are active in different domains and fulfil different functions for the benefit of various groups.

4.1 Activities of Faith-based Organisations: an overview

Before we turn to the activities of local FBOs, we present an overview from a national perspective of activities undertaken in the struggle against social exclusion.

Activities by traditional churches

Some welfare activities of the traditional Protestant and Catholic churches have remained similar, when compared to the pre welfare state period such as visiting elderly and ill people in their communities and providing pastoral care. Churches are also still involved in helping people living at the fringe of society, for instance by providing services (including food, clothing, shelter and spiritual care) to homeless people, drug addicts and prostitutes. Different than in the past, these diaconal services are often no longer directly related to missionary goals and rather aimed at ‘helping there where is no helper’. Other activities relate to the new role of churches in the context of the welfare state, such as helping people to find their ways in the differentiated web of institutions and regulations. Another task churches have taken on is to provide a safety net for people excluded from state benefits, such as undocumented people and asylum seekers, or for whom these benefits are insufficient, such as people with large debts.

A broad spectrum of religious communities and organisations has done research on the material individual and collective services of parishes, religious communities and other religious organisations in the Netherlands. The project ‘Poverty in the Netherlands’ has presented results in 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008 and will be published again in 2010. The research is conducted under supervision of Church in Action - the diaconal body of the Protestant church in the Netherlands, and Working group The poor side of the Netherlands /EVA (Economy, Women and Poverty). The survey in 2008 among 1236 Protestant and Catholic churches and organisations in the Netherlands (Crutzen, 2008) indicates that ¾ of the parish charity institutions, deacons and other diaconal organisations assist people with financial problems. While most organisations (83 per cent) provide gifts, half of the organisations (51 per cent) also give loans. In addition, 53 per cent of the organisations provide non-financial aid.\footnote{Taking different measures together 86 percent of the churches and organisations are involved in poverty reduction. Those that are not involved more consist of smaller communities and give as explanation that there are no poor people in their community.}
churches together spent in 2007 between €8,130,577 and €14,662,655 on financial aid. The most important target groups are single parents with children, jobless, asylum seekers and undocumented people, elderly, people with psychological problems, and disabled people. Another striking result is that 50 per cent of the organisations are involved in food delivery (often in cooperation with so-called food banks, in Dutch voedselbanken).

**Activities by ecumenical networks and organisations**

Sometimes diaconal activities of local churches for specific (social excluded) groups have resulted in ecumenical networks and organisations, such as network DAK. Ad-hoc provisions of shelter by local churches to asylum seekers resulted in the establishment of a working group within the Council of Churches, a broad NGO platform with a strong presence of FBOs on undocumented migrants (PMZV) and independent advocacy organisations such as INLIA. The growing number of food banks resulted in the Food banks Netherlands Foundation, a network of some 110 food banks, many supported by volunteers from local churches. Both food banks and church asylum are often understood as forms of ‘helping under protest’, and ecumenical platforms such as Arme Kant/EVA, the working group on refugees and INLIA have been involved in lobbying on behalf of excluded others for more fair poverty and asylum policies. Others, like Vincentius and its many volunteers prefer to help in silence and contribute far from the spotlights to local initiatives like food banks, funds to enable children to fully participate in school and sports, and to holidays for families in need. Other FBOs have developed into professional service providers to specific groups living at the margins of society, such as Salvation Army, Exodus, etc. Still other FBOs focus their activities on social activation of volunteers. Some recently established faith-based organisations in this category are characterized by new working philosophies. For instance, organisations such as HiP and Present aim at matching supply of volunteers to needy individuals, by activating people from churches to do volunteer work on an ad-hoc rather than structural basis. While these matching approaches are in line with the network society, the emphasis on volunteers being ‘present’ for needy others aims to bridge the gap of people’s need for a community of proximity.

**Activities by faith-based self-organisations of Christian migrants**

Faith-based self-organisations of migrants play an important role in the integration of their members in society, many of whom belong to the most vulnerable groups in society. Migrant churches often provide practical information about all kinds of issues, language courses, educational activities, psycho-social care and social work (Van der Sar and Visser, 2006; Euser et al., 2006). A study on the social role of Christian churches in Rotterdam indicates that the social benefits of migrant churches are similar to that of native churches. Applying the method of ‘Social Return On Investment’, the average social return of investment per annum of an autochthon church is estimated at 456,000 Euros, and that of a migrant church on 437,000 Euros. The city hosts some 272 churches (approximately 1/3 are migrant churches) with some 200,000 members, of whom more than 10 per cent do volunteering. Most activities of volunteers take place in the fields of psychosocial care, social welfare and community development. Care and aid of churches is mainly aimed at their own members, but they also reach out to groups outside the religious community (Castillo Guerra, Glashouwer and Kregting, 2008). A study among 44 Catholic migrant churches in the Netherlands (mainly in the Randstad area) indicates that the main reasons for participation in a migrant church are: meeting people with a similar background (85 per cent), faith perception in own language and culture (85 per cent), retaining cultural identity (55 per cent), search for help (24 per cent), providing help (24 per cent) and orientation on Dutch society (19 per cent) (Guerra et al., 2006, p. 29).

34 In comparison, Van der Sar & Visser (2006) estimate the average social return of 23 migrant churches in The Hague to be 180,000 Euros.
Umbrella organisations of migrant churches, such as SKIN, have also been active in informing member churches about the rights of undocumented people, for instance in the field of health care.

**On the social role of mosques and other Islamic organisations**

Mosques play a similar role and often develop activities aimed at the emancipation, integration and participation of their group members in society, e.g. via social and cultural activities, educational activities, charity, individual aid and advice, women groups, youth branches etc. (Canatan, Popovic and Edinga, 2005). Initially mosques had mainly a religious function, but when the process of family reunification started, mosques gradually broadened their activities and became important volunteer organisations in civil society. Research into the social role of mosques in Rotterdam (Canatan, Oudijk and Ljamai, 2003) reveals that next to their religious and related educational activities (e.g. Koran and Arabic lessons), mosques often develop a wide range of social activities. This includes providing information (on for instance on elections, provisions for the elderly, school choices for children, employment), education (e.g. Dutch language, health, psychology, child rearing), homework guidance for school children, emancipation activities for girls/ women (e.g. raising autonomy), intercultural and inter-religious activities, recreational and sport activities and individual help (e.g. advising or bridging the gap with regular social services). By providing these services, mosques succeed in reaching minority groups (usually characterised by low income and educational levels) for which the threshold to regular services is high (see also De Gruijter, Doğan and Rijkschroeff, 2006). Moreover, most mosques function as informal meeting places where mutual aid is organised in case of financial or other need (e.g. financial support for a funeral or in case of chronic illness of a child; fund raising in case of nature disasters like the earth quakes in Turkey and Morocco). They also often function as informal places to exchange information on demands and supplies in the labour market (Civiq, 2005).

Some studies indicate large differences in the social role of mosques. In a study among 120 mosques in the Netherlands, 22 percent was only active in the religious sphere, while 44 percent developed social activities in variety of social domains and 34 percent in specific social domains (Canatan, et al., 2005). Focusing on the situation in Rotterdam, Canatan et al. (2003) argue that differences between mosques are largely determined by the age of the members of the board, cultural and religious factors (mosques with a Turkish or Pakistani background more often play a social role) and the attitude of the imam. Other results show fewer differences among mosques. Research by Civiq (2005) for instance indicates that three quarters of the mosques in the Netherlands develop social-cultural activities and social work. Also a report on the social role of mosques in Amsterdam concludes that there are no large differences between social activities of mosques. They conclude that most social activities are aimed at the self-help and emancipation of group members, while less attention is paid to the participation in society and integration. An exception is the large-scale participation of mosques in inter-religious dialogue networks. Active cooperation with welfare organisations or local authorities is incidental (Driessen et al., 2004).

There are some methodological issues which call for caution about sweeping generalisations. In interviews with representatives of Muslim umbrella organisations it became clear that the idea of volunteering is not always recognized as such. Helping out people in the community is not necessarily regarded as some kind of volunteering. Second, religious and social activities are not always separated by those involved, which makes it difficult to measure the scope and intensity of welfare provision. What did become clear in the conversations with representatives of Muslim umbrella organisations and IHSAN is that mosques have become multifunctional places, where people do not only come to pray, but also to meet one another, to build informal networks, to collect information
about new regulations and bureaucratic procedures, to receive help, and educate their children. One striking finding mentioned by several interviewees is the fact that mosques often serve as day-care centres for elderly. Mosque leaders have also become political representatives of Muslims, and local authorities and private care institutions increasingly cooperate with them to organise information events in mosques to reach their rank and file. Third, while mosques are primarily a meeting place for Muslim men (although women also have activities in mosques), Muslim women organisations (that are often but not necessarily linked to mosques) play an important role in assistance to Muslim women. Sometimes such assistance takes care instead of, or in parallel to, official government assistance.

4.2 Local activities of Faith-based Organisations in social domains

This section describes the activities of FBOs in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg, based on domains in which social exclusion occurs and can be combated.

Incomes/debts

A lot of people in the Netherlands have to manage on low incomes and recent statistics (Steketee et al, 2010) show that the gap between children who live in ‘good’ or deprived neighbourhoods continues to grow. FBOs often get in touch with groups that live on the margins of society. Sometimes they help out by dispensing small financial help at the individual level, within the community as well as outside their own community. Financial support can be given in a variety of forms and at different levels. Providing financial support to specific target groups, the Open Door (Amsterdam), for example, administers several funds such as a fund for school books for children (Leren zonder Papieren).

In migrant communities religious and social activities are often mixed. This results in a different way of assisting people. While most Dutch people go home after mass, migrant communities often stay together to eat, and informally solve social or financial problems, or set up initiatives for needy members. We see this often with Islamic FBOs, in all three municipalities. They act out of the zakat. This is a religious obligation of the Islam to give a part of your property to the poor. The collected money is often sent to the poor outside the Netherlands, but the attention for poverty in their own country is growing. One example is the Al Kabir mosque is Amsterdam which provides sporadically financial aid to individuals in need in their own community, like transportation costs of deceased to Morocco. They also help out outside their own community, for example during Ramadan zakat al fitr is collected for poor people abroad. Another example is Masjid El-Feth in Tilburg where collections are made for when emergencies occur among members. Other FBOs instigate separate ‘working groups’ for financial aid, like the Portuguese speaking/ Cape Verdean religious community Nossa Senhora da Paz in Rotterdam, which has a separate working group that offers help to people in acute financial problems.

Often, however, religious communities do not have enough financial means to dispense money. And, overall, we observe that demands for financial aid have increased considerably, especially the demand for debt aid. The Kocatepe mosque in Rotterdam for example states “we are a big community, at a given moment you risk becoming the Social Service.” Therefore, more and more FBOs refer those people to professional organisations, specialized in financial aid and/or dept counseling.
Besides the dispensing of money, FBOs actively signal (often hidden) poverty and look after the interests of the people who live in poverty. The administration of funds by the Open Door for example resulted out of attention the Amsterdam Taskforce Refugees drew of the local authorities, now providing temporary financial support to asylum seekers that are denied government support and/or are waiting on decisions in their legal procedures. FBOs in Tilburg play an important role in signalling bottlenecks concerning poverty and social exclusion. Examples are the platform Social Security (with forty organisations) and the Religious Platform Tilburg (Religieus Beraad Tilburg). In Rotterdam the local social alliance ROSA35 fulfils this task.

One component of signalling poverty is trying to better reach people in poverty. The Protestant Community Tilburg, for example, trains its own volunteers in recognising poverty. And the Missionary Centre Tilburg knows an ‘ombudsteam’, which performs pre-work for the case managers of the Social Service and helps people filling in tax forms. Old Neighbourhoods Pastoral Care organisations in Rotterdam and the ‘purpose foundation’ of the Glorious Chapel in Rotterdam educate people about dealing with bills, and Abou RakRak in Rotterdam gives a course ‘how to deal with money’. These examples illustrate that FBOs regularly work in a preventative fashion, by educating people in poverty about their rights and duties. All three municipalities also make use of faith-based networks to call attention to income support regulations.

**Non-financial aid**

Volunteers from churches and sometimes mosques are often involved in food banks in cities. Leading members of the evangelical Trinity Chapel were, for example, the driving force behind a large food bank in Tilburg. In Amsterdam an inner city food bank was initiated by the deacon of the St. Nicolas church, attracting some 50 volunteers including many non-church members. To coordinate the volunteer work, church members from the Roman Catholic as well as the Protestant churches formed a steering group. In the Bos & Lommer district in Amsterdam volunteers from churches and mosques set up a food bank together; faith inspired Mrs. Mac-Nack started in her living room the ‘independent’ food bank for Amsterdam South-East ‘Hope for Tomorrow’. Furthermore, the pastor and volunteers from the Glorious Chapel are running a food bank in Rotterdam Lombardijen - with the pastor personally checking peoples’ income and debts according to the official guidelines of the Food Bank of the Netherlands.

Food banks represent a contentious form of aid. Within FBOs and also in politics it is debated to which extent a problem is kept alive in this way. On the other hand, although food banks may not structurally solve a problem, they carry within them an important function of recognizing problems. Food banks reach people stuck in the bureaucracy of public social service delivery, the homeless and occasionally also undocumented people. Buddy project VONK (initiative of the Rainbow Group, Amsterdam) links volunteers to clients of food banks in the city, with the aim of guiding them towards professional assistance and making them more self supporting. In all three cities the local authorities have decided to cooperate with Food banks. Food is also distributed via gatherings in churches or mosques, walk-in centres, diaconal centres of churches in the city centres (e.g. the Paulus church in Rotterdam) and projects like the Innercity Project in Rotterdam. This last FBO drives around the city with a bus and distributes coffee, fruit and sandwiches.

Many FBOs report other forms of non-financial assistance: the St. Nicolas church in Amsterdam develops in cooperation with Kruispost (a small medical centre for people without medical insu-
rance) the idea of a medicine bank, because since January 2009 some medicines are no longer refunded by insurance companies. Since the 1980s, medical personnel has always been working in the Paulus Church in Rotterdam, as members of staff and on a voluntary basis. In the Suleymaniye mosque in Tilburg members can have their blood pressure and other medical things checked every Monday by employees of home care.

FBOs like the Salvation Army and Emmaus have a professionalised system of second hand shops. The majority of FBOs in our survey is regularly collecting furniture and clothing for individuals or families in need. In these ways, FBOs offer emergency assistance, despite the fact that some municipalities have an emergency fund themselves. This is needed, according to them, because assistance calls often take to long; “shortly stated: we have already buried the people and they still did not received an answer” (Trinity Chapel, Tilburg).

**Housing**

Various FBOs provide shelter or supported housing to a variety of groups, for example homeless people, drug addicts, undocumented people, ex-convicts and people with socio-psychological issues. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam FBOs have a relatively large share in the shelter and support of the homeless and other people ‘from the street’, with or without the approval of the government. Examples in Rotterdam are the unsubsidised ‘homes’ of Victory Outreach (for people with addiction and other problems), the fully subsidized shelter projects of the Meeting foundation and the Salvation Army, and the mixed financed initiatives like ‘Lodge the Neighbours’ (Logeerhuis de Buren) of the organisation for social work KSA. This last example is a lodge for people who come from the hospital, but have no supporting network at home. They can stay for six weeks and are assisted by volunteers. (Funded by Churches, the Johanniter Order (Protestant) and a local budget for innovation within the Social Support Act.)

In Amsterdam, already in 1955 a living community was founded at the Oudezijds Achterburgwal 100, in the heart of the Amsterdam red light district. The communitarian community Oudezijds 100 consists of several foundations, among others Kruispost. It was an explicit choice of the founders to live in the middle of the city in a neighbourhood with social problems. Furthermore, the Christian Aid and Resources Foundation (CARF), working hand in hand with the African church community The House of Fellowship, provides women that want to leave forced prostitution with shelter, owning 5 apartments/mission houses at secret locations in the city. The Jeanette Noelhouse shifted its target group from homeless people with addiction problems into providing temporary housing for refugees excluded from Asylum Seeker Centres and/or from access to public services. In addition to the Jeanette Noelhouse there are two other Catholic Worker Houses in Amsterdam providing housing to undocumented people. Also, with 653 employees and 3600 registered clients, the Salvation Army’s Goodwill Centre in Amsterdam has a large market share in the field of social care, especially regarding accommodation and shelter for vulnerable groups. And Exodus (also active in Rotterdam) combines supported housing in combination with intensive support aiming to contribute to a successful reintegration in society for its residents.

The term ‘housing’ often embraces different forms of help. In the Jeanette Noelhouse in Amsterdam, for example, the Catholic Workers also help members to get access to healthcare, make sure children can go to school, provide possibilities for Dutch lessons and help people find a temporary job. Besides that, vigils (wakes) at the detention centre at Schiphol Airport are organised and refugees in prison are visited. As a result, the Jeanette Noelhouse also functions as a meeting place for activists wanting to become politically active regarding refugees. A variant of the more regular
housing is formed by the Rainbow Group who in close cooperation with the municipality and the police provided 4 of their walk-in centres with so-called ‘user rooms’. In these rooms a select group of chronic drug users can use drugs under supervision. Experiments with ‘user rooms’ were introduced by the Paulus Church in Rotterdam in the 1980s.

Whereas private initiatives in Amsterdam and Rotterdam historically played and still play a substantial role in housing, this is much less the case in Tilburg. There are, however, two exceptions. The first is the work of father Poels, but the shelter for the homeless of ‘Poels Home’ has nowadays become secular. The second exception is the tradition in supporting and housing asylum seekers with the congregations as the driving force (the Religious Order and VLOT- part of the Missionary Service Centre Tilburg, MST).

\textbf{Participation and work}  

FBOs add to participation in two ways. First of all they are ‘producers’ of voluntary work: their members, volunteers and managers deliver “a free and valuable contribution” to society (Van der Sar and Visser 2006). This contribution will be discussed later. Secondly, FBOs try to boost participation among people experiencing social exclusion, by offering voluntary work and enlarging the chances for paid work. This happens in different ways. It often starts with the creation of small networks around these people. A nice example is formed by the so called compassion networks of the Meeting Foundation in Rotterdam. At this moment a pilot is running, in which the foundation selects the homeless who need social network support and another organisation (Passion) organises the volunteers around them. Within religious communities we regularly see a ‘high level of self help’. In the Scots International church in Rotterdam, for example, the native members explain the procedures in the Netherlands to non-native members. An example of concrete help finding a job is ‘Dress for Success’, introduced in the Netherlands by Mara, an independent Catholic organisation (Rotterdam and The Hague). In this project people at the bottom of the labour market are supported via the provision of appropriate clothing for a job interview and dressed professionally.

Some FBOs that used to provide services to homeless people and drug addicts, are now also engaged in local policies of activation, by organizing day-activities, running supported labour schemes and subsidized work. With support of a social investment fund, the Salvation Army currently tries to develop 300 new jobs. The Rainbow Group (Amsterdam) represents an organisation which has increased its work and social activation projects for homeless and addicts visiting the walk-in centres. Since the latest fusion with ‘De Amsterdamse Vriendendiensten’ (buddy projects), it also tries to make walk-in centres more like a community centre, by mixing clients with volunteers. Another organisation that tries to activate its members is the Pentecost Revival Church International (Amsterdam). The church actively tries to empower its church members, in the words of the respondent, “We develop people.” The women ministry at this church includes Dutch language and computer courses for example. Further, church members are encouraged to start their own business; the respondent notes that most people working in the market and shopping centres are church members who used to depend on state benefits. The minister of the Surinam EBG church in Amsterdam South-East stresses the fact that individuals and society as a whole benefit from the fact that people develop themselves by contributing to their community/church. In Tilburg, the Missionary Service centre Tilburg (MST) offers activation trajectories for social assistance clients. Furthermore, sometimes mosques and diaconal centres offer some subsidized jobs themselves, although the number of places was reduced a few years ago. This created difficulties for many mosques and faith-based grass-roots organisations that were otherwise without paid staff.
Independent work-and living communities that rely heavily on volunteering, like Emmaus and Oudezijds 100 in Amsterdam, could be mentioned here as well. Reciprocity is an important principle in the community Oudezijds 100. People that temporally live in the community are not supposed to only receive or provide aid, but to give and receive. The individual members of the community are occasionally engaged in lobbying, by participating in meetings with other social relief organisations, and by writing letters to politicians or through personal contacts. We see the same thing happening at House of Hope in Rotterdam; “you clearly see participation of the neighbourhood and the people we accompany or meet. Those people become meaningful for others”. A difference with regular organisations seems to be this willingness to encourage volunteering among their beneficiaries: clients or visitors become volunteers or even employees (for example CARF, Paulus Church, Victory Outreach, Glorious Chapel).

**Culture and leisure time**

Christian and Islamic migrant communities often organise cultural and leisure time activities for their members. The Jewish Social Work can also be mentioned here. Through organizing these activities, the organisations become important meeting places for the community. Urban Mission workers, for example, organise in ‘their’ neighbourhoods activities with the inhabitants. Within neighbourhoods, churches can turn into walk-in centres, where people can come for coffee, use the internet, or receive help and advice. With a project like ‘Mixen in Mokum’ linking Amsterdam natives with ‘new’ inhabitants the Moseshouse contributes to social cohesion on a local level. ‘Welcome in Rotterdam’, an independent programme carried out by Mara intends the same. In the Elthetchurch in Amsterdam people can drink coffee together every Friday morning. In these activities people with different faiths or people not attending further church services are also included. Another good example is the ‘living room’ of the House of the World in Tilburg. This is a meeting place for ex-psychiatric patients and homeless people. Every day around 200 people use the living room and around forty volunteers are responsible for the state of affairs.

In the Netherlands, mosques often carry within them a broader function than only being a house of worship. Mosques in the cities under research organise social and cultural activities in addition to religious activities. Cultural activities can range from readings on Turkish culture and cooking or stitching classes to debates on societal issues and holding an open house for visitors yearly.

Women and children are often target groups of culture and leisure activities of FBOs: swimming courses for Islamic women, holidays for children from poor families and music and sports groups (Foundations Mara and KSA, Islamic neighbourhood organisations in Rotterdam, Antillean New Song community, MST and Süleymaniye mosque in Tilburg, Victory Outreach, Youth for Christ and Hope for Tomorrow are examples). Mosques turn out to be an important meeting place for elderly people too. The Al Kabir mosque, Amsterdam lobbied for a living community for Moroccan elderly, for example. In the case of the Fatih mosque in Amsterdam, a related youth organisation provides sport activities for boys and film evenings for girls. The Kocatepe mosque in Rotterdam has its own soccer teams (600 members).

**Inter religious dialogue**

The involvement of various FBOs in the organisation of inter-religious dialogues could be mentioned here as well (see also section 6.2). An important driver behind inter-religious dialogue meetings in Amsterdam is the Council for Life Convictions and Religions Amsterdam (RLRA), founded in 1997. RLRA-members include religious as well as non-religious people and representatives of umbrella organisations like Council of Churches, UMMAO and the Humanist society. Rotterdam has inter-religi-
ous umbrella organisations like SPIOR (Islamic FBOs), SKIN (migrant churches), the Rotterdam Council for Life Conviction and Religion (Roravolere) and the new Rotterdam Platform for Life Conviction and Religion (Platform L & R). Furthermore, often FBOs are inter-religious themselves. Because of the multi-religious composition people of different groups meet each other automatically. Some FBOs organise activities to stimulate this interaction even more, like the so called ‘cultural fellowships’ of the International Baptist church in Rotterdam. After the Sunday worship all members bring traditional food from their own country which is offered to everyone. Overall, theological differences as well as different opinions on world conflicts regularly cause challenges to inter-religious cooperation. At the same time, arguments on these issues are mentioned as a reason to invest even more in dialogue.

**Education and upbringing**

Besides cultural and leisure activities, a variety of FBOs also organises education and upbringing related activities. For the ‘new Dutch’, for example, multiple (often migrant) FBOs offer language- and habituation courses, upbringing courses and guidance, social skills courses, computer courses and home work classes (examples in Rotterdam are Ettahoud, Participation and Renewal, Abou RakRak, Sagrada Familia and Parochie Nossa Senhora da Paz). Often, mosques provide Islamic education for children in the weekends. More specific is the example of extra-schooling for children taking the primary school exam, homework classes or information meetings on schooling possibilities after finishing primary school (e.g. Fatih mosque Amsterdam). Providing homework assistance and other activities for the youth, also serves in order to keep the youth involved in the organisation. And, children “are not only helped with respect to the content of the courses, but it is also the case that some children have no computer or printer at home.” (Abou RakRak, Rotterdam). Umbrella organisation UMMAO sees improving the quality of education within mosques as an important future goal.

The Moses House in Amsterdam also functions as a centre for education as well with programs and trainings for adults and elderly. In Tilburg MST is an important provider of language courses for migrants and refugees, with around 720 participants annually. They also organise popular computer courses. In addition, the Round Table house in Tilburg-North has so called ‘family meetings’ in which people from different self organisations discuss problems and help each out. Other examples in Tilburg are the theme meetings of New Song about social topics for young parents and the elderly, and the guided tours of the Liberal Jewish Community to inform others about the Jewish culture and as a result create better understanding.

**Justice**

Various FBOs are involved in assisting asylum-seekers and undocumented people with legal procedures or in protesting against immigration and asylum policies (e.g. INLIA, Council of Churches nationally, the Paulus Church, KSA and Mara in Rotterdam, several organisations in Amsterdam including The World House and the Jeanette Noelhouse in Amsterdam and VLOT in Tilburg). With this they try to influence national policy and call the attention of the municipality to the situation of their clients. “If you tell people; you are allowed to stay here while you wait for your procedure, but you are not allowed to work and you do not get an allowance or home, than that is a gap that should be closed” (KSA, Rotterdam).

There are also various local initiatives aimed at specific issues of social justice, mostly in cooperation with national networks, like the Poor Side, involved in political lobbying on poverty policies at the national level. The Spark in Tilburg, for example, translates individual experiences of poor
people to the political domain and ‘maintains’ local networks of NGOs, FBOs and public officials. In Amsterdam CARF is involved in political campaigns against human trafficking, the Rainbow Group writes newspaper articles to make society more aware of problems related to addiction and homelessness, Casa Migrante supports the strive of domestic workers to be represented by labour unions.

**Integration**

Almost all mosques and migrant churches are in one way or another involved in fostering the integration of their members in society, by providing Dutch language courses, homework assistance and information on Dutch culture, society and public services. Integration is not always intended: “Although this is not the most important goal of the church, unintentional it contributes to the integration of her members in the Dutch society.” (Scots International church, Rotterdam). Some Islamic FBOs focus on the integration and participation of women by offering activities in which men and women are separated. According to the respondents, this way of working leads to fewer objections of the men when their women want to attend activities of these organisations. On the longer run it is contributing to emancipation of women. In the public debate these activities are increasingly disputed.

FBOs working with migrant communities also offer language and computer courses or give tailor-made assistance and training (e.g. Worldhouse, SPIOR, Mara and KSA). Protestant diaconal body KSA Rotterdam merged with an organisation specialised in training in a multi-ethnic context. According to many FBOs not speaking the Dutch language is a major obstacle for participation. “We try to motivate the people, because you can not function in the country without language.” (La Sagrada Familia, Rotterdam). In Amsterdam, members of the Elthetochurch started a project to help people that speak Nepali, Urdu or Hindi with problems of integration, healthcare or asylum, for example. Other FBOs have started special projects aimed at bridging social capital and fostering social cohesion. Examples in Amsterdam are projects initiated by the Protestant Diaconate (like ABC Buurvrouwencontact and Living and Working together in Bos & Lommer).

### 4.3 Functions of Faith-based Organisations in the local welfare system

The previous section showed that social active FBOs unfold a range of activities in the social domain of combating social exclusion and promoting social inclusion. The method and the content of those activities may vary greatly between the different types of FBO. These differences can be explained by the different functions organisations (want to) fulfil within the local welfare system. Insight into these functions makes it easier to discover common grounds in the activities and to compare FBOs.

The relationship between FBOs and the (local) welfare system forms a central research theme within the European FACIT project. The hypothesis is that the retreating welfare state leaves empty spaces which can or should be filled by FBOs. The term ‘welfare system’ should be understood here as the whole of services and resources concerning social security, care and well-being. A part is taken care of by the government and a part by social organisations; both on their own initiative and by order of the government. Furthermore, people can receive support of family and/ or friends. So, discussions about the welfare system here go beyond the boundaries of the responsibilities of the government and the question whether other parties come into play. In other words: our research focuses on how things are organised or have grown spontaneously in the local context and which role FBOs fulfil in this scheme of things.
Within the FACIT project we developed a classification of seven functions, which we will describe below. We emphasise that organisations can fulfil more functions at the same time and that functions can be distinguished but not separated.

1. **FBOs that provide professional social services to specific target groups within the context of the welfare state, for which they are largely funded by the state.**

*In general*
These FBOs resemble NGOs in the third sector executing part of the state welfare provisions. Many FBOs in this category focus often on one or just a few issues or target groups. Examples are the help of ex-convicts by Exodus, the Salvation Army supporting the homeless or youth work in neighbourhoods by Youth for Christ. The lions’ share of their activities is paid for by the (local) authorities. Volunteers are involved, but always under the responsibility of professionals. In the field of homelessness services and re-socialising of ex-convicts, FBOs are ‘market leaders’. Innovation of working methods, professionalism, certification and accountability are emphasised. While their faith-based identity and/or working philosophy make them competitive in certain sections of the state controlled welfare market, state dependence sometimes also puts pressure on their faith-based identity and/or working philosophy (see also chapter 5).

*Cities under research*
In Amsterdam, the Rainbow Group represents an organisation clearly working within the context of the welfare state. Close cooperation with the local authorities in Amsterdam exists, funding the organisation for 84 per cent (in 2008). Other examples are Meeting Foundation and the Salvation Army. They are heavily subsidized by the government and in return they render an account of their activities. In Tilburg FBOs hardly fulfil this function. Basically, only MST, with the supply of social activation and language and habitation courses has this role.

2. **FBOs that provide social services to marginalized groups that are outside the scope and/or reach of the welfare state. Services the state cannot or does not want to provide.**

*In general*
Most initiatives in this category are linked to diaconal work of established Protestant and Catholic churches, on the local as well as at the national level. However, there are also examples of organisations started by individual theologians or pastors, by Roman Catholic congregations or by Evangelical communities. Ecumenical cooperation is growing. Volunteering with the back up of just a few professionals is the dominant way of operating. The boards of the organisations involved, entirely exist out of volunteers. The organisations vary in geographical scope (national/local), approach (top-down/bottom-up etc.) and target group (specific activities versus community outreach). Diaconal work and caritas is often broadly oriented towards ‘helping those without helper’. The opinion of most organisations is that while welfare is the responsibility of the state, it is their duty to fill the gaps and point out the negative consequences/failures of the state. In this context ‘help under protest’ is often mentioned. What these FBOs perceive as shortcomings of the welfare state changes over time. Important gaps in last 10 years include children living in poverty, the lack of care for homeless people, drug addicts, undocumented people, prostitutes and hard to reach communities. Strengthening self-help initiatives and grassroots solidarity groups are also widespread.

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36 A special case is Jewish Social Work (JMW) which focuses not on a specific issue of social exclusion, but delivers social services to the Jewish community, for which it is largely financed by the state. It resembles how most FBOs looked like in the time of pillarization. While most older faith-based welfare organisations opened their doors to the general public, JMW has continued to provide social services to Jewish people.
forms of support. Some evangelical organisations are less focussed on pointing out the shortcomings of the welfare state and rather focus on individual aid and evangelisation.

Cities under research
Within Amsterdam, numerous FBOs do supply these services, like the Protestant, Lutheran and Catholic Diaconates. Some typical FBOs matching this category are: the Africa House, the Parish San Nicolas and the Church House, supporting target groups as African immigrants, Spanish speaking people and Christian migrant communities in finding locations for worship respectively. The World House focuses upon people without valid papers by writing letters for undocumented people who want to visit a hospital, for example. Similar to Amsterdam, the majority of FBOs in Rotterdam and Tilburg do fulfil this role to a lesser or greater extent. The general opinion is that “what the government can not do, we probably can” and “churches have the principle ‘help under protest’ (...)

Temporary, we will put out small fires, but not for too long” (The Spark, Tilburg).

3. Informal care and mutual support, often provided ‘in silence’.

In general
Local churches and mosques habitually help out individual people/families in need within their respective communities, or in their neighbourhood. They run their social activities independent and often in silence. Co-ordinated by e.g. the deacons and elderly in the local Protestant churches, the Imam and ‘wise men’ in mosques, or reverends and elderly in for example African migrant churches, they support needy members within their own ranks. People receive material aid, are visited in hospital or jail, widows and lonely elderly people are supported, church or mosque members without legal permits temporarily are supported in case of emergency. Beside these activities, in some Christian circles, a lot of time is devoted to prayer sessions and spiritual counselling with people in need who ‘knock on the church door’. Especially representatives of Muslim and Christian migrant communities state that social help should not be seen as work to be organised, but as spontaneous actions that follow directly from the believers’ soul.

Cities under research
All FBOs in Tilburg, who see themselves as a religious community in the first place, know this form of help or ‘self help’. Within Catholic and Protestant churches assistance is regularly organised via religious groups and deacons. In general, in other religious communities this help is less organised within stated frameworks, but emerges from decisions of boards or pastors/imams or is spontaneously coordinated by mosque or church goers. An example of a FBO fulfilling this function in Rotterdam is La Sagrada Familia. They see themselves as the home front for newcomers in the Netherlands. “It is much nicer when you as newcomer are taken care of by your ‘family’ than by the municipality.” Other examples in Rotterdam are the Scots International church, the International Baptist church, the Christian Family International, the Glorious Chapel, Parochie Nossa Senhora da Paz and mosque and Islamic associations. In Amsterdam, for example, the All Saints’ church holds monthly welfare collections and members come to the priest for material and non-material help. The same counts for the Parish San Nicolas, in which people come to the pastor with problems varying from marriage crises to financial issues. With a special group of volunteers visiting ill and old people and organizing social neighbourhood activities around Christmas, the Ethetochurch tries to fill perceived welfare state gaps. Same activities are organised by the Lutheran churches and the Parish of the Blessed Trinity’s Legion of Mary which takes care of the sick and aged as well as

37 We have no clear view yet on the existence of this kind of religious activity undertaken with people in need in Mosques.
4. Organisations that aim to activate volunteering within specific target groups.

In general
Multiple (international) research shows that church members are more involved in volunteering than non-members (De Hart, 2008, Schmeets and Te Riele, 2009). Some FBOs enforce this by stimulating volunteering within specific faith group with inspiring projects. These FBOs also time and again advise other volunteering organisations. Although volunteering by faith adherents includes very different activities, they are often related to helping out social excluded or marginalized people (such as elderly, youth at risk, disabled people, parts of migrant communities, people experiencing poverty). Remarkable are some new initiatives initiated by Christian organisations and networks with both ‘mainstream’ and evangelical influences, that try to adapt faith-based social action to an increasingly individualized society, by linking faith-inspired volunteers to demands of people in need (HIP, Present). These organisations take activation of volunteering as a starting point, not combating social exclusion.

Cities under research
Within Amsterdam, the Council of Churches Amsterdam, a platform of various Christian churches, is stimulating ecumenical cooperation between churches aimed at enhancing volunteering to improve the situation of the ‘worst off’ in society. FBOs in Rotterdam matching this category are the KSA and Mara. These organisations stimulate, advice and support volunteers who apply themselves for people in vulnerable and deprived positions. They also support other volunteering organisations with the recruitment and training of volunteers and the search for funds. The strength of Mara is according to the respondent the organisation’s position within the city. The organisation “operates at the boundaries of the religious and the secular organisations, the government and the market”. In Tilburg Catholic organisation The Spark should be mentioned here. But also MST stimulates volunteering in the city: “The first one comes to bring something, the other comes to get something, but it is also a continuous process of changing perspectives. Because the refugee who thinks he has nothing to give does bring something and the volunteer who wants to do good also comes to get something. That is the exciting thing about it.” Other FBOs in Tilburg also stimulate volunteering, but this is not their main goal.

5. Community building and empowerment.

In general
Community building often involves attempts to empower individual community members and make the community as a whole stronger. Many mosques and churches organise educational activities for their members, for which they sometimes receive some public funding in the context of national or local integration, habituation and emancipation policies. In recent years mosques and churches have also increasingly been involved in (government subsidized) dialogue projects. The latter is largely a consequence of the ‘moral panic’ around Islam. The idea is that dialogue leads to acquaintance and cooperation and as a consequence to increasing social capital of organisations and individuals. In addition, some FBOs participate in initiatives of others to improve the social cohesion, quality of life and participation in neighbourhoods.

Cities under research
In all cities this function is fulfilled by FBOs of and for ‘new’ Dutch citizens. Their goal is to help their own supporters to participate and integrate in Dutch society, and to reconcile different
cultural and religious values. These FBOs want their community to feel at home in the Netherlands. Members are actively involved in activities intended to empower them and to contribute to a successful integration process. In addition, many Christian FBOs in the cities try to empower either marginalized groups or inhabitants of deprived neighbourhoods. For example, The Mall projects in Rotterdam and Amsterdam fulfil a role in empowering so-called ‘youth at risk’. The Round Table House is especially established to contribute to the integration process by organising inter-religious meetings, the exchange of information and enhancing cooperation between different religious groups in Tilburg North. The territorial parish of Heikant-Quirijnstok in Tilburg is explicitly present in neighbourhood organisations and promotes social cohesion in its district. The Liberal Jewish Community focuses especially on the empowering of the own Jewish community. “There are still a lot of Jews mentally ‘into hiding’. People who are afraid for the Jewisch identity and do not want to show it to the outside world.” The community invites schools to the synagogue and tells children about Judaism.

On a slightly higher level, the Council of Moroccan Mosques North Holland, SPIOR and UMMAO are also involved in capacity building and contributing to social cohesion by means of organizing training sessions for board members of mosques, sharing expertise and stimulating cooperation between member mosques.

6. Political advocacy.

In general
Various organisations are engaged in political advocacy, although they do so in different ways. Professional service providers are often participating in advisory councils that provide them a platform for lobbying on behalf of excluded others, which is also in their own interest. Organisations operating largely independent from the state are more likely to combine practical help and political protest on behalf of excluded others or to defend the interests of their own members. Within traditional churches ‘helping under protest’ has been a common slogan, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Diocesan initiatives were set up for specific target groups, with the aim to transfer these projects into independent organisations for which the state should take financial responsibility. De Hart and Dekker (2006, p. 141) argue that churches have traditionally played an important political role, by inspiring and financing different social movements (including emancipation movements, the peace movement, moral issue-organisations or human rights and aid). One example is the platform ‘the Poor Side of the Netherlands’ (Arme Kant van Nederland), which campaigned over poverty issues and kept it on the political agenda in the last decades. Another recent example is the provision of shelter and support to asylum seekers that have been denied a legal status or who are still waiting for a juridical decision. Sometimes such ad-hoc provision of shelter by local churches has resulted in structural help and the establishment of independent networks and organisations, like INLIA and the Network Religious for Refugees.

Rather than overt protest, most churches nowadays stress the importance of a signalling function towards the government. They emphasize that good PR can raise awareness on issues of social

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38 In an overview of diaconal work and charity by the Catholic Church, Meeuws (2004, 2006) places the function of diaconal work in a historical perspective. While in the 19 century diaconal work was important for fighting poverty and stimulating emancipation of Catholics in Dutch society, a century later, with the emancipation project accomplished and the social assistance law taking care of poor people, diaconal work found a new social and political role in its involvement in the peace and emancipation movement, development cooperation etc.
exclusion, which eases the lobby for government support. FBOs make sure that the government acknowledges the problem and that issues like poverty and social exclusion retain their place on political agendas.

Churches and mosques are not seldom invited by local government to become part of loose governance networks. Cooperation in this sense is often not structural and on an incidental basis. Both at the national and local levels, FBOs representing migrant communities have an important role as political representatives of new faith groups.

Cities under research

We encountered only a few examples of organisations that are primarily focussed on political advocacy. Advocacy is often the result of other activities. The Spark Foundation in Tilburg for example campaigns for people in poverty when necessary and always in cooperation with others. Other examples are Exodus, maintaining good relations with local authorities, the Ministry of Justice and the police, and CARF working closely with the police and justice department in order to politically oppose the sex slave trade. Furthermore, the Protestant Diaconate Amsterdam describes keeping good contact with politicians as an emerging trend. The Evangelical-Lutheran Diaconate Amsterdam is also engaged in political advocacy: “although we know that the church is no longer the centre of the town, we think it is also our task to influence society.”

In Rotterdam different FBOs actively address social problems to policy makers. The Innercity Project for example emphasizes that they are “a voice for people in the city and we do that in different ways on all domains (…) Keep shouting”. On the one hand they want to cooperate with the government and on the other they want to oppose certain policies. Another example in Rotterdam is the Paulus Church. With respect to asylum seekers and undocumented people, its reverend is worried that the national government, and to a lesser extent the municipality, do not want to acknowledge the pressing problems these groups face. He is campaigning to change that: “To initiate that is typically a role for the Pauluschurch. The first thing that needs to happen is that people acknowledge the problem and that they realize that denying it (…) does not work, because numbers do not decrease”. Furthermore, Islamic platform SPIOR tries to advocate the interests of its member organisations and the Islamic communities at large in Rotterdam and surroundings. And last, the neighbourhood pastoral care organisations advocate the needs of “the people with the least acknowledged values. People, who are the least visible.”

7. Bridging demand and supply.

In general

This function is not about offering guidance or self help, but focuses on the bridge function between different ‘worlds’. Local churches and mosques, as well as other FBOs regularly act as intermediaries between people in need and professional service providers. They help people with papers and bureaucratic procedures and provide information about social services. Local authorities increasingly perceive religious communities (especially migrant communities) as places to find the socially excluded (in Dutch vindplaatsen). Referring people and members to other organisations is also an important part of FBO-work, employed by almost every organisation to some extent, in a formal or informal way. When bridging demand and supply, FBOs often operate in strong organisational networks, creating relations with other FBOs, NGOs, welfare providers, secular self-organisations, neighbourhood organisations and municipal departments. Building bridges between the (own) community and the rest of society is often part of the empowerment of individual members of the
community and strengthens the community as a whole. Therefore this function is strongly related to the fifth function.

Cities under research

In Tilburg, like in the other two cities, especially the mosques function as a bridge when it comes to information about laws and regulations. They invite professionals to explain these things to the rank and file. But also the Trinity Chapel and the Protestant church in Tilburg refer people to the appropriate institutions, like social work, the municipal social service and family coaches.

In Amsterdam, the All Saints church deploys incidental relations with healthcare organisations, while the Fatih mosque and the Salvation Army maintain consultative structures with local government and care institutions. In addition, the Parish San Nicolas has an important bridging function partly due to the low accessibility of its building. An organisation with the bridging function as core task is the Open Door foundation, part of the Parish San Nicolas Amsterdam, providing people with information, a conversation, advice and support to professional care and assistance agencies.

In Rotterdam this function is present among many FBOs. Members of migrant churches, for example, often accompany people to their appointments with hospitals, doctors or Social Service, to translate or just to ‘hold their hands’. Abou RakRak functions in a chain in which partners within youth care directly cooperate. “(...) we are actually some kind of intermediary, for youth as well as adults. You try to be a link between the target groups and the general institutions where they can get professional help.” The Aya Sofia mosque in Rotterdam established a separate project ‘Link Aya’, which creates a bridge between visitors of the mosque and its facilities and the regular welfare services in the district. In this project they cooperate with two regular welfare providers, the local municipality of Delfshaven and the municipality of Rotterdam. The Rotterdam umbrella organisations of SKIN (migrant churches) and SPIOR also create bridges between the municipality and the member organisations.

4.4 Discussion

FBOs in the Netherlands are working for the benefit of various groups. In some domains were social exclusion occurs, the organisations and associations are prominently present, in others their role is limited. Besides national developments, the local context is important in understanding differences in the level of FBO activity. The presentation of seven functions carried out by the organisations in the (local) social system might contribute to help clarifying the impact of the activities in the social domain.

The relative importance of the religiously inspired social activities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg has remained relatively stable over the last decades, yet the type of work has changed. The activities of local parishes/ groups of the major, traditional churches are dwindling, due to a decrease in membership and financial means. However, this decrease has been compensated for in terms of innovative working methods of (independent) organisations affiliated with the Catholic and Protestant communities and through the creation of new contacts between FBOs, funds with an ideological background, general organisations and public authorities. This leads to less ‘innate’ and more communal projects, in which the religious inspiration takes on new forms. In these new alliances, projects and networks, religion either plays a role in the background or is a prominent constituent of activities, together with other identities. Examples of what might be labelled postse-
cular co-operation include, Food Banks, schoolfunds for children from poor families, youth work, anti-poverty campaigns, buddy projects, welcome programmes to new citizens, inter religious dialogues, neighbourhood meetings or medical and legal assistance to undocumented migrants. Second, the role of the ‘new’ religious communities is growing, which is not always visible. They provide many services for members of their own communities and for people belonging to their own ethnic group. The social position of some of their adherents demands it - in terms of a lack of money, lower levels of education, partly unsuccessful integration (unable to speak Dutch, low participation levels of women) - according to the representatives of these communities. They increasingly cooperate with other organisations and the authorities, which enables them to offer better help, referrals, etc., to their own members. Criticism from within and from public officials can be heard on several issues. First, on the ability of these communities and organisations to reach out to young people and marginalised others not attending the religious services and activities. Second, on the slow progress of raising the level of professionalization in terms of leadership of mosques, churches and organisations.

There is a third development which, albeit indirectly, supplies the FBOs with new initiatives in the field of combating social exclusion, namely the increase of inter-religious dialogue. Where this used to be a token of goodwill, contacts over the last 5-10 years have clearly increased. This has occurred predominantly between the evangelical and traditional Dutch churches, followed by co-operation between Dutch churches and the so called migrant churches, and finally, between mosques and (mainly) the traditional Dutch churches. Nevertheless, dialogue, and certainly further cooperation, often depends on a few people in these communities. Representatives of organisations, who strive for openness, are aware of the scepticism concerning cooperation with other faiths, and hence, the vulnerability of their own position.

As described in many of the other FACIT reports, welfare retrenchment is not a clear cut trend. For instance, the interviewees active in homeless services have witnessed an increase in available funding and state intervention, albeit this intervention taking the form of increased centralisation in policy design and regulation, in setting agendas and facilitating institutional environments for joined-up working. This proves the hypothesis that welfare state restructuring and the forms of neoliberal urban governance do not simply entail a roll-back manoeuvre wherein the state cuts its direct involvement in welfare provision; rather, there are simultaneous roll-back and roll-out manoeuvres that bring about new institutional forms of regulation. These are premised upon the centralisation of policy design, evaluation and regulation within the powers of the local and central government, and the decentralisation of risk and responsibility for service delivery to voluntary, private, non-profit and faith-based organisations (see also the concluding chapter).
5  On the religious dimension

This research project is not about religion, but about social action of FBOs. Nevertheless it is crucial to pay attention to the different ways in which religious identities or values might influence the activities of organisations. Faith plays an essential role, both in organisations which separate religious activities from social ones and in organisations that don’t. This chapter investigates this role.

The precise role of religion is nevertheless hard to grasp and differs by organisation and sometimes even by activity. First of all, FBOs are of course inspired by many different religious streams, such as Roman-Catholicism, Protestantism or Islam. The last two streams - and even the in theory unified first one - are again divided in different faith directions, which sometimes have very little in common. In addition, in religious organisations of old or new migrants, religion is often intertwined with culture and ethnicity. In this project we tried to reflect this diversity in the selection of the organisations under research. However, we do not focus on the differences in faith or faith background in itself. This chapter provides more detailed information on the motivation of involved people to be socially active and on the influence and present of faith in the activities of the organisation.

5.1  Faith and motivation of professionals and volunteers

In general, the respondents pointed out that faith inspires people to care for their ‘vulnerable fellow man’. In the words of a respondent: “It is very rewarding job, because you do not only signal where things go wrong, but you can also give people trust”. This quotation and others like it from volunteers and professionals of FBOs provide a good impression of this inspiration:

“**We want to work based on the vision, as noted in the Bible, that Jesus did good for all**”
“**Christianity is not only praying**”
“**To make God’s love present in the city**”
“**To help where there is no helper**”
“**To live and act in the footsteps of Mohammed**”
“**To fight evil with good**”

Many respondents, though, think it is hard to distinguish specific religious motivations from other. ‘Acting from the love of one’s fellow man’ is not seen as an exclusive Christian or Islamic view of life. They refer to the ‘duty of every man’, or explicitly point out humanistic, liberal or leftist values guiding their choices and engagement with others. A lot of respondents therefore stressed they could well cooperate with people who fight for an inclusive society from a different world view.
Next to faith, being loyal to the community is an important motivation. The Portuguese speaking (Cape Verdean) community Nossa Senhora da Paz in Rotterdam, for example, stresses that their members are especially active because they see the religious community as ‘their second home’. The feeling of belonging to a community is not exclusive for migrant religious communities and can be observed in FBOs organised in projects, too.

Other reasons for engaging in faith-based activities and organisations are making a living, the urge to do something practical for people individually as well as community building, enjoying the work or working with motivated people. Voluntary work has become more of a “way to self actualisation” (Mara, Rotterdam).

Especially for (older) members of Islamic FBOs, voluntary work is not always experienced as a free choice. It is seen more as a ‘divine obligation’; fulfilling you duty towards God. In the words of one of the respondents: “Islam is the starting point for mutual respect. According to Islam, you have to help somebody in need”. This duty to help the poor is also shown in the so called zakat, the religious obligation to give a part of your financial assets to the poor. The social role of mosques is developing in Europe today. In Muslim countries the cultural norm is to rely on the family for help. In general, the mosques there are perceived primarily as places of worship, although some of our respondents said inspiration could be found in the social role of mosques in the past in e.g. Turkey and Morocco. In the Netherlands, Muslims find it easier to use the welfare facilities of the mosque. They give entrance to new social networks and to regular services. Moreover, they can be ‘trusted’ and language barrier do not exist there, what seems especially relevant for the elderly people and new immigrants. Likewise, independent Islamic FBOs use faith as an “inspiration to activate” (Ettaouhid, Rotterdam) and state that “Islam can be a motive, to convince people to participate actively in society” (Foundation for Renewal and Participation, Rotterdam).

Despite the number of motivated volunteers and professionals, certain risk factors, such as the decreasing membership of common Catholic and Protestant parishes, challenge the recruitment of volunteers and as a consequence the continuity of the organisations and their activities. This is not to say that all those who left the churches or who have stopped attending the religious services, are lost for activities carried out by FBOs (Schmeets and Te Riele, 2009). The trend, ‘believing without belonging’, results in the recruitment of so-called side-line churchgoers (randkerkelijken) or non-church members as volunteers to help out with diaconal projects. The Protestant diaconate Amsterdam responds to this trend by only requiring a ‘spiritual base’ of its volunteers. Oudezijds 100 in Amsterdam solves the loss of volunteers with hiring more professionals. The Elthetocurch in Amsterdam mixes people who are only engaged in social voluntary activities and not attending church services, with faith inspired volunteers. A respondent of this church believes that people inspired by faith are more likely to ‘make an extra step’ for the neighbourhood. Volunteers can also be recruited from job centre aiming at activating social assistance recipients. However, in general, faith is still important when it comes to hiring personnel.

Organisational modernization seems to be a requirement for large and medium-sized FBOs that seek to attract both believers and non-believers as donor and volunteers or workers. It is necessary “to demonstrate transparency, good management and accountability. Writing reports and meeting standards of partners is imperative to growth.” (Mara, Rotterdam).

All faith-based organisations do consider the involvement of young people as vital for continuation of the activities. For instance in the Moroccan and Turkish communities, this is seen as an important
challenge. UMMAO, for example, sees an important task in the self-organisation of young Muslims, and the need to invite Muslim youth as board members and volunteers within mosques and other Islamic organisations. The board of the Turkish mosque in Tilburg, can function as an example of an Islamic organisation that succeeded in attracting young people.

5.2 The role of faith in organisation and activities

The role of faith in an organisation can take many different forms. Sider and Unruh (2004) point this out as well in their study on the religious degree of FBOs in the United States. They emphasize that the label ‘faith based or religious organisation’ does not provide any insights about the role of faith in these organisations and their services. To gain more insight into the different roles faith might play they developed a typology. This typology is discussed later on. To come to this typology, they distinguished a number of organisational characteristics. Along with these characteristics we will discuss the role of faith on four dimensions (see also Ebaugh et al. 2006):

- Identity and public face of the organisation.
- Employment policies, concerning both professionals and volunteers.
- Working philosophy and activities.
- Selection of and/ or choice for certain clients.

Identity and public face of the organisation

The strength of the influence of faith on the identity and public face of a FBO differs per organisation. Some FBOs already have a clear faith identity because of their name (e.g. Youth for Christ, Salvation Army, Council of Moroccan mosques), their mission statement or by their location in a religious building.

To understand the role of faith in the identity and profile of FBOs it is important to emphasize that in the Netherlands in general two types of religious organisations operating in the social domain can be distinguished:

- Organisations established for a religious goal, being in the first place a religious community.
- Organisations inspired by faith, which are specifically established for a social goal, like the provision of good (or ethically inspired) services to individuals or groups, or the connection of volunteers and ‘good causes’.

The amount of intermediate forms is numerous, but almost all FBOs can be traced back to these two basic forms. The first group is first of all a community. Examples are migrant churches and mosques. Some of these organisations develop little or no structural activities for the wider society and fall therefore outside the scope of this research project. Another part develops a range of activities for their own (partly ‘socially excluded’) members or for needy ‘others’. Sometimes these are executed via separate or independent foundations. Among this group faith is seen as a combination of ‘praying and acting’. An important principle of churches and mosques is the help of people in need. For some it is of equal importance as loving God: serving God is not possible without serving one’s fellow man. For others it is a consequence of worshipping God: “So it is a goal of Christianity, not the most important task (...). But the side effect is the help of and care for people.” (Christian Family International, Rotterdam). In Rotterdam we experienced that the degree in which mosques organise social activities strongly depends on how the role of a mosque is defined. “Some think: the mosque is a
place to pray, other things are just ballast. In the past, however, the mosque did much more. Moroccan youth realizes this very well, they profile themselves socially much more. But the elderly think the mosque is divine and not a place for social activities.” (SPIOR, Rotterdam) Since the 1990s these differences in views resulted in younger Moroccans establishing new organisations, after unsuccessful attempts to renew the functioning of mosques from the inside. In addition, among migrant churches and mosques we often see that, next to faith, ethnicity, nationality and language are important components of their identity.

The second group distinguishes itself from the first, because they are in the first place founded as service organisations with a social goal. These organisations offer professional services and are often partly subsidized by the government. The role of faith in these organisations can vary strongly. This type of FBOs is more common in Amsterdam and Rotterdam than in Tilburg. In Tilburg the group consists merely of MST, the Round Table House and the Spark Foundation. An example in Rotterdam is the Meeting Foundation, as we see in their mission: “Based on Christian love of one’s fellow man, the Meeting Foundation offers professional help to the homeless, based on the needs and possibilities of the client.” Another example in Rotterdam is the Mara Foundation. This organisation re-examined its roots and claims to combine a business like model of operating with a clear faith-based identity: “We are more catholic than ever.”

In some organisations in Amsterdam, which were set up by churches in the past, the faith-based identity of the organisation has become the subject of internal debate. A respondent from the Rainbow Group told that “the question has risen whether we should get rid of the faith-identity. In discussions it turned out that there were always enough reasons, also organisational, to keep it in place”. Another example is the Moses House, which has left behind its explicit religious function already in 1970. This organisation was founded as a secular organisation to do things churches used to do in the city. However, a few years ago the organisation changed the statues to formally establish that the organisation subscribes to the diversity of religions and worlds views in the city.

**Employment policies, professionals and volunteers**

Faith often plays a role in the selection of personnel. Religious communities among the FBOs often recruit their professionals and volunteers preferably within the own community, both for religious and social activities. In the case of FBOs set up by migrant communities, both (volunteering) personnel and clients are members of the faith community. FBOs with a clear evangelical identity recruit personnel with the same background.

Among organisations, which are specifically established for a social goal, substantial differences exist and selection criteria change over time. The selection of professionals and volunteers can also differ by activity or function within the organisation. There may be other demands for employees in functions vital to the image of the organisation than for ‘normal’ employees, temporary workers or volunteers. In general, almost all FBOs ask of their employees and volunteers respect for the religion and affinity with the mode of operation and the target group. Especially FBOs linked to traditional Dutch churches have become more open to non-church members. Volunteers, are still often recruited from local parishes, but this is changing in the context of new spiritual engagements in contemporary society. A common remark was that many volunteers do not go to church anymore, but still like to be involved in diaconal work. Young people involved in volunteering often have no church background at all and their interest in volunteering in social projects brings them into contact with faith (sometimes for the first time). According to several respondents, this new generation does not have the trauma of closed religious communities their parents grew up in (especially the baby-boom
generation) and are more open-minded towards faith. Nevertheless, some respondents pointed out that it is important to maintain a majority of religious people in the organisation; “there should be a certain equilibrium” (Paulus church, Rotterdam).

Professionals are more often required to be active members of faith communities. The Salvation Army and the Meeting Foundation, for example, select their personnel on the basis of their ‘Christian inspiration’. “If you have absolutely nothing with the Bible and absolutely nothing with Christian compassion, than you are not fit to work within our organisation” (Meeting Foundation Rotterdam). However, the Salvation Army’s Goodwill Centre Amsterdam sees that secularization has made it increasingly difficult to attract new professionals. Internal discussion exists on the religious requirements of their employees. Others only ask new employees to subscribe to the mission statement of the organisation (which can be more or less faith-based). For example the Exodus organisations are inspired by the bible story exodus. However, the organisation is open to everybody, and personnel are only required to support the mission and goals of the organisation.

Working philosophy and activities
Faith plays an important part in the working philosophy and/or activities of many FBOs. We can distinguish the following degrees in which faith influences the content of the activities:

- Faith aspects are strongly intertwined with the activities. They cannot be separated because the faith factor is indeed what makes the activities effective.
- The organisation works with a clear distinction between religious, faith related and social activities. The faith content depends on the needs of the client.
- Faith aspects are deliberately omitted from all activities.
- Faith plays a rather implicit role in the organisation itself and in the activities, but it is at the same time always present in the background.

An example of fully integrated religious and social activities, the first category, is provided by Victory Outreach. For this organisation following Jesus is seen as the only long term solution for drug addicts to overcome their addiction and other problems in life. Another different example is the reverend from the organisation CARF, who prays with victims of human trafficking (for him the sex slave trade) to break voodoo curses over young African girls. Several migrant churches also engage in prayer sessions or have a phone number people can call to if they need ‘the Lord’s Divine Intervention’ (Pentecostal Revival Church). Faith is also part of Africa House (Amsterdam) services, by proclamation of the Good News, helping Africans to experience inner and external peace and to offer both material and spiritual assistance. According to these organisations social activities can not be separated from the religious ones.

Many other FBOs, however, deliberately choose to separate their religious and social activities. Sometimes they do so by creating separate foundations. This separation keeps things clear but also eases public funding. An example of this is ‘Link Aya’ (Schakel Aya) of the Aya Sofia mosque in Rotterdam. All social activities of the mosque take place within this project. Subsidy for the project is not granted to the mosque but to the Districts’ social-cultural work organisation. The employees are engaged by this organisation and detached to Aya Sofia. There are also organisations that adjust the degree of faith in their activities to the needs of their clients. Exodus, for example, pays special attention to peoples ‘philosophy of life’ (zingeving) as part of their rehabilitation programme for ex-convicts, but it does not matter whether this is based on Christianity, Islam or Humanism for example. The Neighbourhood Pastoral Care FBOs and the Innercity Project in Rotterdam also work
this way. “We look with people for their philosophy of life. This is why we can cooperate with people from different traditional religions, because philosophy of life is part of every religion.”

Nevertheless, such separation between religious and social activities is not always clear. Are the language courses of a mosque for example free of faith? And is the guidance of young drop-outs by the church free of proselytization? Clarification about these cases is important, especially when public funding is involved. Some organisations, for example, encounter a certain degree of distrust because of their evangelical or orthodox character and are accused of ‘converting souls’, even though they themselves have worked to clarify boundaries with respect to this thorny issue.

This might be one of the reasons why FBOs sometimes choose to omit faith entirely from all activities. An example is seen at the Mission Service Centre (MST) in Tilburg. “[…] This spirituality is present through the whole organisation. When it is taken into the organisation you preferably spread it as secular as possible. Theology is no good starting point. You should provide practices in which you can work together and see each other. Then you can see the values regardless of the words.”

Faith can also implicitly influence activities, like is the case in Abou RakRak and other Islamic welfare and neighbourhood organisations in Rotterdam: “Except for the fact that it [faith] is part of the target group, it places no further role. We are no Islamic or religious organisation. The organisation is for emancipation of people, not for faith. But it is part of their norms and values where they get things out.”

Selection of and/or choice for certain clients
The public idea is often that FBOs ‘care’ and help everyone, while other service providers are more likely to only help only those people for which funding is available. In general, as mentioned above, most FBOs delivering social services do not discriminate clients on the basis of faith. They are aimed at helping a specific target group, regardless of their faith background.

Especially FBOs who operate independently from a religious community are open to everybody, regardless of their belief or other background or positionality. The organisations act this way from conviction: possible demands from the government in the light of subsidies do not play a role at all. While many FBOs in this category depend largely on government funding for ‘approved categories’, they often reserve some places for ‘unapproved categories’ as well. Different than most of their secular competitors, the Salvation Army helps clients directly, independent from the possibility of receiving public funding for this client in retrospect. Exodus in Amsterdam reserves some places for ex-convicts that voluntarily want to join the programme, in addition to those places subsidized by the Justice Department. The ecumenical community Oudezijds 100 in Amsterdam also wants to stay open for undocumented people to join the community, for whom they do not receive funding from the local authorities. Subsidised organisations like KSA and the Mara Foundation in Rotterdam and MST in Tilburg do the same.

For religious communities and closely connected organisations it is often a different story, although this also depends on the activity. There are some FBOs that only help members of their own faith community, either because they are a faith community and have no capacity to deal with problems beyond their own community (this is the case for most migrant churches and mosques), or because their specific faith plays an important role in the organisations’ social strategy. Others are open to everyone but hope or demand that clients will become members / believers after a certain period of time (Victory Outreach and many socially active non-native evangelical churches). The Pentecos-
tal Revival church in Amsterdam represents a missionary church. By evangelization, including street crusades, the church tries to recruit people. The reverend explains that: “The church helps the community, it brings people together like a family (...) Most criminals, prostitutes, drug dealers and drug addicts are now in the church.” On the whole, nonetheless, active proselytizing among FBOs is rare. More frequently FBOs (like Youth for Christ, House of Hope, and Scharlaken Koord) have adopted a demand driven approach towards evangelization (they only talk about their motivations when clients ask them).

Sometimes it also just happens in practice that only the own members of a FBO take part in the activities, while they were originally organised for the whole neighbourhood. This last observation also appears with certain professional faith-based service providers, especially when people have the choice between different religious and non-religious organisations.

Lastly, for FBOs involved in supported housing openness towards clients regardless their convictions, sometimes results in tensions. The ecumenical community Oudezijds 100, for instance, does not discriminate clients/co-residents on the basis of faith, but expects that clients/co-residents accept/choose to live in a Christian community. The organisation Exodus no longer obliges clients to participate in Easter and Christmas celebrations, but residents are required to take part in preparations for the celebrations.

5.3 Faith-based Organisations and the salience of religion

In the study of Sider and Unruh (2004) discussed before, based on these dimensions a typology with six categories is described. According to us these categories can be reduced to four main categories of relevance in the Dutch context, which we will discuss briefly. Following that, we have a look at the specific situation in the Netherlands.

Faith-saturated organisations
In this type of organisation faith has a role in all aspects. The identity and principles of the organisations are strongly based on a specific religion, the personnel (both paid and voluntary) exist (almost) entirely of religious people and faith is explicitly present in the content of the social activities. Furthermore, the religious faith is seen as essential for the effectiveness of the activities. Clients need to be religious in the beginning, but eventually the organisation has a clear goal of faith building.

Faith-centred organisations
In these organisations faith place a big and explicit role, but it differs by organisations in which aspect of the societal activities it is concentrated. Various FBOs fall into this category. At least in all cases the identity and principles are unambiguously based on a religious tradition. Besides, the activities are often organised within a religious context, like in a church building, but this does not necessarily have to be the case. The personnel, however, is always religious for the most part and often this is a strict condition to work for the organisation. The role of faith in the content of social activities differs from not or barely present to moderate presence. Examples are praying or reading from the Bible during provided meals and the possibility of exploring the values of Islam.

Faith-related organisations
The organisation has a clear religious identity and principles, often formulated in a more open and inter-religious way, but it is demanded that the employees (exceptions are public figures) and
volunteers are religious. Volunteers may openly carry out other motives. The activities can have the intention to bring across a religious message, but this conveyance is often preformed non-verbally and not explicitly by deeds of charity and compassion.

**Faith-background organisations**
These organisations operate secular and often seem secular, despite the historical ties with a religious tradition. Activities have no explicit religious content.

The typology of Sider and Unruh is strongly based on the specific situation in the US. Nevertheless, these categories are useful to accentuate differences between organisations. In the Netherlands, we find a continuum with a lot of organisations in the middle (faith-centred and faith-related), where some degree of intermingling and hybridization of activities and motivations play a role. We can identity two significant objections to this typology. First of all, many organisations in the Netherlands depend for the content of their activities strongly on the wishes and possibilities of the target group. This is a deliberate choice with elements like ‘presence’ and ‘exposure’, following Baart (2001), at the heart of the philosophy of engagement. There is no approach or goal determined beforehand. Faith is the inspiration, but the activities and action are determined by “what is needed in the neighbourhood” (Old Neighbourhood pastoral Care Middelland-South). Consequently, the role of religion in these activities can vary strongly, depending on the wishes of the clients. Often one looks with the client for meaning in someone’s existence. This can mean something else for everybody. A lot of organisations are, indeed, strongly context-orientated and can operate like a secular supplier, a supplier of meaning or evangelizing.

The second problem with this typology is that has difficulties dealing with FBOs in which faith is at the same time absent in most activities and omnipresent in the background. These kinds of FBOs are often established by and for members with the same ethnic background, who practice the same faith. Faith is often not explicitly mentioned in the vision of the organisation, and the organisation not always presents itself as an FBO. In the content of the social activities faith also plays a minor role. However, the activities are in practice organised by and for religious people. Among this type there are especially Moroccan, Turkish and Somalian self organisations.

With this typology also the risk of stereo typing occurs. The typology (and especially the differentiated dimensions) can nonetheless be used as an instrument, yardstick or tool for FBOs to determine the place of religion in their organisations. For authorities this typology might be helpful with decisions concerning subsidy. It is important that authorities decide in which aspects faith is ‘allowed’ and in which aspects this is more of a problem with respect to the neutrality of the state towards religion (see sections 7.1 and 7.2).

**5.4 Discussion**

As we have seen in this chapter, people have different reasons to actively participate within a FBO. Furthermore, FBOs differ on multiple aspects concerning the role of faith. Consequently, FBOs will encounter different effects of social and demographical developments and will also respond differently to those developments. One of the biggest challenges for many FBOs is the process of secularisation, which makes it hard to find capable volunteers or those with the requisite attributes for engagement.
Another challenge for the religious component of FBOs is the dependence on public funding. In order to receive government support, FBOs have to professionalize, and that makes it harder to work with volunteers. Another criterion of public funding is a clear distinction between religious and social activities. As a result, organisations which declare not to want or not being able to do draw this distinction are excluded from financial assistance of the government.

An organisational separation between religious and social activities does not mean that all potential areas of conflict have been eliminated. Are the language courses in a mosque free of a religious content? Is the guidance of young drop out by the church free of evangelization? What is tolerable or desirable? Intelligibility and openness about these things is important, when the government is engaged, but also in other circumstances. Just like the focus on freedom of choice for clients: do they have a choice regarding their participation in religious activities?

FBOs linked to traditional churches mentioned that the atmosphere has changed, as it has become more accepted to talk about their faith-based identity and motivations than some years ago. This situation might change, now that in Parliament and many local City Councils proponents of a clear separation of church and state, demand that all elements of faith have to be banned from subsidised projects carried out by FBOs. In some cases these calls have already met with some success.
6 On the organisational network

There are big differences between FBOs in terms of their attitude towards cooperation and whether they harbour the necessary resources to do so. Organisational networks are usually complex in nature, as our analysis of the relations between different FBOs and NGOs reveals. Networks develop at different levels and in different places. Yet, some organisations barely cooperate with others and are solely focused on their own group or activities, while others participate in all kinds of networks and meetings. Discrepancies are common between what organisations strive to achieve in regards to cooperation and what happens in practice.

This chapter provides an overview of the different types of cooperation practices we encountered in the three case studies in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg.

6.1 Vertical and horizontal cooperation

Two different types of cooperation practices exist between organisations: vertical and horizontal. Vertical cooperation practices express those relations between local organisations and their position within broader regional, national or international hierarchical organisational or rather informal networks. In general, cooperation is strong inside denominations and ideological or theological ‘families’, but it develops nevertheless (also outside these circles) depending on thematic and strategic choices. As a result, the organisational networks of FBOs vary widely. Only a few FBOs are solely organised at the national level. In most cases, national organisations set up branches at the local level, or national networks developed ‘bottom up’. Most mosques are members of international movements with Dutch ‘branches’. Examples are Diyanet and Milli Görüş. The same is true for the 15 local or regional communities of Alevi, associated with national federation HAK-Der, and internationally linked with other Alevi organisations.

In addition, just like some of their predecessors (the Salvation Army and Youth for Christ) many new and upcoming FBOs in the Netherlands are part of transnational networks, either as branches of an international organisation (such as the African Methodist Episcopal church, Victory Outreach, Hope International Baptist church and New Song), or as part of an unrestricted network of similar organisations (Catholic Worker Movement).

The Catholic and Protestant churches participate in various international networks, like Eurodiaconia and Justitia et Pax. Furthermore, the national diaconal body of the Protestant church of the Netherlands, Church in Action, is involved in domestic as well as in international projects. It supports local religious activities of protestant churches in the Netherlands and initiates new projects. Its Catholic counterpart, organised through Cordaid, is predominantly focused on development.
cooperation, but has also been engaged in offering assistance to asylum seekers in the Netherlands. As in other countries with a Roman Catholic presence, there are also religious congregations engaged in social action, at the national level, organised within the Conference of Religious Dutch orders (Konferentie Nederlandse Religieuzen). Examples of FBOs set up by such congregations include the Religious Foundation against Human Trafficking, Don Bosco Amsterdam (youth work), and MST (Tilburg).

Although it is essential to have a clear understanding of the organisational power and effectiveness of vertical relationships, this report will primarily focus on horizontal cooperation practices. Horizontal relations manifest themselves in cities, at city or neighbourhood levels or in between these levels. FBOs maintain contact with other FBOs, but especially with other, more general institutions such as the police, hospitals, schools, child protection services, social work organisations, healthcare facilities as well as neighbourhood associations. While some FBOs mainly have relations with other FBOs (e.g. local mosques and migrant churches), others have ties with both FBOs and NGOs who provide similar services or lobby on similar issues.

6.2 Types of horizontal cooperation

In every city, some FBOs fulfil a central role within their networks (e.g. the Protestant Diaconia in Amsterdam, Mara and KSA in Rotterdam and the MST in Tilburg). Such FBOs usually do not focus on a specific target group and therefore tend to cooperate with a wide variety of organisations (NGOs and FBOs).

Furthermore, most FBOs maintain contact and cooperate with other FBOs and NGOs who provide similar services or advocate on similar issues. The more professional FBOs, which are involved in the provision of social services within the context of the welfare state, are often structurally embedded in a network of organisations that provide similar services, often through government initiated platforms or advisory councils. The same applies to religious organisations of migrants who are often included in local and national migrant councils. FBOs engaged in political lobbying often cooperate with NGOs and labour unions that strive for similar goals (e.g. Social Alliance, Keer het Tij). For example, CARF is a member of SKIN, and cooperates with various Christian faith-based organisations, like the Protestant Diaconate in Amsterdam, the (Catholic) Religious Foundation Against Human Trafficking (SRTV), and Scharlaken Koord (from Heil des Volks). CARF also cooperates with NGOs, such as Refugee Work (Vluchtelingenwerk). FBOs engaged in service provision beyond the scope and reach of the welfare state, are also often embedded in a network of FBOs and NGOs assisting similar target groups (for instance undocumented people), and also cooperate with regards political advocacy. A respondent of the Rainbow Group describes their relationship with other competitors as one of ‘cooperative competition’. A strategy is commonly adopted when organisations contact each other to ensure that each will work with an exclusive target group.

Below we will highlight some of the most common horizontal cooperation practices between FBOs and FBOs/NGOs. That is:

- Informal practical cooperation
- Formal cooperation
- Inter-religious platforms
Informal practical cooperation (issue-based or local-based)

Many FBOs cooperate with others on a project basis. This way, cooperation can take place with multiple organisations, each one harbouring a specific expertise: “It is horses for courses” (Scots International Church, Rotterdam). This practical cooperation can vary from one small project to a more structural cooperation. The most common form is the exchange of information. Furthermore, FBOs tend to refer people to the general social services, in cases where they encounter individuals with debt, psychological or addiction problems.

As we already noted, this cooperation is also frequently based on the fact that others work with similar target groups or are located in the same neighbourhood. For instance, in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, different organisations working with undocumented people know and support one another when needed. This type of cooperation is for the most part informal, based on individual contacts and the issues at hand.

Neighbourhood-based cooperation, on the other hand, focuses on the idea that different organisations cater to different social needs in the neighbourhood. The Neighbourhood Pastoral care network in Rotterdam offering pastoral and diaconal support cooperates with various residents’ organisations, social work and Islamic organisations. The Mall De Baarsjes in Amsterdam, for example, maintains good relations with other welfare organisations in the neighbourhood. They regularly meet to consult one another and work in closer proximity than other organisations because together they are primarily responsible for a relatively large part of the social work in that specific neighbourhood.

Such local-based cooperation is stimulated by the existence of lower levels of government (city districts in Amsterdam and Rotterdam), and a neighbourhood-based approach in social policies, such as the national policy for deprived neighbourhoods and the focus on decentralisation in the Social Support Act.

Besides the practical benefits of cooperation based on a concrete ‘job’ with a certain topic and a common goal, FBOs also mention that in this way, theological differences can be transcended. A good example which illustrates this advantage is the ‘reading club’ of the Neighbourhood Pastoral Care organisation Middelland-South in Rotterdam. The members of this FBO and managers of a Moroccan self-organisation agree on reading the same book and discuss it afterwards. “This creates an increasing atmosphere of confidence and helps develop a common frame of reference in which matters of society may be addressed.”

Formal cooperation (issue-based or group-based)

An important form of formal cooperation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam is the national action Plan for Social Relief (2006-2012). With this plan, the Dutch government aims for a compulsory and individually orientated approach of people experiencing homelessness, including ex-psychiatric patients and daily users of hard drugs. Over the last couple of years, this plan has become the main driver of change behind the Dutch homelessness policies and services. It is an integral strategy consisting of the main national government departments, the four big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) and the providers of services in the field (among them FBOs).

Furthermore, organisations that provide professional services are often integrated in formal advisory councils. In Amsterdam, for instance, there is a Platform for Social Relief (Platform Opvang Amsterdam), where FBOs and NGOs meet on a regular basis and discuss clients or other important issues. Oudezijds 100/Kruispost represents an organisation that is part of this platform. A formalized
A structural manner of cooperation exists between this community and other NGOs and FBOs. Another example is the Social Security Platform in Tilburg, with over 40 participants. In addition, FBOs that act as professional service providers often try to specialize in specific areas in order to prevent competition. A good example of this in Rotterdam is the branch organisation inZ, where FBOs and secular organisations cooperate to support volunteering in the city and to avoid unnecessary competition.

Formal cooperation also exists with respect to political lobbying activities. For instance, the Social Alliance in Rotterdam (RoSa) and Amsterdam consists of different NGOs and FBOs striving for social justice. Furthermore, the St. Nicolas church in Amsterdam conducts regular meetings with local authorities about food banks.

**Inter-religious platforms**

Another form of formal cooperation is found in local ecumenical and inter-religious platforms, and in organisations representing new faith-groups, like SKIN, CMO and CGI (recognized representative organs of Muslims in the Netherlands) at the national level, and SKIN Rotterdam, SPIOR, Local Councils of Churches and the Council of Moroccan Mosques Amsterdam at the local level. These platforms are often co-initiated by the government and as representatives of the connected organisations are also discussion partners of the government.

A recent phenomenon in terms of horizontal relations is the establishment of inter-religious platforms or councils in cities, sometimes initiated by local authorities. In 2008, Rotterdam for example, decided to finance two platforms: *Raad voor religies en levensbeschouwingen* (Council for Life Convictions and Religion) (an official partner for the municipality with all religions assembled) and another which supports capacity building among migrant Christian churches. The Council, or *Raad* is still ‘under construction’. The much older (end of 1980s) Islamic platform, SPIOR in Rotterdam, is subsidized through projects only but remains widely acknowledged.

In Amsterdam, the Council for Life Convictions and Religions, was initiated by people from various religious communities in 1997. Although it aims to organise joint social activities as well, until now it has mainly acted as a platform for inter-religious dialogue. It gained prominence as an inter-religious platform, stimulating peaceful co-existence after the murder of Van Gogh in 2004 and also initiated a conference on the policy paper ‘separation of state and church’ in 2009. UMMAO also maintains contacts with this Council, as well as the Council of Churches, the Liberal Jewish community and the representative organisation of homosexuals Amsterdam (COC). A smaller example is the cooperation between the Protestant Diaconate Amsterdam and the local Milli Görüş mosque, which resulted in the start of an inter-religious food bank.

Tilburg has a religious platform known as the *Religieus Beraad Tilburg* (Religious Dialogue Tilburg). A special feature of this dialogue-based platform is that the responsible alderman is present during (almost) all meetings or conferences. Members of the Religious Dialogue Tilburg have an intermediary role between the municipality and the citizens of Tilburg. This intermediary role implies that this particular FBO has a direct entrance to civil servants working for municipal departments or programmes. The religious communities and the municipality have established a kind of equilibrium between active involvement of the participating faith communities and modest practical and political support from the authorities.
6.3 Discussion

As we have seen in this chapter, multiple forms and degrees of cooperation exist between FBOs and NGOs. In general, these developments largely depend on: the specific social and/or political role FBOs choose to play (mission and vision), on the resources available, and finally, on the specific local constellation of actors and circumstances.

In short, FBOs cooperate with others for the following reasons:

- Better reach of and help for the target group: referring people to each other, knowledge sharing.
- Practical reasons: exchange of volunteers or resources, sharing a building (places of worship, offices).
- Personal relations: recognition of shared visions, trust in the engagement of others.
- Financial relations/ economic motives (unite resources).
- Increasing effectiveness of political action.

Nevertheless, not all FBOs choose to cooperate with others and the arguments behind this decision are:

- A lack of time and manpower.
- Language differences.
- Different religious backgrounds and/or differences in (theological) visions on combating social exclusion.
- Competition (for economic reasons, for clients or members).
- National or international umbrella organisations reject cooperation.

Many of the reasons given to cooperate are hard to influence. The various organisations come across each other paths and recognise similarities in terms of ways of working. In other cases, cooperating organisations may choose to tackle new goals together, but this is not a written rule. According to the FBOs, a sincere interest in each other’s backgrounds and activities is most crucial in terms of cooperation. Furthermore, a clear vision is important. Why does the organisation want to cooperate with other religious or secular parties in the city in the first place? The outcome of this question not only depends on whether they share similarities in their goals and specific target groups, but also whether certain activities will benefit from a cooperation with general organisations or other FBOs.

Some forms of cooperation between FBOs and NGOs have been stimulated by local authorities, which prefer to deal with fewer but larger organisations. They tend to structure their funding system on this preference. As a result, subsidies are granted to networks instead of individual organisations.

In Rotterdam, for instance, the local authorities have forced organisations to cooperate in order to continue to receive financial support for two FBO ‘bulwarks’: volunteering policy and homeless policy. In Amsterdam, most walk-in centres for homeless people and drug addicts set up by churches have merged into one organisation because of economies of scale. The Rainbow Group in Amsterdam serves as an example where such fusions also took place. In 2008, the NGO Amsterdamse Vriendendienst, (Amsterdam Friends Service) which supported volunteering merged within the Rainbow Group. In Tilburg, economic motivations are less centre stage and obligations to cooperate with other organisations, initiated by the local government, are uncommon. This might be influenced by the fact that financial relations between the local authority and FBOs are rather limited in this town.
7 Faith-based Organisations and questions of governance

What is the position of FBOs towards the government, and what is the vision of the government on cooperation with these organisations? Can local governments and FBOs establish partnership relations, maybe even developed into new modes of urban governance? In this chapter, this relationship is considered in the light of the activities to combat social exclusion. However, these activities cannot be separated from the relation between FBOs and the (local) government in general. Therefore this chapter starts with a discussion on the interpretation of the separation between church and state in the Netherlands. Attention is also paid to other principles and attitudes guiding the day to day relations between religious organisations and the (local) state. Further on, we have a closer look at the different perspectives of the Government and the FBOs on cooperation. Subsidy relations are here discussed as one of the possible forms of cooperation.

7.1 The framework of state-religion relations

FBO involvement in public policies is largely determined by formal and informal relations between state and religion. The principle of separation between state and church is not incorporated in Dutch law as such, and should rather be understood as the result of subtle, often ‘silent’ political agreements. These non-official agreements only slowly change under pressure of shifts in public opinion. Articles 1 and 6 of the Constitution highlight the most important elements that affect the relations between state and church. Article 1 stresses the equality of individuals and prohibits discrimination based on religion or beliefs among others and article 6 guarantees the freedom of religious practices of individuals and groups. Another important article is 23 on the freedom of education, which implies state support for faith-based schools. One effect of the latter article is the exemption of religious institutions from certain anti-discrimination laws. An organisation founded on religious principles, for example, may impose requirements on the occupancy of posts which are deemed necessary to live up to its founding principles. By most FBOs this possibility is seen as an important achievement, although quite a few FBOs recruit staff and volunteers belonging to other faith groups than their own or to none at all (see chapter 5).

The principle of separation of church and state in the Netherlands does not prohibit financial aid of the government to certain activities of religious communities and organisations. The fact that the Roman Catholic and Protestant pillars were basic constitutive elements of the modern Dutch state has certainly been crucial for that. In their analysis of the 1917 legacy of public funding to religious schools, Kennedy and Valenta (2006) describe the relations between the Dutch state and religion as follows: “The Dutch state itself has never been neutral in respect to religion; indeed, extensive involvement of the state with religious expression in public life has been the traditional approach” (Kennedy and Valenta, 2006, p. 337). They see it as ‘unfortunate’ that many Dutch people in recent
times stress the need for a separation of church and state. In their view a state being ‘neutral’ in respect to religion is impossible; a naïve assumption that has proven unfruitful in debates in self declared ‘neutral states’ France and the United States, according to the authors. They show how the great deal of latitude by the state to enable faith groups to sustain religious identities, has led to recent criticism of the system being too accommodating toward religion. The religious particularism of orthodox Christian schools (due to their views on Darwinism and rejection of homosexual teachers) and Islamic schools (due to their views on homosexuality and unclear foreign ties) has been criticised and the abolishment of the state funding of private religious schools demanded by people of different political backgrounds.

With two-thirds of primary and secondary education carried out by ‘special’ (bijzondere), meaning private (but highly subsidised) schools of all possible denominations, this would be an unprecedented practical challenge. Apart from this pragmatic argument in favour of the arrangements that followed from the 1917 agreement, another line of reasoning stresses that “in reality private schools have actually been operating deeply within the Dutch state’s orbit of influence” (Kennedy and Valenta 2006, p. 338). They speak of a relatively comfortable relation between Dutch religious schools and the state, due to the fact that these schools never stood apart from the political establishment.

FBOs in other domains of society, such as welfare provisions, were operating in a similar situation, although state influence was more limited when compared to education at first (until 1960s) and quickly became more present and dominating afterwards (Polderman, 2002). The state funded FBOs operating in the field of welfare, health care and social work “enabled the state to closely monitor and regulate what religious groups are doing, and set the parameters for their continuing participation in public life” (Kennedy and Valenta, 2006, p. 340). Kennedy and Valenta (2006, p. 348), however, paint the Dutch past in darker colours, too: “The separate but equal institutions of Dutch pillarised society enabled the equitable distribution of government monies and support across communities, while stimulating an intense distrust and intolerance between communities, particularly at the individual level and ideological level. It is precisely this history of religiously-based practices of intolerance within structures of tolerance that the Dutch fear will return through the support of minority communities (...)” New tensions arise now that society is no longer officially organised along the old socio-religious lines, whereas at the same time new religious groups cling to their right of building capacity in their own communities, instead of the willingness or combined with the willingness to integrate with the rest of Dutch society.

**The neutral state and subsidizing**

Due to the historical developments of Dutch state-religion relations, faith-based organisations are treated equally to secular organisations in civil society and can count on financial support for their non-religious activities - if these fit the interests of the state.

Van der Burg (2009:18) points out that the separation of state and church and neutrality are two different - although related - things. Neutrality is a broader ideal related to the content of policies, while the separation between state and church concerns the institutional connections between organisations of the church and the state. It therefore has a more legal nature.

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39 French authors would not describe France as a neutral, but a ‘lay’ (Etat laïc) state.
Van der Burg distinguishes three forms of neutrality:

1. **Exclusive neutrality.** Religion in this vision is a private matter and is therefore kept out of public space as much as possible. Subsidizing activities of churches or mosques is out of the question, regardless of their nature (religious or social). This seen as the own responsibility of these groups.

2. **Inclusive neutrality.** Individuals and groups have the freedom and right to speak and act from their own religion or life conviction also in the public sphere. This vision demands an equal treatment of all (acknowledged) religions and life views by the government. The government may offer support to activities of organisations (also financially). Activities should meet the goals of the government and the government may not prioritize one religion over the other. Religious and non-religious groups should also be treated equal.

3. **Compensating neutrality.** In this vision religious convictions and faith-based actions are tolerated in the public space, as well. In addition, the government may also fulfil an active role in compensating religions and life convictions that are -because of special or structural circumstances- disadvantaged. In this vision the support for religious activities is sometimes possible, like support for the realisation of a church or mosque facility.

Legally and historical the realization of neutrality corresponds mostly to the second vision, the inclusive variant (Davelaar and Smits van Waesberghe, 2010, Van der Burg, 2009, Nickolson, 2008).

Equal treatment with other non-profit organisations is visible in a rather passive form of financial state support: all FBOs are exempted from value added tax on payments. In addition, FBOs can also benefit from other tax exemptions if they are regarded an ‘Institution for General Benefit’ (Algemeen Nut Beogende Instelling or ANBI). This category includes a list of non-profit organisations, like churches, mosques, faith-based organisations, charity, cultural and scientific institutions that contribute to the ‘collective good’ and are approved by the Tax Service (Belastingdienst). Such institutions don’t have to pay tax on donations and inheritances they receive, and payments made by ANBI’s for the collective good are also exempted from donation tax. Individuals that provide gifts to ANBI’s in turn can deduct these from their income tax.

### 7.2 General tendencies in state-religion relations

Beside these more principled considerations, public officials have to make considerations of more practical or pragmatic kind.. Van der Burg states: “The Salvation Army and Jewish Social Work justly receive support for a part of their activities. The use of this ‘religious structure’ does not have to lead to objections as long as the separation of church and state (no institutional influence and no judgment with respect to the content of the views of the organisation) is respected in the design. This support, however, should not be seen as outcome of compensation or inclusive neutrality. The support should primarily be justified by the argument that the use of the religious infrastructure is an effective mean to reach certain policy goals. The Salvation Army receives much more money for her social activities than would be justified according to the proportional assignment based on the amount of members. But proportionality is in this case not the criterion; the question is if the Salvation Army executes a worthy activity in a good manner” (2009, p. 64-65).

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40 See [http://www.belastingdienst.nl/variabel/niet_commerciele_organisaties/niet_commerciele_organisaties-02.html#P13_1024](http://www.belastingdienst.nl/variabel/niet_commerciele_organisaties/niet_commerciele_organisaties-02.html#P13_1024)
Of course the opinions on this topic differ. Counter arguments, for example, emphasize that by the use of the religious infrastructure the focus on religion in the lives of groups and individuals is too big. The first line of critique is that the use of FBOs forms an obstacle for integration and social cohesion. Maybe the social cohesion within groups is strengthened, but not the cohesion between religious groups. A second line of critique focuses on the role of religion within the organisations and the activities. Are the services available for adherents of other faiths or non believers?

Despite these objections, Dutch authorities subsidise many activities and projects of FBOs, either within the context of official policies, or because they have an interest in FBOs providing assistance to certain groups the welfare state does not include, such as the homeless or undocumented people. Subsidizing activities of religious organisations is advocated because of their social importance (implicitly meaning more effective or efficient). Pro arguments are for example that FBOs are better able to reach certain group than the government. Another argument is that FBOs are cheaper because they work with volunteers or bring in own means. The government has also been keen in financing projects of faith-based self-organisations of migrants aimed at fostering the emancipation and participation of their members in society. In recent years there has been increased state funding for (inter-religious) dialogue projects as well. Although there is a great deal of continuity in the relations between state and religion, especially at the local level, a change in national integration policies can be observed, from stimulating the emancipation of minorities in society towards the civic integration of newcomers. Public support for mainly Moroccan and Turkish Muslim institutions used to be related to the dominant belief that self-organisations were important for the emancipation and integration of these various social groups. In recent years the model of integration with retention of identity laid down in the ethnic minorities policy has become increasingly contested, and new emphasis is put on civic integration, by introducing civic integration courses and exams as prerequisite to obtain temporary and permanent resident permits. As a consequence, previously undisputed forms of state support for activities of religious self-organisations in society, meet with much more suspicion and are debated openly, also at the local level.

While some FBOs, such as Exodus, the Salvation Army and other local faith based service providers have their activities up to 80 per cent or more funded by the state, others work with a variety of financial sources. Support from faith-based Funds, such as Haella, SKaN, the Rotterdam Foundation etc., is important for many FBOs, as are independent fund-raising campaigns. Faith-based self-organisations of Muslims and Christian migrants mainly rely on contributions from members, although sometimes financial support for the building of a mosque or contracting of imams comes from abroad. Those national FBOs with relatively high levels of donations by members, regard high degree of financial self support a healthy situation for any faith-based organisation. Some umbrella organisations, however, feel excluded from government subsidies. A common complaint of representatives of Islamic umbrella organisations is a lack of financial means to create a small professional executive office. Many would like to see the government invest in the sustainability of their organisations. Dissatisfaction among ‘new’ FBOs also exists in the context of large amounts of subsidies given to ‘neutral organisations’ that try to reach their ‘rank and file’. But there are also signs of increasing cooperation. In the last years, Islamic women and mosque umbrella organisations, in cooperation with IHSAN, have been successful in obtaining government subsidies for projects aimed at raising awareness on issues such as honour killing and domestic violence. Although these are signs of fruitful cooperation, some representatives regret that the government seems only interested in subsidizing

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41 A term that is used for organisations that are established by, and represent members of a specific group in society.
projects on ‘controversial’ issues, which represent relatively marginal problems in comparison to issues such as the labour market discrimination of women wearing a headscarf.

7.3 Cooperation from the local government perspective

Discussions on government subsidies to FBOs often start at the local level. Due to the decentralisation of policy responsibilities in the field of welfare and care to municipalities, subsidies for FBO activities in these areas are dependent on local authorities’ preferences. The outcome often depends on the perceptions of responsible mayor and alderman about whether social activities of faith-based organisations can be defined in non-religious terms, and whether the organisations are perceived as representative interlocutors or partners for the implementation of policies (Rath et al., 2001; Canatan et al., 2003; 2005; Beck, 1996; Dautzenberg and Van Westerlaak, 2007).

The document ‘Churches and mosques within the Wmo’ (2007) states that the separation between church and state is very common within municipalities; church related activities are not subsidized. However, the specific translation of this separation differs strongly among municipalities. Especially regarding the extent in which mosques and associated organisations are seen as serious partners for cooperation. The document shows that some districts in Amsterdam and some sub municipalities in Rotterdam are very active and have a positive working attitude towards these forms of cooperation.

The first national survey on public funding by municipalities of organisations based on religious or other life convictions (Davelaar and Smits van Waesberghe, 2010) shows that local governments subsidize a broad range of concrete social or cultural activities which contribute to local goals. Most often mentioned are the improvement of integration and participation, the encouragement of voluntary work, support for self organisations, enabling cultural events, encouraging dialogue and providing shelter to vulnerable groups in society (tabel 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Municipalities funding %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving integration and participation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving voluntary work in society</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting self organisations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating cultural events</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting dialogue and integration activities</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter of vulnerable groups in society</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the accessibility of social- and care services</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offering upbringing support</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offering homework guidance/ activities outside school</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating inter-religious deliberation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation jobs, re-integration routes within FBOs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realising support structure for discussion in times of crises and disasters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities that improve dialogue with Muslim youth</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursue diversity policy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching deralled-radical youth</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the same time many municipalities indicate that they maintain no subsidy relations at all and in many cases subsidy amounts are modest. For governments the standard is usually to cooperate with general, ‘neutral’ organisations. Cooperation with FBOs often emerges to reach certain groups (better), to stimulate voluntary work or to enhance social cohesion and inter faith dialogue. Organisations with a Protestant-Christian background receive public funding for their activities in 37% of the municipalities, Roman Catholic organisations in 26% of the municipalities. Then humanistic organisations (15%), Islamic organisations (14%) and inter-religious organisations (12%) follow. Non-western Christian groups only receive public funding in 3% of the municipalities, followed by Jewish (3%) and Buddhist organisations (2%).

From this national overview, we turn now to the situation in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg.

**Amsterdam**

In general, subsidies for FBOs come from various departments, such as the Care and Society Service (*Dienst Zorg en Samenleving*), the Work and Income Service (*Dienst Werk en Inkomen*), the Diversity and Integration Service (*Dienst Diversiteit en Integratie*) and the Social Relief Service (*Dienst Maatschappelijke Opvang*). However, an explicit approach in terms of cooperation with FBOs within the field of social work and the Social Support Act, does not appear from the policy documents published by the municipality of Amsterdam. For example, the Wmo-nota states only in general terms that “volunteer organisations are consulted when mapping social problems in the municipality”.

Only in the field of social policy and integration the role of faith-related initiatives is identified explicitly. The programme agreement of 2006-2010 recognizes that the contribution of social organisations in the field of integration is very important. The municipality recognizes that self-organisations are well equipped to play a role in this policy field as well. Therefore the subsidy program was evaluated in order to see whether not only projects but also organisations should receive support in the future (program agreement 2006-2010). The older Integration Nota of the municipality of Amsterdam (2003) states that the connections between municipality and religious organisations of ethnic minorities have intensified, that the possibilities have grown and that applications and subsidies also increased in the period 1994-2002. The Integration Nota offers some reasons as to why the municipality wants to work with FBOs. Important considerations include; the bridging function of these organisations; the possibilities of introducing and connecting people to regular welfare organisations in this manner; and the organisation of social activities across different religious and ethnic groups. The Amsterdam Together Platform (Platform Amsterdam Samen), a project office directly accountable to the Mayor of Amsterdam, played a role in this.

Canatan (2005) writes about the pragmatic vision of Job Cohen, the former mayor of Amsterdam, on the role of religious organisations. Cohen is of the opinion that the church and the state should be separated, and that local governments should seek possibilities for cooperation with religious organisations. This is because these organisations have better access to specific groups in society and because the convictions of regular welfare organisations do not always match those of some groups residing in Amsterdam. In 2008 the Red-Green coalition issued a comprehensive document on church and state that was adopted by the municipal council (Mayor and Aldermen Amsterdam, 2008). It stated that the policy of Amsterdam on the matter was in line with the vision of ‘inclusive neutrality’, whereas ‘compensating neutrality’ could be necessary in exceptional situations (see section 7.1). This document did not temper the debate in Amsterdam on the role of religion in the public domain at all. In Amsterdam, for example, more than elsewhere, discriminatory hiring practices of FBOs executing public policies have become an issue of contention. Youth for Christ
(YfC) that won a public tender in 2009 to execute public youth work in the Baarsjes district was fiercely criticised, because an organisation with the mission ‘to bring youth into contact with Jesus Christ’ was not deemed able to conduct ‘neutral’ youth work. Concerns were mostly related to the possible exclusion of young people of different faiths and to the discriminatory hiring practices of the organisation. A new round of negotiations between the city district and the organisation resulted among others in concessions to hire non-Christian personnel and the creation of a separate foundation and website. The (elected) President of the District Council did not survive the local and national political turmoil that followed. This summer, the (new) District Amsterdam West announced that they were not prolonging the contract of the (YfC) for their youth centre The Mall. YfC states that they made enough concessions and refused to moderate its demands anymore: “By the name of The Mall our social work takes place in 25 other cities, everywhere just as part of Youth for Christ. Nowhere is talk of converting with subsidies”, so the representative of the organisation explained.

Another faith-based organisation that became subject of political debate in Amsterdam is Tot Heil des Volks (For the Salvation of the People), that receives public money for their ministry to prostitutes that want to quit their job (called Het Scharlaken Koord, Scarlet Cord). Like others the organisation discriminates on the basis of religion in its employment policies. In November 2009, when the local anti-discrimination policy was discussed in the council, a resolution from the Liberal Party was accepted (except by the Christian Democrats) that states that the central city government will not contract organisations anymore that discriminate against certain groups in their employment policies. Debates that followed showed that some parties were not fully aware of the possible consequences of the resolution and that no party did want to a priori rule out FBOs as service providers (Davelaar and Smits van Waesberghe, 2010). And although the city government did not carry out the resolution because it conflicted with the Law for Equal Treatment that allows faith-based organisations to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring practices of core personnel, it indicates that the faith component of FBOs continues to be an issue of tension in state-FBO cooperation in an increasingly secular society.

Rotterdam

The municipality of Rotterdam has a long history of cooperation with FBOs. Cooperation and the application for public funding are arranged along different policy lines. The majority of subsidies for FBOs are granted by the department for Social Services and Employment (SoZaWe Rotterdam) or the department for Youth, Education and Society (JOS). These include those subsidies that the municipalities could file under the Social Support Act - or not. Subsidies for education, integration and participation in general, are provided by JOS. All subsidies on combating poverty, enhancing the voluntary sector and homelessness services go through the Social Service. In addition, the city Districts (deelgemeenten) develop their own policies and subsequent relations, although according to the responsible aldermen and District staff, financial relations with FBOs are rather limited, in absolute and relative terms.

When it comes to subsidizing, no distinction is made between FBOs and NGOs. The government assumes a demand-driven policy regarding cooperation with FBOs. FBOs are stimulated to actively think along about targeting problems at the local level. In this way, the municipality has a pragmatic mentality in which it acknowledges and appreciates the contribution of FBOs in obtaining governmental goals, like poverty reduction, integration, safety and social cohesion. The fact that they tend to work with volunteers makes FBOs relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, FBOs are more capable of reaching groups, to whom the government has no or little access to, like certain groups of women,
youth and the homeless. FBOs can be complementary to the work of the municipality and at the same time form a bridge between the municipality and the rank and file.

In Rotterdam, there is no ongoing political debate, nor an official policy, on relations between government and FBOs. Some respondents explain this, by pointing at the ‘pragmatic’ way in which Rotterdam supposedly approaches problems. However, some courses of action can be distinguished: First, when a FBO intends to contribute to the goals of the government in the social sphere, normally, requests for public funding are possible. Second, the municipality is not allowed to interfere in the organisations activities and in their religious doctrine. Third, the municipality does not accept when any organisation pretends to represent and speak on behalf of a whole (ethnic or religious) community. Because the city of Rotterdam is constantly confronted with religious differences, this could easily lead to the exclusion certain groups. These guidelines can be described as the ‘communitas opinio’ on the matter.

In the past, organisations that received subsidy had to publicize/present all their reports to the municipality. Nowadays, the municipality only has to account for their subsidies. This has decreased the transparency and knowledge about the activities of these organisations. Furthermore, “the new subsidy-system means that subsidy has become really inaccessible for new groups. It requires technique, handiness, and experience to know the trick. So this subsidy regime is not that obvious as aldermen often think.” (policy advisor, municipality of Rotterdam). In some cases, the financial support of a group runs via an older subsidy organisation like Stichting Samenwerking (Cooperation Foundation) or the Catholic Mara Foundation and Protestant KSA. This occurs when the municipality does not have enough knowledge about the new organisation or when the organisation has no legal representation (which is obliged to receive subsidy).

In recent years, the authorities have decided to support cooperation and dialogue in the field of religious organisations. Subsidies for the creation of a new platform Religions and Life Convictions have been granted to the before mentioned Stichting Samenwerking. Rotterdam also lends a hand to the Christian migrant communities. A booklet with information of 150 communities was promoted and umbrella organisation SKIN Rotterdam could attract personnel to work on mutual assistance and capacity building.

Since Rotterdam knows such a variety of cultures, ethnicities and religious backgrounds, there are big differences between the city districts in regards to the composition of the inhabitants, social problems and FBOs. Furthermore, there are great differences with respect to the political compositions. These differences make policy interventions problematic. City districts need specific policies, which are inline with the differences between neighbourhoods.

**Tilburg**

Tilburg is looking for the right form in terms of cooperation with FBOs. There is no clear policy and each time considerations are made about (financial) cooperation. They are, however, implicitly addressed as part of the civil society. According to the representatives of the municipality, FBOs are quite active in the social sphere. At the same time, however, their contribution is not yet clear to all and the active approach towards FBOs can be enhanced.

The Tilburg municipal policy towards FBOs has not changed much over the last five years. However, officers declare that the actual involvement of FBOs in the implementation of policies has grown.
In addition, the local government is experiencing a growing pressure from the FBOs for a clarification about the possibilities for them to apply for public funding. Despite the focus of the municipality on the accessibility and quality of general service providers, migrant churches and mosques keep urging for public funding, for example for homework assistance.

In terms of content there is a lot of cooperation, but financial relations are modest in comparison to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In instances where this does occur, it happens in light of creating new connections and encouraging private initiatives, in other words: stimulating the ‘powers of the city’. Furthermore, cooperation with the FBOs fits into the Council’s ‘diversification-strategy’: more contact points in the community, next to standard channels such as professional self-organisations and advice- and client-councils and groups.

An interesting example of an initiative supported by the authorities is the Round Table House, an interfaith community centre. This initiative offers a platform to a number of small and very diverse religious communities with the intention of fostering mutual understanding, support and empowerment within and between these faith-groups. As a long term goal, the centre will be integrated into a larger ‘social housing and care zone’ in the Districts’ shopping centre, also offering a walk-in centre and care facilities.

7.4 Cooperation from the Faith-based Organisations perspective

The previous paragraph provided more insight into the considerations of the Dutch government with respect to cooperation with FBOs. In this paragraph we will focus on the other side of this discussion: the FBO considerations in terms of working with the government.

Common goals
According to multiple FBO’s, the starting point of cooperation is the presence of common goals and interests. This is, according to the Innercity Project in Rotterdam, that had some collisions with the government with respect to food distribution to the homeless - “the game you must play. They [the governmental institutions] have a certain vision on things and a certain goal in mind and so do we. And sometimes you oppose each other and sometimes it is about the cohesion in a neighbourhood (...) and then of course you work together.”

Acknowledgement
Almost all of the FBOs we spoke to, attach a strong value to the fact that the government knows and appreciates their work - ‘pure gain for society’. This is initiated with contact, which, besides a step towards appreciation, can form the beginning of a (possible) cooperation. Some respondents see the Social Support Act (Wmo) as a sign that the easy accessible, local social work - including the work of FBOs - is increasingly viewed as a partner in solving social problems. As a result of the act, in different neighbourhoods, cooperation emerged between FBOs, regular service providers and the government. Others see little changes with the act or perceive its introduction as a ‘consultation circus’ without outcomes. The attention is appreciated, but have also lead to a bit of astonishment: “They have discovered us as a place where you can do something with social cohesion and citizenship (...) For years they have not seen that we already did this for a very long time” (organisation for social work KSA).

Multiple FBOs in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg, receive acknowledgment as some of the following quotes indicate: “The contact is equal. In Tilburg there is not an attitude, like ‘we are the municipality and you have to listen’.” (Masjid El-Feth) and “It is nice to be invited and not to be kept
separate because of the separation between church and state”. Nonetheless, some of them feel that the government uses them for knowledge and their network, while they receive little in return. It is notable that this form of inequality is also experienced by FBOs who closely cooperate with the government and who receive a considerable amount of financial support. They are expected to be transparent and are required to justify all subsidized activities, while the government does not always reciprocate in this manner of working; every (local) department has its own accountability system and decision-making about subsidy can sometimes hinder good management.

Subsidy or independence
Self conscious or not, most of the FBOs experience difficulties when it comes to financing their activities. Funds are being reduced considerably and the economic crisis has resulted in less donations. In addition, the rank and file is often too poor to contribute. Therefore, many organisations need and want to have financial relations with the government. Organisations often stress that they can do more good with help of the government; “What this little church does for the city Rotterdam is often invisible, but we do a lot. If we would receive more financial help, maybe we even could do much more.” (Hope International Baptist church). Projects could be extended and new ones could commence. Cooperation with the government can also strengthen and professionalize the activities. Others see public funding as a helping hand to cover basic needs of the organisation: especially among migrant churches there is a great need of available buildings.

Despite these financial relations with the government, most of the organisations emphasized the fact that they want to remain (partially) independent. They want to maintain the freedom to employ their own working methods. “The more we get within our own terms, the better. But you have to keep control over your method, your content and about your reliability towards the people in the neighbourhood. If those things come into play it stops.” (Old Neighbourhood Pastoral Care Middel-land-South) Another example is Exodus Amsterdam, which stresses the importance of maintaining a degree of independence from the Ministry of Justice. The rehabilitation service in the Netherlands, for instance, was initially set up by churches as well, and is now an independent foundation that is completely dependent on financial support from the Ministry of Justice. As a result they can only help those that fall under the criteria of the Ministry.

Because of the strings attached and reticent because of the bureaucracy, there is also a big group of FBOs which prefer ‘doing it ourselves’, resulting in no subsidy whatsoever. They want to work with their own vision in mind, and accumulate and use their own resources and possibilities. Especially groups of migrants believe that “in principle we [will try to] solve it [ourselves], before we go to the municipality or government”.

The need for independence is also related to the fact that FBOs want to be able to criticise the government. They see it as their job to represent the needs of their rank and file or their target groups. In Amsterdam, for example, the workers from the Jeanette Noelhouse take a critical stand towards government policies on issues such as asylum, trade in weapons and financing the army. They try to give an example of a different kind of society by their particular living style in the house and by organizing monthly vigils (wakes) at the border prison at Schiphol Airport which detains undocumented people. Although the vigils are a form of protest, it is mainly aimed at raising awareness and the mobilization of people against violent and exclusionary state policies. FBOs in Rotterdam are also participating in vigils.
**Good relations require effort**

Another reason to avoid a subsidy relation with the government is the bureaucracy that comes with it, which according to some is quite complex. Some FBOs are also of the opinion that the municipality thinks in “terms of procedures and not in terms of people” (Paulus church, Rotterdam). Furthermore, FBOs feel that instead of taking the time to write reports for the government their time is better spent on activities for the target group. Besides the paper work, meetings with the government also take a lot of time, which the volunteers quite simply do not always have. “There is an overflow of meetings. Our people work to survive and have no time during the day to go to these meetings. Meetings are sometimes from 2pm until 6pm, then you just have to go to your work.” (La Sagrada Familia, Rotterdam).

Another complaint concerns the durability of relations with the government. According to the Spark Foundation in Tilburg, it is a continuing problem that the government only thinks in terms of projects. “It costs a lot of money. You start, and build up knowledge en than you have to stop after three years.” Furthermore, because civil servants and politicians change rapidly, it is difficult to establish sustainable relations. Another consequence of this is that civil servants don’t always possess the right knowledge and skills. Either “they are scared to follow their procedures, because they are afraid to be judged by the politicians, or they do not know the procedures very well” and are therefore not able to provide the necessary services fitting the individuals (Paulus church Rotterdam). Nonetheless, building up relations with public officials will, in the long run, lead to positive changes in policies, most FBOs in Tilburg believe: “The municipality of Tilburg gives FBOs room to take part in conversations about (poverty) policies. Elsewhere in the country it is said ‘in Tilburg everything is possible.’ But before, this was not true, it is something we achieved. In Tilburg the poverty policy has improved. The clients really benefit from this. They are treated more friendly at Social Affairs (Sociale Zaken) and supplementary benefits (Bijzondere Bijstand) are more generously granted. The cooperation between the different care providers is improved. We have achieved this by showing how necessary it was” (The Spark Foundation).

### 7.5 Discussion

Overall we can postulate that in the Netherlands, just as in a lot of other countries, the separation between church and state, just as the principle of the neutral state, has never been an unambiguous principle. It has known different interpretations over the years, because of different circumstances. Consequently, in practice, the concept is always connected to the situational context and object of changing interpretations; a recipe for a lively debate (Davelaar and Van Waesberghae, 2010). “The different social views on the role of religion in society’ in this way influence the realization of neutrality”, the mayor and alderman of Amsterdam concluded (2008: p.7). Nickolson (2008) summarizes the situation as follows: “the separation in the Netherlands [is] historically and legally indeed not really strict (...) On the one hand it provides support for the ‘stretchers’, but on the other hand it gives the ‘precise ones’ the opportunity to plea for a strict separation.” He points out that the separation between church and state, just as the freedom of religion, as principle is no static known fact. “The realization of these principles in the end depends strongly on the vision one has on the role of religion in society, and on the attitude the government should have towards religion.”

In general, Dutch national and local governments have always welcomed alternatives for statutory services or the possible added value to statutory services offered by FBOs. Welfare provision through general services is the rule at all levels, though. The total amount of public funding to FBOs seems
to have been reduced (national level) or remained stable (local level) since the 1990s. Contact between religious communities or organisations and municipalities, however, has clearly increased over the last 5 to 10 years. The forms of cooperation show an increasing variety, as we say already in chapter 4. The reasons to cooperate are divers, too. Recapitulating the views of the three municipalities, we can distinguish the following reasons for cooperating with FBOs.

**With respect to content:**
- Keeping in touch with certain parts/members of society, who can only be reached through these organisations, such as excluded groups.
- Appreciation for the socially relevant work of FBOs in general and especially for voluntary work.
- Acknowledgment of the quality of the services by these organisations.
- The contribution of these organisations to dialogue in the city between groups with different cultures and religions.

**For practical reasons:**
- Religiously inspired volunteers are more persistent and on average work more hours per week than other volunteers.
- FBOs provide services at a low cost.

Many FBOs are satisfied with the recognition by the local and national authorities of their role in society, although especially churches, mosques and other faith-based grass-roots organisations complain of being simply addressed as entrances for government agencies or NGOs to get in touch with their members. Yet, all FBOs want to shape their own course. For almost all communities and organisations, being able to give a voice to the problems and concerns of their members or clients is crucial.

**In sum, we can distinguish the following reasons as to why FBOs would choose to cooperate with the government:**
- The wish for acknowledgement by the government.
- Lower thresholds: enhance contact between beneficiaries or members of organisations and the government.
- Influence governmental policies concerning the target group/ the membership.
- The possibility to acquire financial support of the government.

**Reluctance to cooperate can stem from:**
- The wish to organise activities as free as possible and to approach target groups in a manner which they think is right.
- The wish to be autonomous in the choice of beneficiaries.
- The idea that FBOs need distance from the government to be able to remain critical.
- The fear for bureaucracy when cooperation with the government becomes more intense.
- The fear for taking up responsibility for the execution of top-down policy.
8 Future perspectives of organisations and broader tendencies

At the end of this report we like to shift our focus from the present to the future. We asked all representatives of the FBOs in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg about their opinion on the chances and threats regarding their organisations, goals and activities. What do they expect to be the decisive developments in the near future? We end this concluding chapter with some general tendencies based on all the information we encountered during this project.

8.1 The future from the perspective of the Faith-based Organisations

Chances
It is a harsh reality that the opportunities for FBOs are dependent on the problems of people. There will always be people who fall through the cracks. Although most interviewees believe that the government should take more responsibility here, many of them see also a special task for FBOs in solving the problems of people who fall through the safety net. This is because FBOs have “the knowledge, the involvement, the emotion and also a substantial membership.” (Meeting Foundation, Rotterdam). Furthermore, the government tends to only offer ‘physical’ help, while “there are many more spiritual/psychic problems in society” which FBOs are more capable of dealing with (Christian Family International, Rotterdam). A large majority of FBOs therefore want to expand their activities, in terms of accessing more target groups and locations as well as organizing new activities in the future. In Tilburg especially, activities concerning integration and participation were mentioned, such as activities for children and youth (Majid El-Feth), dialogue (Liberal Jewish Community), language courses (Majid El-Feth), art and cultural activities (Suleymaniye mosque), and solidarity between generations (Suleymaniye mosque). In Rotterdam, the focus is especially on expanding activities for children and youth, like homework classes, sport activities or a community centre. A shortage of activities available for children above the age of twelve was often mentioned. In Rotterdam and Amsterdam, several FBOs wish to move to another (larger or better equipped) building. Several Amsterdam based FBOs plan to provide better support for hard to reach target groups such as women of closed religious communities, undocumented people, victims of the sex slave trade and ex-convicts.

Besides expansion, multiple FBOs want to improve their methods of working, especially in terms of ways of reaching out to people in need. Several organisations see good opportunities in the emphasis on personal development and empowerment of clients, and the implementation of this in existing activation schemes. Many FBOs in Rotterdam stress they can accomplish more through cooperation: “If you want to do things in the long run, you need cooperation.” (Paulus church). FBOs feel that it is especially important to cooperate at the neighbourhood level, because of decentralisation tendencies in government: “It has to happen in the neighbourhoods.” (SPIOR). In Tilburg, New Song and the
Trinity Chapel, for example, would like to see better cooperation between the Evangelical communities, while in Amsterdam, several FBOs have advocated more cooperation between the established churches and migrant churches. However, according to the Evangelical-Lutheran Diaconate, the main challenge will be how to balance cooperation with partners, without losing focus and becoming too much of an ad-hoc organisation.

Future prospects are also influenced by the maintenance or reshaping of the relations between religious institutions and work conducted by groups in the periphery. As the Theological Working Group of Eurodiaconia (Jourdan et al., 2005, p. 53) expresses: “Diaconal work is sometimes done without clear organisational ties to church institutions in a kind of ‘diapora’ situation. This happens e.g. in urban mission with regard to poverty, unemployment and other socially problematic areas [...] [The] official church should be more aware and supportive of this kind of work. After all, it is diaconal and therefore part of the church”. While many active members of these initiatives will probably agree that churches should be more supportive, many also cherish their independence. More support might imply more financial means and a larger audience. Independence, however, might increase the credibility of the organisation among client groups and within certain denominations. It might also allow organisations to be more flexible in their responses to social developments and in their choice in selecting other groups and institutions to work with.

In addition, especially in Rotterdam, FBOs see opportunities in terms of cooperation with the government. They strive for contact on a regular basis on issues and developments. In addition, (more) government funding would enable FBOs to offer more support to people in the margins of society. Subsidies are also seen as a sign of appreciation for the work that they do.

**Threats**

An important reason for wishing to cooperate with government originates from the fear of financial shortages in the future. Original money sources, such as faith-affiliated charitable funds, slowly dry up. The membership levels are decreasing (traditional Dutch denominations) or members are not able to contribute enough (non-western communities and organisations), because they themselves belong to the poorer sections of society. One of the effects of declining financial resources is that paid employees can no longer be afforded. According to the Neighbourhood Pastoral Care Middel-land-South, this affects the quality of work because “mutual relations between people and problems are often so complicated that you need highly qualified, devoted, affectionate and reliable paid staff to keep standing in between.”

However, as we have seen before, FBOs want to be able to shape their course. For many organisations, being able to give a voice to the problems and concerns of their members or clients is crucial, while the fact of the matter is that whoever controls the finances ultimately gains (some) control over the way that it is spent. Subsidized FBOs also have to cope with political changes. In Rotterdam for example, the government pays a lot of attention to target groups which FBOs also focus on, such as migrant women, lonely elderly, youth at risk and the homeless. Although most FBOs feel that they are appreciated for their work and are seen as important partners by policy makers, they are aware that policies can change quickly in the relative unstable political situation in the Netherlands since 2002.

Future concerns also relate to the fact that basically all FBOs tend to use volunteers to carry out their work. This may strengthen the quality of their work, because volunteers are often involved for many years and are not tied to achievement norms, targets, strict numbers of contact hours, etc.
However, this also makes the work vulnerable, as volunteers can quit any time they like. There is also a limited amount of time and responsibility you can ask of them. The Suleymaniye mosque in Tilburg, for example, wants to pay people for giving homework classes in the future: “Because we do not believe in volunteering [in education], you do not attain the quality you want.”

Many FBOs struggle due to a shortage of volunteers. Within traditional organisations, aging and secularization cause a decreasing membership and therefore a decrease in available volunteers. In migrant churches, on the other hand, the rank and file seems to grow and rejuvenate. However, this last group does voluntary work in addition to their paid job and family and therefore has less time. In this group, FBOs also experience individualization; ambitious people with better jobs are often more difficult to recruit for voluntary work. They are too busy with their own career. The church “no longer ranks first”. Furthermore, many (young) people are no longer connected to their neighbourhoods. While most older church or mosque goers have been living in a particular neighbourhood for most of their lives, new residents will likely move on elsewhere after a few years. Without enough volunteers FBOs risk to “go under by our own success” (The Worldhouse).

8.2 Challenges for FBO action on exclusion

In this section we will summarise some major tendencies that might influence the role of FBOs in catering for the needs of vulnerable citizens in in the Netherlands.

Shifts in perception

A first factor of importance to address are shifts in public opinion and subsequent political visions related to the perception of socially excluded people and the problems they encounter. How are the poor, the homeless and other marginalised groups perceived? Will the accent be on disciplining people or on elevating them? The recent period of increased uncertainty, dissatisfaction and polarisation in Dutch society has left its mark. The Dutch have become less compliant. People tend to believe more than before that other people should shoulder their responsibilities. People are less inclined to be tolerant and charitable (Bijl et al., 2010). They want the government to take care of, and help them to civilise the city (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2005). We notice a return of the ‘makeable society’. Remarkably, however, high expectations towards the state go together with growing mistrust of state intervention. In addition, researchers stress that the emphasis compared to the former high days of this idea has changed from guaranteeing material rights, to ‘imparting norms and values to members in society’. These changes can have both negative and positive effects on the support for FBOs as normative service providers. Information from our study so far indicates that Evangelical and Muslim FBOs are more likely to see a normative role in their service provision than the traditional churches that are reluctant to judge individuals and tend to take a critical position towards the government and its policies rather than towards the people they help out. At the same time, all FBOs emphasise the limitations of government intervention, and stress that people have a responsibility to take care of each other, too. In a broader sense, there seems to be growing awareness of the role of meaning and identity in services among opinion leaders (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004). This coincides with a little more hesitation in contracting projects on the basis of short term output or result criteria, and giving more weight to the capacity of organisations to make the right and enduring connections with clients and on responsiveness.
Centralizing tendencies
Some of the above mentioned value shifts enhance centralizing tendencies in the Dutch system. The state wants to discipline receivers of social assistance, Work First schemes are implemented in all municipalities. The state wants all urban outcasts like homeless people and drug addicts to be held in either ‘care or custody’ (House of Representatives, 2003-2004a). The national state tries to enforce compliance with new measures. Some FBOs are heavily criticised for their cautious stance on issues related to safety measures in inner cities or for their reluctance to help achieve the compulsory part of the ‘return policies’ on undocumented persons.

The National Action Plan on Social Relief for the Homeless (House of Representatives (2005-2006a), on the other hand, is a clear example of national-local cooperation building on national goals, instruments and finances, but also with local freedom to define and develop the measures and arrangements that seem necessary for their clients. The Salvation Army was directly involved in creating this influential strategy. It released large amounts of money and political attention for this target group and there is evidence that FBOs have profited from the new possibilities, although several respondents in our survey state that state influence on the choice of support projects or most favourable approaches has increased and tensions on the selection of target groups have risen in recent years.

State-religion relations
Secondly, there is the issue of the institutional, formal separation of state and church - which can be interpreted in various ways - and the way the day to day relations between public authorities and faith-inspired organisations and communities are shaped. Laws, principles, commonly accepted practices (‘soft laws’), local viewpoints and pragmatic solutions are at stake here. Together they constitute FBOs’ room to manoeuvre. A first influential factor on the position of FBOs is the extent to which the services they deploy are rooted on legal ground. If they are, circumstances for FBOs are only slowly changing in one direction or the other due to the nature of law making and the time it requires to introduce and implement new laws. In addition, the FBOs involved take care of a large number of clients, often labelled as difficult to guide or support. Their expertise and share of the market cannot easily be transported to others, like in youth care, forensic rehabilitation and homeless services. Less stable and transparent, for example, is the situation for those FBOs supporting undocumented persons: on the one hand government is opposing FBOs’ attempts to provide shelter or work to these groups, and discourages initiatives like church asylum. On the other hand it tolerates medical care and legal advice by the same FBOs because these rights are guaranteed by law. Medical assistance by FBOs and NGOs is in some cases indirectly co-financed through a quasi-governmental fund. Another aspect related to relations between religious organisations and the state is how different interpretations either increase or limit possibilities of public funding for FBOs. Obtaining public means is seen as important by most FBOs, although certainly not by all. In general, subsidising FBO activity is seen as possible as long as it contributes to (local) policy goals. Governments are not allowed to subsidise religious activities. Most municipalities favour the interpretation of inclusive neutrality (as compared to exclusive and compensating neutrality), although there is more diversity than might be expected with regards to the historical developments and current practices (Davelaar and Smits van Waesberghe, 2010).

Chances through decentralisation of policies?
A third element of importance is the trend towards decentralisation, which opens up new perspectives for FBOs. But are FBOs able to grab these opportunities? Above, we have discussed decentralisation, the search for new governance regimes and the integration of previously separate strands of
social policy at the local level (House of Representatives, 2004-2005, Van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005, Davelaar et al., 2003). These developments create new possibilities for partnerships of FBOs, other NGOs and public authorities. Even when local governance arrangements are built up along the lines of New Public Management philosophy and structures, and privatisation of services is dominant, FBOs have a chance to fully participate, building on specialised, highly professional, services, and their capacities to connect with and empower hard to reach groups in society or their position in volunteering. Overall, this chance seems to be bigger where emphasis is placed on governing through (self-governing) networks (Wälti and Kübler, 2003), or on openness and ‘multiplicity’ in making and implementing policy (Davelaar et al., 2001). Under the before mentioned Social Support Act mosques, temples and churches are invited to become part of these networks. The traditional churches, more than mosques and non-western Christian churches, are preparing for the Wmo and although they see opportunities, they are also afraid that the main aim is cost reduction, rather than genuine cooperation with civil society. In addition, Muslim umbrella organisations are more concerned with informing their rank and file about the ongoing changes related to the Wmo, rather than with new opportunities for cooperation or funding. In addition, representatives of IHSAN and SKIN mention that how mosques and newly established Christian faith-groups and their social organisations function in practice, is hard to reconcile which the requirements attached to receiving subsidies. In other cases FBOs are not even in the game, or directed to clearly defined niches in service delivery, where they have to abandon their more ‘holistic’ approach: i.e. no clear boundaries between voluntary and professional care, unconditioned aid, combination of direct help and political advocacy.

8.3 Discussion

In conclusion, whether FBOs will be able to contribute to the eradication of poverty and exclusion depends on many factors. A main question for the years to come is which parts of Dutch civil society are invited by national and local authorities, or can invite themselves, to shape, join or alter the struggle against poverty and other forms of exclusion. As we have shown it is crucial to bear in mind that there are many different FBOs operating, serving, campaigning and protesting in different domains. In some domains they have lost ground. In others FBOs are integrated in new governance regimes; in some cases they even situate at the core of local or national arrangements.

Answers to the following pressing and interrelated questions will highly shape the chances for FBO involvement in (local) social policies in the near future:

- How to deal with old forms of social exclusion and new and growing inequalities due to the economic crisis?
- How to enhance the integration of immigrants in Dutch society?
- How to reach new productive ways of dealing with religion in the public sphere?

So it is not only the current socio-economic situation that is at stake. Problems in dealing with a public role of religion keep attracting attention. A largely secularised population is obliged to address complex religious questions. People are deprived of the necessary knowledge and vocabulary for a successful resolution of these questions (Bäckström & Davie 2010). In addition, clear shifts in integration policies can be witnessed. In general there is pressure on accommodation to ‘Dutch norms and values’. Multiple Islamic FBOs mentioned that the ‘moral panic’ about Islam in Netherlands is a big threat. The Council of Moroccan Mosques North Holland, for example, hopes that more
cooperation will lead to more mutual respect. At the same time, local differences can be noted, although in all three cities a stress on ‘real dialogue’ between the religious, ethnic and cultural groups can be observed and balancing rights and obligations seems to be the guiding principle. The willingness to support directly religious minorities and their associations will reduce (further). And yet, the broader economic developments are also essential. The severe budget cuts in public spending form the first serious test for the upside-down Social Support Act and hence for the involvement of civil society organisations in policy networks. There will be more people in need, and at the same time less public support for civil society initiatives. They have to rely on themselves (and on their members, fellow citizens and the profit sector). There will be less (positive) financial incentives from the (local) state. Municipalities will only support the supply of services through FBOs or NGOs in case of ‘blind spots’ (neighbourhoods, target groups: e.g. homeless, youth at risk). Interventions will be placed more under control of the local government. General services are the rule and will be so in the future. But general services are also part of the ‘policy problem’: they are not always capable to reach and alter the situation of individuals in need or only at high costs. That and the stress on ‘prevention’, ‘reaching out’ and empowerment of clients and citizens, means that FBOs will be important actors in the social domain and will continue to deliver services to socially excluded groups in society.
9 Conclusion

This study, which included more than 70 FBOs, has illustrated that every FBO in retrospect differed tremendously in the way that they formulated their organisational identity, mission statement and activities. We came across small and large religious communities working on a day-to-day basis, outside the spotlights, empowering their members or disadvantaged groups in society. We encountered ecumenical grassroots projects in deprived neighbourhoods and were informed about new and innovative ways of linking social needs and (young) volunteers. We became acquainted with many informal or formalised public-private partnerships providing financial, medical or legal assistance in emergency situations, signalling social exclusion, supporting children of families experiencing poverty and enhancing the participation of isolated groups. We also uncovered the difficulties within the more well-known specialised services providers. These included working on arrangements with public authorities, and finding compromises that were both in line with the wishes of the government but simultaneously did not stray from the working philosophies of the FBOs in question. This insight might be one of the most important outcomes of our research on FBOs: socially relevant activities are undertaken by a wide variety of communities and organisations, that all correspond to the definition of a FBO. They differ in history, identity, scale, scope, working philosophy, method and religious background. More awareness of the different faces of faith-motivated action in the social domain is therefore appropriate.

Yet according to the many visions shared with us on how to foster greater social justice in cities, there was a remarkable degree of unity. First of all, whether it be formulated and understood as a religious duty or as a way of individual self-expression, helping and supporting fellow human beings is seen as a central element of faith. Second, all FBOs, regardless of their denomination or the functions they fulfil in the social domain, expect the public sector to take care of the basic needs in society in the first instance. No triumphalism could be heard about the failures of the state in this respect. Or in the words of a neighbourhood pastor: “The state is still the biggest charity around.” Finally, FBOs are socially active because they believe that their services are necessary in addition to those activities of other organisations or governments. That is not to say that many FBOs do not hold strong and/or critical opinions concerning the level of public services and the way they are provided.

The FBOs involved in our research, however, differ in terms of what they believe are the main problems of individuals and society, and how social exclusion can be combated most effectively, in a way other than providing direct help and referring people to the right services. Different opinions can be found here: Can these problems be solved by piecemeal social changes? Or must faith-affiliated organisations directly address the very foundations on which our society rests and the structures that determine so much of our lives? Should faith-motivated people actively refrain from giving into

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42 The authors like to thank Andres Walliser for his report on the cross evaluation in the Netherlands.
Do FBOs see the true acceptance of God/Allah as an indispensable requisite for a just society or are more worldly visions expressed by FBOs in their actions against social exclusion?

9.1 Activities and trends in FBO presence in cities

From a national perspective we described the activities of the traditional Dutch churches, of ecumenical networks, of religious self organisations of Christian migrants and of mosques and Islamic organisations with a social goal. After that we looked at the main contributions that Dutch FBOs make to the local social fabric (Saraceno 2002) and hence the local capacity to fight social exclusion and foster inclusion and cohesion. By providing examples, we listed the contributions of FBOs on domains on which activities are deployed: income, non-financial needs (like food, furniture and medical treatment), housing, participation and work, culture and leisure time, education and upbringing, legal rights, integration and inter religious dialogue.

The relative importance of the religiously inspired social activities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg has remained relatively stable over the last decades, yet the type of work has changed. The activities of local parishes/groups of the major, traditional churches are dwindling, due to a decrease in membership and financial means. However, this decrease has been compensated for in terms of innovative working methods of (independent) organisations affiliated with Catholic and Protestant communities and through the creation of new contacts between those communities, independent FBOs, funds with an ideological background, general welfare organisations and public authorities. This leads to less ‘innate’ and more communal projects, in which the religious inspiration takes on new forms. In these new alliances, projects and networks, religion either plays a role in the background or is a prominent constituent of activities, together with other identities. Examples of what might be labelled postsecular co-operation include, Food Banks, schoolfunds for children from poor families, youth work, anti-poverty campaigns, buddy projects, welcome programmes to new citizens, inter religious dialogues, neighbourhood meetings or medical and legal assistance to undocumented migrants.

Second, the role of the ‘new’ religious communities is growing, which is not always visible yet. They provide many services for members of their own communities and/or for people belonging to their own ethnic group. The social position of some of their adherents - in terms of a lack of money, lower levels of education, partly unsuccessful integration (unable to speak Dutch, low participation levels of women) - demands this according to the representatives of these communities. They increasingly cooperate with other organisations and the authorities, which enables them to offer better help, referrals, etc., to their own members. Criticism from within and from public officials can be heard on several issues. First, on the ability of these communities and organisations to reach out to young people and marginalised others not attending the religious services and activities. Second, on the slow progress of raising the level of professionalization in terms of leadership of mosques, churches and organisations.

There is a third development which, albeit indirectly, supplies the FBOs with new initiatives in the field of combating social exclusion, namely the increase of inter-religious dialogue. Where this used to be a token of goodwill, contacts over the last 5-10 years have clearly increased. This has occurred predominantly between the evangelical and traditional Dutch churches, followed by co-operation between Dutch churches and the so called migrant churches, and finally, between mosques and
(mainly) the traditional Dutch churches. Nevertheless, dialogue, and certainly further cooperation, often depends on a few people in these communities. Representatives of organisations, who strive for openness, are aware of the scepticism concerning cooperation with other faiths, and hence, the vulnerability of their own position.

9.2 Typology of functions

Subsequently, to be able to fully consider the contributions of FBOs in the social field, it seemed necessary to look beyond the concrete activities and pay attention to the different functions in the local welfare system of the organisations vis-à-vis the (local) state, other organisations, communities and families. In what way do these organisations and institutions work in complementary ways? Do they extend beyond plain service provision? Are they mainly aiming at individuals or also on capacity building inside communities or on changing views, beliefs or fears in communities of faith? Do they engage in political advocacy on behalf of excluded ‘others’?

For this purpose we introduced a typology of functions of FBOs in the local social system: (1) Professional services offered to specific target groups within the framework of the (local) welfare state and regulated by the authorities. Examples are: services to the homeless, to ex-convicts, youth work; (2) Supporting vulnerable people and groups who are outside the view and/or the reach of the official authorities. For instance: assisting people who are entitled to but make no use of debt-related advice, visiting people who lead isolated lives, supporting clients of the Food Bank, helping undocumented migrants; (3) Offering informal assistance and mutual support. Mostly provided, in silence, by religious communities; (4) Recruiting, activating and supervising volunteers from specific religious communities to carry out activities for vulnerable individuals and groups, inside or outside their own community. A few national and local organisations specifically devote themselves to this, for others it is a precondition to their activities. Practically all FBOs contribute to some extent to (5) community building and empowerment of their own or other deprived groups. Most organisations are involved in (6) political advocacy - indicating and listing problems, lending a voice to socially excluded groups and trying to get (solutions to) problems on the political agenda. All the organisations see this as belonging to and resulting from their general social activities. The degree of professionalism with which they influence politics does, however, vary considerably. Finally, practically all the interviewed organisations try to (7) bridge more or less inaccessible groups with regular welfare and care organisations and public agencies.

Overall, traditions within different faiths and denominations, deliberate choices, available funds and (wo)manpower determine the extent to which activities are carried out and whether this takes place with volunteers only or also with some professional support. This typology illustrates that a more simple division between, for example insiders and outsiders, or between religious communities and faith-based service providers, is insufficient to fully grasp the variety and impact of FBOs in the social field.

9.3 Where’s the faith in faith-based organisations?

In this study the role played by religion in social activities has been examined according to the following aspects: first, the motivation of professionals and volunteers, second, the identity and public profile of the organisation, third, the role faith plays in selecting and recruiting (volunteer)
workers, fourth, the influence of faith on the content of the activities and finally the role of religion in the selection of clients and visitors.

Supporting one another is one of the pillars of every religious community, caring for fellow-parishioners or people who are less fortunate is an important motivation. On the whole, the interviewees declare that faith inspires people (and sometimes obliges them) to care for their vulnerable fellow man. Faith is not only a motivation for volunteers and professionals, it is equally important in defining the public profile of FBOs. The way in which that takes place differs considerably. Organisations which are first and foremost mosque, congregation or parish have a clear religious profile. That is also the case with organisations that have strong ties to the community from which they originate. For organisations established primarily as service providers this is different. They frequently present themselves as being motivated by faith and religious values, and affiliated with a certain denomination. Other organisations nevertheless do reveal a clear religious profile. Although tensions in state-religion relations in general are on the rise, mounting the pressure to 'hide' the peculiarity of the faith-based identity, only few organisations are willing to change their faith-identity as such.

Most FBOs select members from their official bodies, and workers and volunteers based on their faith. In religious communities this is a clear cut matter: you are or you become a member because of your faith and from there you may become socially active. In independent organisations this is sometimes different. In almost all organisations workers were expected to show at least affinity with the religious background of the organisation, and certainly key personnel must in general show active involvement in a religious community. This is not always emphasised in recruiting volunteers. In fact, different motivations and ideological backgrounds can be welcomed, to suit the multiformity of the client group. Occasionally, it is also seen as a way to interest a broader circle of (young) people for the cause of a project or for religion in general.

Considering the extent to which faith influences the choice of activities, the following possibilities exist: (1) Religious practices and deeds are intertwined with social activities: they can not be separated, because it is the religious factor which is regarded as necessary for success in the social domain; (2) There is a clear distinction between religious and social activities; religious aspects are deliberately excluded from social activities. Clients and members have a choice to engage themselves with meaning giving or explicit Islamic or Christian activities; (3) The organisation is strictly offering secular services; and (4) Faith plays a more implicit role in the organisation. There are no religious activities, but faith is always present in the background (this position seems to be rather unique for Islamic self organisations in the Netherlands).

One danger is the overestimation of the role of religion in the lives of groups and individuals (and hence of the faith-factor in struggles against social exclusion). Our research shows that many FBOs contribute to empowerment and integration of their members and other target groups, and that churches and mosques do enhance inter-religious dialogue and contact between different ethnic and social-economic groups. But religious organisations, socially active or not, may stand in the way of integration, too. And social cohesion within their own community can block off attempts to engage in fostering social cohesion between groups. The opposite, however, also poses a threat. Not taking faith into account as an important motive for social activity, or of the religious infrastructure as an effective gateway to reach, confront and help people would mean neglecting an important element of many people's lives and reducing the capacity of public authorities to make their policies work.
In general, drawing sharp lines between faith-motivated citizens and others is not in line with the day-to-day reality in many organisations and projects: not all volunteers in FBOs are necessarily religious, but they are attracted by the aims of the organisation, the working methods or by the way a sense of community is created. And the opposite is also true: many volunteers and members of staff in secular organisations are people of faith.

9.4 Urban networks

FBOs in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg are well founded in the local networks surrounding poverty, integrating and supporting newcomers, and inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue. In addition, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, FBOs are vital to networks offering services to the homeless and supporting asylum seekers and undocumented migrants and refugees.

Almost all FBO involvement in networks starts on a practical level; it stems from individual contacts and relates to a common context: certain issues and projects, a shared working philosophy, or area-based concerns. Cooperation with other FBOs and NGOs is often informal and practical. In many cases regular (secular) and religiously inspired organisations cooperate. An important conclusion is that FBOs do not have a preference for cooperation with other FBOs (of the same domination). Of course this has partly to do with the main reason to link with others: serving your target group, clients or members/supporters the best you can. Rendering them the information they need to improve their situation and those of their children, is most of the time realised by linking their own limited services with more specialised or regular services.

Many networks operate both on a practical and a managerial level, but especially faith-based communities and small projects either prefer not or are not capable (because of a lack of resources and time available) to cooperate at the policy level. Influential policy oriented networks with a strong FBO presence are, for example, the Platform social security in Tilburg and the networks in the homelessness sectors in the other two cities. In the fields of integration and fostering social cohesion the national and local inter-religious councils and platforms should be mentioned, as well as small scale neighbourhood dialogue projects.

9.5 FBO – government relations

In general, Dutch national and local governments have always welcomed alternatives for statutory services or the possible added value to statutory services offered by FBOs. At the national level, long lasting financial relations between FBOs and the state and the habit of automatic prolongation of these relations belong to the past. The national government still supports actions promoting volunteering through intermediary organisations like FBOs and improving the implementation of policy measures (anti-poverty and anti-debt projects, projects against human trafficking, domestic violence, improving civic integration) aiming at hard-to-reach groups. Most frequently, however, the government does so on the basis of short-term projects or contracting-out policies. Overall, not only the nature of the relations between government and nation wide FBOs has changed, also the amount of money involved has decreased since the 1990s, although exact information is difficult to come by in terms of figures (Davelaar et al., 2009, Davelaar and Smits van Waesberge, 2010).

At the local level welfare provision through general services is the rule. The total amount of public funding to FBOs seems to have remained remarkable stable since the 1990s. Contact between
religious communities and municipalities, however, has clearly increased over the last 5 to 10 years. The forms of cooperation show an increasing variety. The reasons to cooperate are divers, too. In the first place, from a government's perspective, FBOs are thought of as working efficiently and effectively. FBOs are seen as simply doing the job, just like any other NGO that is ‘hired’ to help reach policy goals. This pragmatic approach also raises criticism. Representatives of religious communities complain of being simply addressed as entrances for government agencies or NGOs to get in touch with communities. There is the perception that there is no real interest in establishing long-term relations or engaging themselves in equal partnerships. FBOs understand the support of government for service delivery and other public goals as predominantly pragmatic. Another area of debate is that government prefers partners that primarily adhere to and implement governmental objectives. Orthodox and evangelical organisations, but also radical progressive FBOs, find it more difficult to be accepted as partners in governance networks. Throughout the report several local discussions on these issues were described. In addition, examples from Amsterdam indicate the danger of public tendering in social policies for the position of FBOs. When tendering gives organisations a monopoly on the provision of certain public services, the faith-identity of FBOs will be more contested than when these services are provided by different secular and faith-based organisations.

Other FBOs and policy makers do emphasize the contribution of religious inspired communities and organisations to widely accepted goals like empowering people, building bridges between informal and regular services, enhancing volunteering and participation, fighting poverty, re-establishing trusting relations between marginalised people and society and developing small-scale, contiguous networks. In addition, policy makers recognise the contribution of FBOs to community building and in promoting inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue and social cohesion. Many FBOs are satisfied with the recognition by the local and national authorities of their role in society.

Yet, FBOs want to shape their own course. For almost all communities and organisations, being able to give a voice to the problems and concerns of their members or clients is crucial. For that reason they keep some distance towards the government. Even though FBOs do welcome support from the (local) state, they are aware that policies can change quickly in the relative unstable political situation in the Netherlands since 2002.

### 9.6 Added value

FBOs are thought of bringing an ‘added value’ compared to governmental agencies and in some cases secular NGOs. Discussions on ‘added-value’ concentrate on a few things. In the first place, they are centred around alternative approaches to support and care that seek to attend to the holistic person - encompassing physical, emotional, social and spiritual dimensions. Adjusting to the pace of the beneficiaries, listening to them, simply ‘being present’ (Baart 2001), looking under the surface, trying to get to the ‘question behind the question’, building up trust, are also common concepts. Only in established Dutch FBOs are these discussions explicitly held. But many of these concepts seemed also at work in many Islamic organisations and migrant churches, although often limited and in some cases distorted by other approaches. Many of these discussions are also currently held in broader circles of social work, care and community building. The issues are also present in a national campaign of the government, the municipalities and the social sector, titled ‘welzijn versterkt’ (welfare and social work reinforced). In the second place, emphasis is put on the contribution of religious groups to existing networks in neighbourhoods, or on the way they help to establish new connections in neighbourhoods where old ties have vanished and structures crumbled.
down. The work of the Neighbourhood Pastorate contributed to new insights on these challenges, just as the practices in many ordinary parishes and mosques do. In the third place, the added value was also identified in terms of monetary value, because, “for every Euro the government spends on a public funded FBO, the FBO brings in an additional Euro through private funds and the use of volunteers”, as some organisations in Rotterdam claim.

9.7 FBOs and the welfare system

From a comparative perspective, the following characteristics, related to the welfare state, come to the fore: Firstly, other than the past of pillarisation might assume, most churches, mosques and independent service providers engaged in social action do not have close ties to socio-political families anymore. This has profound consequences: there is no strong defender of the interests of the organisations and organisations are relatively powerless, with a few exceptions to the rule. The other side of the coin is that this makes the debate on the role of FBOs in the social system relatively ‘power-free’. The same goes for the broader Dutch NGO sector in general. A good track record, sufficient past performances, positive contributions to the efficacy of networks and personal links are essential for the possibility to claim success. Secondly, there is no dominance of any single FBO in any domain at the local level. At the national level there are large shares for religious affiliated organisations in the homeless services (Salvation Army with a share in homelessness services of about a quarter) and support to ex-convicts, but the ‘market’ is divided among different FBOs. Unlike the situation in countries like Germany, Belgium and Spain, there is only one big professional service providing organisation at the national level in the Netherlands (Welfare and Health Services Salvation Army).

9.8 Retrenchment hypothesis

One of the hypotheses underlying this European research project states that globalisation, neoliberal reforms and the retreat of the welfare state open spaces for NGOs in general and FBOs in particular to engage in economic, social and political actions with vulnerable, excluded and marginalized citizens. This hypothesis rests on the assumptions that 1). The role of government (spending) has decreased and/or that services have been increasingly privatised and 2). that the number/scope of faith-groups operating in the social field, has increased. There is no conclusive evidence from the Dutch case for the thesis that FBOs have filled the gap of a retrenching welfare state. First, government spending has not decreased in those fields in which FBOs in the bigger cities have traditionally played an important role (over the last decades or even longer) such as with respect to services for the homeless, drug addicts, ex-convicts). Although local public authorities were responsible for formulating policies and distributing budgets, the services on the ground have been designed and delivered entirely through non-profit organisations, including FBOs. Over the last couple of years, the main agent of change behind the Dutch homelessness policies and services has been the national action Plan for Social Relief (2006-2013). Introduction of this plan led to an increase in the budgets available for local authorities and service providers with hundreds of millions a year.

Secondly, national and local governments have partly taken up financial responsibility for many projects set up by churches and diaconal bodies in the last decades (on issues such as homelessness, ‘hidden poverty’, loneliness among the elderly, and the situation of undocumented people). In this way, rather than filling the gap, FBOs seem to have played an important role in putting new urban
social problems on the political agenda. Examples of FBO activities that were ‘adopted’ include:
direct participation of poor or disabled people in consultative bodies, support for Food Banks, public-
private cooperation in financial emergency funds, incorporation of churches and mosques in
attempts to increase the affectivity of anti-poverty policies (like increasing the use of special social
assistance budgets) and the establishment of small funds for groups or individuals for which public
authorities can not or only partly take care (such as uninsured people, undocumented migrants,
etc.).

Viewed from other angles, the picture is different. One could argue that the government had, due to
stricter regulations, left these groups to NGOs especially FBOs. Many national FBOs have argued that
the rise of Food Banks and the necessity of financial emergency funds, has been caused due to e.g.,
insufficient levels of social assistance and incomplete pensions for the elderly (migrants), and have
been campaigning for better public services in the prevention of debts, long term unemployment, et
etera. In the field of migration, the pressure has been put more and more onto individuals, and as a
consequence, their families and (religious) communities. They are responsible and have to pay for ef-
forts that will eventually lead to a successful integration of themselves in the Netherlands.
In comparison to previous decades, the central state and the municipalities do contract out more
services. There is evidence that this has increased opportunities for some FBOs to become market
leaders in niche areas, whereas for others it caused a decrease in activity, simply because they lost
more or less structural subsidies.

At the same time, the Social Support Act (2007) - which has decentralized the responsibility of social
and care policies to the local level and emphasis individual responsibility - has been criticised for
being a retrenchment measure. On the short term, the Social Support Acts seems to have opened up
opportunities for funding for some FBOs, as the government has a renewed interest in volunteering
and informal support and was willing to stimulate new initiatives with financial incentives. In 2010,
however, in the aftermath of the economic crisis and thus public budget crises, policies have
changed. National and local governments have made clear that self supportiveness of citizens and
the organising capacity of groups and communities must in many domains (further) replace the
activities of public services. In addition, public subsidies will be limited to situations where needs
are extraordinary and private initiatives do not develop. Gaps will fall. It is too early, though, to
conclude who will step in to fill these gaps. Moreover, as municipalities now have the responsibility
for social policy, local solutions to reduce these gaps might be different.

When assessing the second assumption, an increased presence and impact of FBOs operating in the
social field, we also have to conclude that it is impossible to report an increased presence of FBOs,
in general. Compared to the high-days of pillarisation, the share of FBOs in welfare provision at the
national level has certainly decreased. On the local level the picture is less clear. General - secular -
services are the rule, but they have been so for many years. While FBOs used to be closely related
to the different denominations and catered for the needs of their own vulnerable groups, nowadays
most FBOs that act as professional service providers are specialized in service delivery to specific
excluded groups and do not discriminate clients on the basis of faith. These FBOs have grown in
importance, partly because they filled gaps in (local) welfare regimes, but partly also because they
have simply been successful in attracting government funding (due to an increased demand, profes-
sionalization, their good past performance, their image and/or their ability to win in competition
with other organisations).
That is not to say that FBOs do not fill any gaps in the Dutch welfare state. As we have shown above, various (small-scale) FBOs focus on groups that are not included within the welfare system. In reaction to processes of professionalization, specialisation and fragmentation in regular services, FBOs also function as intermediaries, filling the gap between those in need of assistance and professional service providers and between the limited care given by these services and the need for long term, unconditioned (pastoral) support.

9.9 Future

How do FBOs appraise future developments (chances and risks)? In the future, most of the organisations would like to expand their social activities to some extent. Several organisations say that they would like to cooperate with other faith-oriented or neutral organisations with similar aims. Most of the interviewees say that more can be achieved through cooperation. A few organisations are looking for chances to become subsidised, because other sources of income, such as contributions from members and Catholic orders, is diminishing. Other threats are a short supply of volunteers due to ageing, secularisation and individualisation which has left its mark in all denominations. Having many young members does not always help, as they must often combine their voluntary work with their jobs and busy family lives. Finally, in all cities it is feared that the municipality will show less interest due to the present economical crisis.

All figures indicate that in the short run the number of unemployed will increase and the purchasing power of citizens living on a minimum income level, will decrease. While there is much work to be done for groups and organisations focused on supporting social excluded people, it is not realistic to expect that the presently active FBOs in the Netherlands are going to develop new activities on a large scale. This observation has several reasons: (1) They do not have the people or the financial means to do so; (2) it does not suit the small-scale and often personal manner in which they prefer to work; (3) in general the amount of public subsidies available will be reduced, due to the economical crisis; (4) obtaining a higher share of public funding in one’s budget requires adaptation to more strict requirements (although some governments are undertaking efforts to reduce the bureaucratic load); and (5) support to general services is the rule, and will be even more dominant in the near future, so it seems: subsidies to religious organisations, even if they are strictly used to reach public goals are increasingly the subject of public debate. In the short run, this will deter (perhaps even scare off) some FBOs and make policy makers more reluctant to subsidise projects initiated by FBOs. In the long run, this debate may increase opportunity prospects to obtain public funding once organisations and policy makers become more familiar with the new rules and preconditions for financing FBOs. The public debate might also contribute to more knowledge and awareness of the many functions that FBOs fulfil in society.
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**Documents of the municipalities:**

**Amsterdam**


Rotterdam


**Tilburg**


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www.newsong.net/
www.ljgbrabant.nl/
www.pkn-tilburg.nl/
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www.Süleymaniye.nl/nl.htm

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www.johanniterorde.nl
Appendix 1 Interviews conducted with representatives of national Faith-based Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation name (English / Dutch)</th>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National bureau DISK (Church Service in Industrial Society)</td>
<td>Mr. Hub Crijns</td>
<td>Director of DISK (and treasurer of 'The poor side of the Netherlands/ Working group Economy, Women and Poverty')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting landelijk bureau DISK (Dienst in de Industriële samenleving vanwege de kerken)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Network of Local Initiatives for Asylum Seekers (INLIA)/ Internationaal Netwerk van lokale Initiatieven ten behoeve van Asielzoekers (INLIA)</td>
<td>Mr. John van Tilborg</td>
<td>Director of INLIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togetherness Church in the Netherlands, Association for Migrant Churches (SKIN) Samen Kerk in Nederland, vereniging van migrantenkerken (SKIN)</td>
<td>Mrs. June Beckx</td>
<td>Coordinator and secretary of the board of SKIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church in Action, the missionary and diocesan work at home and abroad of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands Kerk in Actie, het missionaire en diaconale werk in binnen- en buitenland van de Protestantse Kerk in Nederland</td>
<td>Mr. Evert Jan Hazeleger</td>
<td>Head of domestic diocesan work of Church in Action (program manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army Welfare and Healthcare Foundation Stichting Leger des Welzijns- en Gezondheidszorg</td>
<td>Mr. Jeroen Hoogteijling</td>
<td>Issue manager, national office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help in Practice Foundation (HIP) Stichting Hulp in de Praktijk (HIP)</td>
<td>Mrs. Joke Haaijer / Mr. Rikko Voorberg</td>
<td>Office Manager / Relation manager (region Amsterdam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Görüş North-Netherlands (MG-NN) Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland (MG-NN)</td>
<td>Mr. Yusuf Altuntas</td>
<td>Vice-president of the board of MG-NN (and vice-president of the Contact Body Muslims and Government - CMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Alliance (EA) Evangelische Alliantie (EA)</td>
<td>Mr. Wim Althuis</td>
<td>Coordinator Prayer and Diaconate of the EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation Foundation (TICF) Stichting Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie (TICF)</td>
<td>Mr. Ayhan Tonca</td>
<td>Vice-president of the board of TICF (and member of the board of the Contact Body Muslims and Government - CMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Islamic Federation (NIF) Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF)</td>
<td>Mr. Rasit Bal</td>
<td>Member of the board of NIF (and member of the board of the Contact Body Muslims and Government - CMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation name (English / Dutch)</td>
<td>Name of interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Centre the Netherlands Foundation (SICN) Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland (SICN)</td>
<td>Mr. Mutlu Ercelik</td>
<td>Spokesman of SICN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Institute for Social Activation (IHSAN) Islamitisch Instituut voor Maatschappelijk Activeringswerk (IHSAN)</td>
<td>Mr. Hasan Yar</td>
<td>Director of IHSAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Social Work (JMW) Joods Maatschappelijk werk (JMW)</td>
<td>Mr. André Agsteribbe</td>
<td>Secretary to the board of JMW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Islamic Mission Netherlands (SWIM) World Islamic Mission (SWIM)</td>
<td>Mr. Nasr Joemman</td>
<td>Secretary of SWIM (and member of the board of the Contact Body Muslims and Government – CMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Foundation Stichting Present</td>
<td>Mrs. Riek de Haan</td>
<td>Policy-advocate of Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaconal Alliance of Catholics in the Netherlands/ Actioma, institute for activation, innovation and research</td>
<td>Mrs. Lieke Steinmeijer</td>
<td>Director of Actioma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (UMMON) Unie van Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties in Nederland (UMMON)</td>
<td>Mr. Driss el Boujoufi</td>
<td>Member of the board of UMMON (and president of the Contact Body Muslims and Government - CMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Organisation Milli Görüş North-Netherlands Vrouwenorganisatie Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland</td>
<td>Mrs. Canan Uyar</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincentius Association in the Netherlands Nederlandse Vincentius Vereniging</td>
<td>Mr. Harry Dirkx</td>
<td>Treasurer Vincentius Association, president of the Vincentius organisation for recreation and holidays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation HAK-Der, Alevis Federatie van Alevitische en Bektashitische sociaal-culturele verenigingen in Nederland • HAK-Der Contact Group Islam Contactgroep Islam (CGI)</td>
<td>Mr. Muharrem Cengiz</td>
<td>Vice-president of Hak-der, president of CGI.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2 Interviews conducted with representatives of local Faith-based organisations

### Amsterdam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation name</th>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>The social role of the organisation in one sentence</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elthetochurch</td>
<td>Ruben Altena</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>The Elthetochurch is a protestant parish church with diaconal activities aimed at empowering people and contribute to social cohesion in the neighbourhood.</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World House/ Het Wereldhuis</td>
<td>Issa Thomas/ Cor Ofman</td>
<td>Volunteer / Pastor</td>
<td>This organisation, related to the Protestant Diaconate, provides a place and assistance to undocumented people in Amsterdam.</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Diaconate Amsterdam/ Protestantse Diaconie Amsterdam</td>
<td>Arend Driessen/ Paul van Oosten</td>
<td>Diaconal counselor/General secretary</td>
<td>The Protestant Diaconate is the agency for social welfare of the Protestant Church in Amsterdam.</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical-Lutheran Diaconate</td>
<td>Hanne Wilzing</td>
<td>General secretary</td>
<td>The Evangelical-Lutheran community consists of a voluntary organisation of some 50 deacons and diaconal volunteers, a diaconal bureau that supports volunteers and is involved in various projects, and some former diaconal institutions.</td>
<td>Protestant, Evangelical-Lutheran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army, Goodwill Centre Amsterdam/ Leger des Heils, Goodwillcentra Amsterdam</td>
<td>Koos Koelewijn</td>
<td>Policy-maker</td>
<td>A professional organisation supporting vulnerable women, men and children needing support in life, housing and participating in society.</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainbow Foundation/ Stichting De Regenboog</td>
<td>Marit Postma Janneke van Loo</td>
<td>Manager informal care / manager social relief / policy advisor</td>
<td>The organisation supports people with social and psychiatric problems, the homeless, and drug addicts. Professionals and volunteers work in walk-in centres and buddy projects.</td>
<td>Christian, interchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Aid and Resources Foundation (CARF) and The House of Fellowship</td>
<td>Tom Marfo</td>
<td>Reverend The House of Fellowship, executive director of CARF</td>
<td>This organisation helps illegal, mostly African women wanting to leave forced prostitution and bring people and (political) institutions together to fight against sex slave trade.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Song in Amsterdam South East</td>
<td>A. Nahr</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>New Song is a Christian community whose main social activities are for people of Antillean descent aiming at personal counseling, integration and education.</td>
<td>Evangelical Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation name</td>
<td>Name of interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>The social role of the organisation in one sentence</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Computerbrain Foundation</td>
<td>E. Botchey</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>Computerbrain wants to help the (immigrant) youth and adults in the Netherlands and Africa with computer skills and homework.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Explosion Foundation</td>
<td>R. Ofori</td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>Youth Explosion is founded in 2007 in connection with the project 'Sing 4 life'.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEHU Foundation</td>
<td>B. Castillion</td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>Jehu provides shelter and support to youth between 15 and 23 years old who have no home or can not go home.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is hope for tomorrow/ Stichting Er is hoop voor morgen</td>
<td>R. Macnac</td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>The main activity of the foundation is the distribution of food to homeless and poor people. Also youth activities.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Brotherhood South East / Evangelische Broeder Gemeente ZO</td>
<td>C.W. Lindner</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>The EBG is a Protestant Church in the tradition of the Hrnhhutters. The main Church of people of Surinamese origin in Surinam and the Netherlands. The church in South East became independent in 1996 and has over 1200 members.</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exodus Amsterdam</td>
<td>Frank Stam</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Exodus Amsterdam provides supported housing for ex-convicts to contribute to successful integration in society.</td>
<td>Christian, Interchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Open Door / Stichting De Open Deur</td>
<td>Cor Ofman</td>
<td>Pastor (works also part time for The World House)</td>
<td>Ecumenical church centre for people with questions on faith, offers pastoral, psychosocial and practical support.</td>
<td>Ecumenical (Catholic and Protestant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Church House/ Het Kerkhuis</td>
<td>Erika Feenstra</td>
<td>Advisor migrant-churches</td>
<td>The Church House supports diaconal work of churches in Amsterdam South-East and generates contacts between established and migrant churches in Amsterdam.</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Churches Amsterdam/ Raad van Kerken Amsterdam</td>
<td>Ruud Huysmans</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>The council is a platform of various Christian churches in Amsterdam, addressing social issues in its meeting and occasionally supporting local campaigns</td>
<td>Christian, Ecumenical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mall De Baarsjes (independent organisation part of Youth for Christ)</td>
<td>Roel Boogaard</td>
<td>Regional manager</td>
<td>The Mall De Baarsjes is an independent foundation, part of Youth for Christ NL, organising youth welfare work in the Baarsjes district in Amsterdam.</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Oudezijds 100 and the Kruispost Foundation</td>
<td>Luc Tanja</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Ecumenical Christian living community for (ex)homeless people and foundation for medical care provided to people without insurance.</td>
<td>Ecumenical (Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deacon Amsterdam/ Dekanaat Amsterdam</td>
<td>Bernadette van Amerongen/Tom van Meigarden</td>
<td>Diocesan worker/Former council member</td>
<td>This body of the diocese of Haarlem aims at care and support for needy individuals and groups in society and contributes to social justice.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam Catholic Worker movement / Jeanette Noëlhuis</td>
<td>Frans Zoer</td>
<td>Member of the council of advice</td>
<td>The Jeanette Noëlhuis is a living-community providing (temporary) housing for refugees excluded from Asylum Seeker Centres.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation name</td>
<td>Name of interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>The social role of the organisation in one sentence</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Nicolas Church/ Sint Nicolaaskerk</td>
<td>Eugène Brussee</td>
<td>Deacon</td>
<td>The St. Nicolas church aims to provide aid to both members of the church and people in need in the inner city. The parish has a diaconal centre in the inner city, The Open Door.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Parish of the Blessed Trinity</td>
<td>Thomas Murrey</td>
<td>Deacon</td>
<td>An English-speaking Catholic community with the objective to develop an inclusive community.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Saints’ Church and Africa House</td>
<td>Edward Muge/ Gerard Timmermans</td>
<td>Deacon (2006-2009)/Director Africahouse</td>
<td>All Saints’ Church and Africa house are English-speaking African Catholic communities, assisting African migrants.</td>
<td>(African) Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish San Nicolás and Casa Migrante</td>
<td>Toos Beentjes/Jeroen Hoekstra</td>
<td>Pastor/Coordinator</td>
<td>The Parish San Nicolás is the Spanish speaking migrant community in Amsterdam. The Casa Migrante foundation is a walk-in centre for Spanish speaking people.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecost Revival Church International</td>
<td>Emmanuel Koney</td>
<td>Reverend and chairman of Pentecostal Council of Churches</td>
<td>The Pentecost Revival Church is a missionary church, focusing upon community building and empowering its members.</td>
<td>Pentecostal/Charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aya Sofia mosque</td>
<td>Adam Köse</td>
<td>Board member</td>
<td>In its social work, Aya Sofia Mosque is focusing upon integration, emancipation and participation of its members.</td>
<td>Islamic/Turkish (Milli Görüş movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatih mosque</td>
<td>Mehmet Yamali</td>
<td>Chairman of the youth organisation</td>
<td>A mosque passing through faith and culture and stimulating integration, bringing Muslims and non-Muslims together.</td>
<td>Islamic/Turkish (Diyanet movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Moroccan Mosques North Holland / Al Kabir Moskee en gelieerde organisaties</td>
<td>Mohammed Echarrouit/Roemer van Oortt/Tjino Venema/Rabab Moulain</td>
<td>Chairman/Advisor/Employee/Involved in campaigns against the discrimination of veiled women in the labour market.</td>
<td>Umbrella organisation of 18 Moroccan mosques. The boards of associated mosques meet once a month to share expertise, discuss problems and new initiatives.</td>
<td>Islamic/Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam &amp; surroundings/Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Amsterdam &amp; Omstreken (UMMAO)</td>
<td>Khalil Aitblal</td>
<td>Spokesman</td>
<td>UMMAO is an umbrella organisation of Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam and surroundings. It acts as advice organ toward its member mosques and periodically the councils of these mosques meet with UMMAO to discuss internal and external issues.</td>
<td>Islamic/Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for Life convictions and Religions Amsterdam/ Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam (RLRA)</td>
<td>Jan Ruijter/Ank Veenstra</td>
<td>Chairman/Chairwomen of the women group</td>
<td>RLRA organises exchanges between people of different faiths, inter-religious meetings and ceremonies and aims to develop social projects together as well.</td>
<td>Inter-religious, including non-religious (humanist) groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Moses House/ Het Mozeshuis</td>
<td>Jan Ruijter/Cor Bon</td>
<td>Former director/Director</td>
<td>The Moses House is an independent centre for adult education and society building.</td>
<td>Founded as secular organisation now subscribes to the diversity of religions and life convictions.</td>
</tr>
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* In Dutch only when useful for a correct understanding.
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<tr>
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<th>The social role of the organisation in one sentence</th>
<th>Background</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church and Social Work/ Stichting voor Kerkelijk Sociale Arbeid (KSA)</td>
<td>Hanny de Kruif</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>This ecumenical organisation for social activation work by churches is empowering volunteers, supporting the voluntary sector and running its own social projects.</td>
<td>Christian, representing the Reformed, Remonstrant and Mennonite (Doopsgezinde) Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Hope</td>
<td>Elisabeth Hubach</td>
<td>Founder of House of Hope Rotterdam and coordinator</td>
<td>House of Hope is a Christian organisation that offers practical help to people who need this and contributes to participation of the people in neighbourhoods in Rotterdam Charlois.</td>
<td>Christian, Reformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Foundation Rotterdam/ Stichting Ontmoeting Rotterdam</td>
<td>Martin van der Elst</td>
<td>Regional manager South-West</td>
<td>Meeting Rotterdam offers, out of Christian love of one’s fellow man, professional help to the homeless, based on the needs and possibilities of the client.</td>
<td>Christian, Reformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army Rotterdam, Social Centre/ Leger des Heils Rotterdam, maatschappelijk centrum</td>
<td>Rob Pons</td>
<td>Care manager and senior staff member</td>
<td>The Social Centre Rotterdam and environs of the Salvation Army organises activities for the homeless and all other people at the margins of society.</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diocesan centre Paulus church/ Pauluskerk</td>
<td>Dick Couvé and Hans Visser</td>
<td>Minister since 2008/ reverend from 1979 until 2008</td>
<td>The diocesan centre Pauluskerk is a ‘shelter’ for marginalised people in society, a centre for action and protest to establish a more just society and a place for reflection.</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots International Church</td>
<td>Robert Calvert</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>The Scots International Church looks especially after the interests of the English speakers in the Netherlands who are interested in the Christian Faith.</td>
<td>Protestant Church in the Presbyterian tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Outreach</td>
<td>Jerry Mendezoon</td>
<td>Founder and minister</td>
<td>Victory Outreach Rotterdam is a Christian church and is part of the international network of Victory Outreach. A special part of VO is formed by the Victory Homes: Christian rehabilitation homes, where people with addiction- or other problems live under supervision.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glorious Chapel International</td>
<td>Ola Asubiaro</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>The Glorious Chapel International and the linked ‘Purpose Foundation’ offer help to people in need by providing food and clothes, organizing activities (especially for the youth) and by referring people to regular organisations.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Innercity Project/ Het Innercity Project (TIP)</td>
<td>Sjaak Roos</td>
<td>Founder of the project</td>
<td>The Innercity project is a Christian project, operating from centre De Brug, reaching out to people in Rotterdam-West (including the homeless) with ‘company and compassion’.</td>
<td>Christian, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Family International</td>
<td>Nana Opoku</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>Christian Family International is a Pentecostal church, a church that helps society through spiritual help, like prayers, preaching the gospel and counselling, but also physical help to the people in need, examples are providing money for shelter or food.</td>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hope International Baptist Church</td>
<td>Richmond Ofori-Tawiah</td>
<td>Pastor of the church in Rotterdam, and coordinator of Baptist churches in the Netherlands and Belgium</td>
<td>The Hope International Baptist Church is a small community with members from all over the world. The church wants to reach out to the members and the people in the neighbourhood and form a bridge between them and the Dutch society.</td>
<td>Christian, Baptist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Pastoral Care Bloemhof/ Wijkpastoraat Bloemhof</td>
<td>Fokje Wierdsma</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>The neighbourhood pastoral care organisation Bloemhof is a form of being church in the neighbourhood, which provides pastoral and diaconal attention and support for the citizens of the neighbourhood.</td>
<td>Christian, ecumenical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Pastoral Care Middelland-Zuid/ Wijkpastoraat Middelland-Zuid</td>
<td>Herman IJzer</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>The neighbourhood pastoral care organisation Middelland-South is a form of being church in the neighbourhood, which provides pastoral and diaconal attention and support for the citizens of the neighbourhood.</td>
<td>Christian, ecumenical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mara Foundation / Stichting Mara</td>
<td>Lieke Steinmeijer</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Mara is an organisation for social activation work in the province of Zuid-Holland, promoting volunteering and running projects</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish speaking religious community La Sagrada Familia/ Spaansprekende parochie: La Sagrada Familia</td>
<td>Viki Alberdi</td>
<td>President pastoral council</td>
<td>La Sagrada Familia is a special religious community, a home for Spanish speaking people in Rotterdam and far environs.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese speaking/ Cape Verdean community Nossa Senhora da Paz/ Portugeessprekende/ Kaapverdianse parochie: Nossa senhora da Paz</td>
<td>Bernardo den Boer and Fatima Almeida</td>
<td>Pastor/ community assistant</td>
<td>The Portuguese/Cape Verdean religious community supports the Portuguese speaking migrants in Rotterdam and environs, with the objective to improve the living conditions and integration of this group.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform Islamic Organisations Rijnmond/ Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond (SPIOR)</td>
<td>Ibrahim Spalburg</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>SPIOR is an umbrella organisation of Islamic organisations in Rotterdam and around, representing those organisations and engaging in educational and awareness raising projects.</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation for Renewal and Participation Rotterdam/ Stichting voor Vernieuwing en Participatie Rotterdam</td>
<td>Mimoun Kasmi</td>
<td>Active member, and board member of Islamic platform SPIOR</td>
<td>The organisation for Renewal and Participation organises social and educational activities, mainly in Rotterdam Feijenoord.</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aya Sofia Foundation in Rotterdam Delfshaven</td>
<td>Yusuf Duran</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Based on an Islamic worldview, Aya Sofia wants to improve the participation and social integration of the Turkish community.</td>
<td>Islamic/Turkish (Milli Görüş movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation name (English/Dutch)</td>
<td>Name of interviewee</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocatepe mosque / H.D.V Kocatepe Camii</td>
<td>Ilhan Tasci</td>
<td>Member of the board</td>
<td>Kocatepe is a mosque society which organises besides religious activities also social activities, like information meetings, and recreational activities, based in Rotterdam Feijenoord.</td>
<td>Islamic/Turkish (Diyanet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abou RakRak Foundation / Stichting Abou Rakrak</td>
<td>Abdelhafid</td>
<td>General manager</td>
<td>Abou RakRak is a self-organisation that wants to improve the education, emancipation and participation of (especially Moroccan) children and adults in Rotterdam Delfshaven.</td>
<td>Moroccan / Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cultural association Ettaouhid / Sociaal-culturele vereniging Ettaouhid</td>
<td>A. Abdeslam</td>
<td>Co-initiator and volunteer/advisor</td>
<td>Ettaouhid is a Moroccan Islamic association providing social and cultural activities to children, women and adults in Rotterdam Delfshaven.</td>
<td>Islamic/Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam Council for Life conviction and Religion / Rotterdamse Raad voor Levensbeschouwing en Religie (Roravolere)</td>
<td>Co Elshout</td>
<td>Member, secretary</td>
<td>Roravolere is a council which encourages meetings and cooperation between different religious groups in Rotterdam.</td>
<td>Inter-religious, including, humanist organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tilburg**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation name (English/Dutch)</th>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>The social role of the organisation in one sentence</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Church Tilburg and environs / Protestantse Municipality of Tilburg</td>
<td>Dick Penninkhof</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Members of the Protestant Church are engaged in diaconal work, including visits to members in need and financial support to local organisations and projects (poverty, refugees), inter religious dialogue.</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity Chapel</td>
<td>Ramon Chumman</td>
<td>Leading member, initiator Tilburg Food Bank</td>
<td>Trinity Chapel provides spiritual care, counseling, and refers to general services like social work or family coaches. Mr. Chumman and his wife started a Food Bank, now a large facility, supported by the municipality.</td>
<td>Evangelic Christi-anity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean community New Song Tilburg / Antil-laanse Municipality of New Song Tilburg</td>
<td>Edsel Conradus</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
<td>New Song is an evangelical Christian community whose main social activities are aimed at people of Antillean descent aiming at personal counseling, integration and education.</td>
<td>Evangelic Christi-anity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionary Service centre Tilburg/ Missionair Servicecentrum Tilburg (MST)</td>
<td>Bic Driessen</td>
<td>Staff member</td>
<td>The main social activities of MST centre around the three pillars ‘hospitality, informal learning, participation and support’.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spark Foundation / Stichting de Vonk</td>
<td>Marja Wittenbols</td>
<td>Staff member</td>
<td>The Spark is an organisation for Catholic social activation work, active in anti-poverty networks and campaigns and neighbourhood projects.</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation name</td>
<td>Name of interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>The social role of the organisation in one sentence</td>
<td>Background</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Jewish Community/ Liberaal Joodse Gemeente</td>
<td>Marlien Groeneveld</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>The Liberal Jewish Congregation is an organisation who primarily performs as a synagogue, but also aims at getting the Jewish community to the outside, enabling and keeping alive the Jewish life and also working on social cohesion.</td>
<td>Judaism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan association Masjid El Feth/ Marokkaanse vereniging Masjid El Feth</td>
<td>Abdelkader Barkane</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Masjid El-Feth is a Moroccan Islamic association (mosque) which seeks to develop new social activities.</td>
<td>Islamic/Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleymaniye mosque / Islamitische Stichting Nederland Süleymaniye Moskee Tilburg</td>
<td>Burhanettin Yilmaz</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>The Süleymaniye mosque organises activities in the field of education, arts and culture, meeting, participation and healthcare and improves the accessibility of services for members of the Turkish community.</td>
<td>Islamic/Turkish (Diyanet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Round Table House/ Het Ronde Tafelhuis</td>
<td>Thea Blitterswijk</td>
<td>Program manager</td>
<td>The Round Table House is an inter-religious community centre, and its main social activity is creating encounters between different cultural and religious groups.</td>
<td>Inter/religious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 List of interviewed policymakers

Rotterdam
- Rabiaa Bouhalhoul, department of Youth, Education and Society
- Fred Burggraaf, city district Delfshaven
- Marcel Castelijns, department of Social Affairs and Work
- Jolanda van Cooten, department of Social Affairs and Work
- Joke Dekker, city district IJsselmonde
- Aad van Diemen, department of Social Affairs and Work
- TaMara Domenici, department of Social Affairs and Work
- Fred Hoeksema, city district Feijenoord
- Maarten Rensen, department of Youth, Education and Society
- Rian Smit, department of Social Affairs and Work
- Willem Tuinman, policy advisor, municipality of Rotterdam

Tilburg
- Moniek IJzermans, staff member Integration
- Jacques Lemmen, staff member Diversity
- Lex Schoonen, program manager Care and Welfare
- Karin Smeets, program manager Poverty policy

Amsterdam
- Joris Rijbroek, Office Platform Amsterdam Together
- Marijke Vos, alderman Amsterdam (2006-2010)

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43 Interviews with policymakers were not included in the European FACIT research design. Related to differences in the set-up of the local research activities in the Netherlands and due to changes in the research team of the University of Groningen, interviews with public sector representatives in Amsterdam were limited to two persons.
This cahier is a result of the research project ‘Faith-based organisations and social exclusion in European cities’ (FACIT). The consortium exists of eight academe partners in seven countries. This publication is part of a series of cahiers per country, produced by the FACIT-consortium. The series contain the following volumes:

Cahier 1: Faith-based Organisations and social exclusion in Belgium
Cahier 2: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in Germany
Cahier 3: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in the Netherlands
Cahier 4: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in Spain
Cahier 5: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in Sweden
Cahier 6: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in Turkey
Cahier 7: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in the United Kingdom
Cahier 8: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in beland and in Denmark
Cahier 9: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in Greece, in France and in Portugal
Cahier 10: Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in Austria, in Poland and in Hungary

The partners of the FACIT-consortium are:

Belgium: University of Antwerp (coördinator): Jan Vranken, Danielle Dierckx, Wendy Kerstens
Germany: University of Köln: Jurgen Friedrichs, Jennifer Klöckner
The Netherlands: Verwey-Jonker Institute: Maarten Davelaar, Hugo Swinnen, Jessica van den Toorn
University of Groningen: Justin Beaumont, Dynke de Witte
Spain: CIREM: AndrésWalliser
Sweden: University of Örebro: Ingemar Elander, Charlotte Fridolfsson
Turkey: METU, Ankara: Mustafa Sen
United Kingdom: University of Exeter: Paul Cloke, Andrew Williams, Samuel Thomas

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